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Major Professor: Shelly Rambo, Professor of Theology 
 
ABSTRACT 
Scholars attuned to the mystical content in Cormac McCarthy’s novels focus 
primarily on what potential religious conclusions might be drawn from them. This 
dissertation argues that McCarthy’s prose, approached as stylized performances of 
linguistic failure, performs something quite different than what the scholarly assessments 
claim. Rather than mining McCarthy’s novels for indirect forms of religious affirmation, 
this project proposes a distinctive approach to McCarthy’s work: a narrative apophatic 
mysticism. Attention to the non-assertive character of apophasis or “un-saying” reveals 
that McCarthy’s philosophical and religious allusions perform their own collapse. In the 
tradition of apophatic mysticism, the novels represent an ordered failure of representation 
that indicates toward transcendence without rendering it explicitly. The result is the 
fictional production of indicative signs that keep assertions and information in suspense 
while gesturing toward the ineffable.  
Adapting interpretive approaches from Michael Sells and Charles Peirce, this 
dissertation approaches McCarthy’s novels by means of five rhetorical categories based 
on mystical traditions represented by Pseudo-Dionysius, Hadewijch, Meister Eckhart, 
Jacob Boehme, as well as work by Elaine Scarry and Bernard McGinn. These interpretive 
rhetorical categories are 1) the broken references of names; 2) the logic of ontological 
grounds; 3) the collapse of conceptual space; 4) potential infinite capacity of bodily pain; 
and finally, 5) the explicit argumentative tension within the novels generated by the other 
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four categories. Through the repetitive use of apophatic themes over several texts, 
McCarthy’s novels simultaneously erode assertions about the nature of fate, justice, and 
being, indicating that the final truth of these important concepts is not reduceable to 
linguistic expression or artifice. By adapting apophatic literary techniques of religious 
and philosophical traditions referenced in his texts, McCarthy incubates within fiction an 
ancient mode of rhetoric meant to orient the reader toward ineffable truths, offering 
narrative apophasis as a form of imaginative spiritual exercise.   
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Introduction: Mystical Rhetoric 
In Cormac McCarthy’s 1979 novel Suttree, the drunk title character narrates a 
vision of nightlife in Knoxville, Tennessee in the 1950s: 
[t]he stars go rolling down the void like marbles. These simmering sinners with 
their cloaks smoking carry the Logos from the tabernacle and bear it through the 
streets while the absolute prebarbaric mathematick of the western world howls 
them down and shrouds their ragged biblical forms in oblivion (S 457). 
 
The simile in the first sentence is fitting enough. “Simmering sinners” sounds aptly 
slurred. Yet then the sentence begins to unravel a series of theological and world-
historical imagery until the spool is empty and both the sentence and image ends in 
“oblivion.” Sinners parade the Logos out of the tabernacle while some other order engulfs 
them. The novel leaves the significance of the imagery ambiguous and ironic because the 
observer is only barely conscious, insisting—in the manner of some drunks—that it is all 
very “biblical.” This passage is an instance of a common sub-genre in McCarthy’s prose, 
which are frequently described as mystical or “biblical” in tone.1 Both in their content and 
form, the novels frequently reference religious subject matter, though just as frequently 
they undermine the credibility of that religious imagery by embedding it in delusion, 
dream, and intoxication. But what to make of this ambivalence?  
The claim of this dissertation is that McCarthy uses religious form and content to 
signal an “apophatic” form of mysticism operative in the texts. This mysticism, I argue, 
                                               
1 Biblical scholar and translator Robert Alter, has even written extensively on McCarthy’s 
indebtedness to the King James Bible. See Robert Alter, Pen of Iron: American Prose 
and the King James Bible, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2010). David 
Foster Wallace also commented on the similarity, as Lucas Thompson notes in “‘Books 
Are Made out of Books,’” The Cormac McCarthy Journal 13, no. 1 (2015): 5.  
   
 
2 
borrows from a long tradition of religious and philosophical techniques for speaking 
about transcendent objects toward which, in principle, language cannot directly refer. 
Since the existence of this variety of mysticism in individual novels has been perceived 
by others, the task of this project is to both expand detection of apophatic techniques and 
themes active in across McCarthy’s corpus and demonstrate how they work. This is 
distinct from some other styles of analyzing religion’s relation to literature. I take the 
religious elements of McCarthy’s case is not as content to be decoded but a method of 
thought, reflection, even action. Again, our concern with the religious aspect of 
McCarthy’s texts is not “what” it says but “how” it functions. My main contention is that 
through repetition across texts, McCarthy—consciously or unconsciously—refines a 
serious of apophatic rhetorical techniques, resulting in a distinctive form of narrative 
mysticism.  
 In my general claim that mystical content exists in McCarthy’s novels, I am not 
alone. Given the regularity of religiously evocative prose in McCarthy’s novels, it is 
unsurprising that critical intimations of mysticism are fairly commonplace in McCarthy 
scholarship. For example, Edwin Arnold claims outright that McCarthy is a “mystical 
writer” or a “spiritual writer who venerates life.”2 McCarthy’s engagement of the 
“mystery of existence” or of the world is articulated by Brewton and Giles.3 Over this 
                                               
2 Arnold, Edwin T., “Cormac McCarthy and the Sacred: A Reading of The Crossing” in 
Cormac McCarthy: New Directions, ed. James D. Lilley (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2002), 216. 
3 On John Grady’s romantic quest to overcome nihilism, see Vince Brewton, “The 
Changing Landscape of Violence in Cormac McCarthy's Early Novels and the Border 
Trilogy,” The Southern Literary Journal 37, No. 1, (Fall 2014) 141; James Giles, The 
Spaces of Violence (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 46. 
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same world-mystery, Stephen Fry asserts that McCarthy’s narrator’s “preside,” and that 
they depict “a mystical union in the very physicality of the land” that they depict.4 John 
Rothfork emphasizes the linguistic aspect of mysticism, arguing that McCarthy’s use of 
the ineffable occurs in moments experienced by the characters, rather than as  “an absent 
or enigmatic image.”5 The methods of negative theology and apophatic mysticism in 
Suttree and Outer Dark has also been also examined by Jay Aaron Beavers and 
Christopher Metress, as will be examined below, while Susan Tyburski briefly compares 
the McCarthy’s discourse with Christian mystical writing.6 Matthew Potts examines 
McCarthy’s frequent evocation of the sacramental mysteries.7 Petra Mundik’s recent 
book-length study deftly outlines evidence for a metaphysical vision in McCarthy’s texts.8 
Most recently, Ty Hawkins finds an entire systematic philosophical scheme hiding within 
the same novels, noting relevantly for this dissertation that McCarthy leaves traces of an 
                                               
4 See Steven Frye, “Yeats' ‘Sailing to Byzantium’ and McCarthy's ‘No Country for Old 
Men’: Art and Artifice in the New Novel” The Cormac McCarthy Journal 5, no. 1 
(Spring 2005), 18; and Steven Fry, “Wilderness Typology, American Scripture, and the 
Interpreter’s Eye,” in Cormac McCarthy: Uncharted Territories/Territoires Inconnus, ed. 
Christine Chollier (Reims: Presses universitaires de Reims, 2003), 121.  
5 John Rothfork “McCarthy as Pragmatist,” Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 
47, no. 2, (2006), 210. 
6 See Jay Aaron Beavers, “‘Stairwell to Nowhere’: The Darkness of God in Cormac 
McCarthy’s Suttree.” South Atlantic Review 80, no. 1–2 (January 2015);  Christopher 
Metress, “‘Via Negativa’: The Way of Unknowing in Cormac McCarthy’s Outer Dark,” 
Review of Outer Dark by Cormac McCarthy, The Southern Review 37, no. 1 (Winter 
2001): 147-154; and Susan J. Tyburski, "The Lingering Scent of Divinity" in The Sunset 
Limited and The Road," The Cormac McCarthy Journal 6, Special Issue: The Road 
(Autumn 2008), 123.  
7 Matthew L. Potts, Cormac McCarthy and the Signs of Sacrament: Literature, Theology, 
and the Moral of Stories (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). 
8 Petra Mundik, A Bloody and Barbarous God: The Metaphysics of Cormac McCarthy 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2016). 
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“absent referent” in the place of a displaced Platonic Good.9  In many of these cases, the 
appeal to mysticism is either left vague or examined merely in terms of a single 
theological tradition or by appeal to simple negation.10  
On the other hand, others who focus on religious and moral themes in McCarthy 
have actually moved in opposing directions, particularly in their interpretation of violence 
and evil in the novels. Hillier, for instance, warns readers from “mysticizing” the great 
moral villains in McCarthy. Likewise, Matthew Potts, emphasizing McCarthy’s 
sacramental references, stresses the mortality and finitude of the novel’s malevolent 
characters, reducing, for example, the preternaturally strong and omnipresent Judge 
Holden as a narcissist and the creepily prescient Anton Chigurh to his “insane” 
philosophy.11 James Dorson likewise devotes an entire essay, “Demystifying the Judge,” 
to deflate of these characters’ supposed superhuman qualities.12  
This being said, Allen Josephs has said that “sometimes you think you have case 
with McCarthy when you really don’t.”13 To whom this applies specifically, he does not 
                                               
9 Ty Hawkins, Cormac McCarthy’s Philosophy (New York, NY: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2017), 6. 
10 The former seems true of Beavers (2015) who make comparisons in terms of Christian 
theologian Karl Barth, or Rick Wallach, who discusses Blood Meridian’s judge in terms 
of South Asian Siva divinities, see Rick Wallach’s “Judge Holden, Blood Meridian’s Evil 
Archon,” in Cormac McCarthy, Harold Bloom , ed., (New York, NY: Chelsea House 
Publication, 2009). 
11  Russell M Hillier, Morality in Cormac McCarthy’s Fiction: Souls at Hazard (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 198; Potts, Signs of Sacrament, 39, 50. 
12 James Dorson. “Demystifying the Judge: Law and Mythical Violence in Cormac 
McCarthy’s Blood Meridian.” Journal of Modern Literature 36, no. 2 (Winter 2013): 
105–21. 
13 Allen Josephs, “The Quest for God in The Road” (lecture, IHMC hosted the inaugural 
talk in a new University of West Florida, October 9, 2013) accessed February 27, 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdjczfZ82WA. 
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say. There are many false clues in McCarthy’s texts and many voices tempting 
interpreters down explanatory garden paths. These include narrators that bury simple 
similes in long, metaphysical meanderings and villains who ostensibly defeat the novels’ 
protagonists in moral arguments. In light of those cases, what is each novel ‘saying’? In 
other words, even though there are clearly allusions to theology and mysticism in 
McCarthy’s books, does their mere presence assert something mystical? If so, how and 
when would such a reading apply? 
I argue with other critics that apophatic mysticism exists within McCarthy’s 
novels and make an argument for how it does so given the method’s negative mode. In so 
doing, I will address some limitations in the many recent insightful projects on 
McCarthy’s mystical inclination. A more elaborative account of apophatic mysticism 
within McCarthy’s novels is both possible and warranted by a consistent thread of 
rhetoric in McCarthy’s novels. While I do not argue that in this thread consists the whole 
of each text, it is a consistent weft throughout. McCarthy stitches together allusions to 
long traditions of mystical speculation but does not univocally assert one. Rather, the 
allusions raise the questions on the frontiers of religious reference while underscoring 
their final inadequacy.  
 My proposed analysis draws from the performative analysis of Christian and 
Islamic mysticisms by Michael Sells. Sells claims that the performed instantiation of 
linguistic and logical failure is the goal of apophatic mysticism. Put in terms of semiotics, 
as I do throughout this project, apophatic failure produces an indicative (index) sign of 
transcendence while failing to represent (icon) the transcendent itself. While Sells’ 
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“unsaying” may be stated bluntly (e.g. the divine cannot be named), it can also be 
aesthetically and spiritually intensified by adding more material for use in the failure (e.g. 
the divine has no name, including “the divine”). I argue that the rhetoric of McCarthy’s 
texts forges indexes for an otherwise ineffable transcendence. It does so without the 
explicit support of privileged knowledge or revelatory texts—as might be the case in 
some forms of Gnosticism or revealed religious traditions. They do this, I argue, precisely 
by emphasizing where its own language strains to engage the limit-themes that frame this 
project’s chapters.   
 But why do a set of contemporary American novels warrant further investigation 
through ancient theological methods rather than through, those for example, the sort of 
intense limit-experiences more recently articulated by Bataille or Foucault?14 These would 
be more relevant to the famously violent and potentially nihilistic edges of McCarthy’s 
ostensibly secular fiction. The brief answer to this is that, apart from the shared concern 
with violence, I do not find them to fit the less ostentatious content of McCarthy’s texts. 
For while imagery of pornographic violence does make appearances in McCarthy’s 
novels, such content is somewhat ancillary to the rhetoric on discursive and conceptual 
limits. While violence or the threat of violence textures most of McCarthy’s prose, the 
narrators and characters also make use of explicit and customary questions about God, 
identity, fate, justice, knowledge, and the limits language. 
                                               
14 Even Foucault was not so existentially ascetic that he would adopt Baitaille’s version of 
limit experience outright. See Hans Sluga “Foucault’s Encounter with Heidegger and 
Nietzsche” in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, Gutting, Gary, ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 24. 
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 Another simple clue to guide the investigation toward these older materials and 
traditions is McCarthy’s use of them, especially the works of Jacob Boehme. Arnold, 
Ellis, and very recently Mundik and Crews (to name just a few) have successfully 
ventured into the vast and disorienting worlds of the 17th century writer.15 While their work 
has uncovered additional evidence of Boehme’s presence in the novel, I take his presence 
as a cue to venture more deeply into the theological tradition of mysticism that informed 
Boehme, especially the formal and thematic emphases Boehme absorbs from other 
German mystics like Nicholas of Cusa and Meister Eckhart, as well as the Neoplatonism 
of local Kabbalistic and alchemical traditions.16 
 The method of investigation I propose follows Sells’ method of isolating 
apophatic themes across traditions and texts and demonstrating their operative features. I 
do so on the much smaller scale of internal repetitions and patterns in McCarthy’s novels. 
In my analysis, the plot and dialogue are aspects of the rhetoric, but not dominant points 
of analysis to the expense of narrative style. My goal here is to walk a line between 
disciplinary tendencies. For example, the inquiry might launch to parse the texts for 
either a coded argument or message, to reveal more or less conscious ideological traces, 
to pick out a figure or theme for comparison, or to situate the author’s work within a 
larger relevant field. Methods in religious studies, theology, and literary studies are more 
                                               
15 See Jay Ellis, No Place for Home: Spatial Constraint and Character Flight in the 
Novels of Cormac McCarthy (New York: Routledge, 2006), 287. Also Crews, Michael 
Lynn. Books Are Made out of Books: A Guide to Cormac McCarthy’s Literary Influences 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017) 162. 
16 See Andrew Weeks, Boehme: An Intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-Century 
Philosopher and Mystic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).   
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or less comfortable with one or more of these tendencies and all have engaged 
McCarthy’s novels with rich success. The argument of this project will demonstrate that 
the rhetoric of McCarthy’s novels has 1) plausible continuity with a form of negative 
spiritual rhetoric employed across religious traditions; 2) that the end-product of this 
rhetoric is not represented by literary signs but performed through the representation of 
collapsing forms of discourse. A third, but I think open-ended suggestion of this 
dissertation is that McCarthy’s novels activate a literary form with potential religious or 
existential significance. That is not to say that the significance is Christian, Neoplatonist, 
Gnostic, or that McCarthy recommends one of these confessional options to the exclusion 
of others.17 Rather, McCarthy’s use of the apophatic initiates an inquiry without a 
predetermined end in which traditions are fuel for a destructive performance that, 
perhaps, produces as much light as heat.  
Approaches to Mysticism and Apophasis 
This project’s orientation to mystical texts has specific methodological and 
literary presuppositions that situate it within debates in mystical studies. Prior to 
examining a set of contemporary novels through the categories and techniques of 
religious mysticism, this project selects a specific route to and through mystical texts that 
focuses on specific styles of European Christian mysticism especially. Nelstrop, Magill 
and Onishi’s taxonomy of theoretical approaches to Christian mysticism offers a coherent 
                                               
17 See Dianne Luce, Reading the World: Cormac McCarthy’s Tennessee Period 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2009), viii.  
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means of differentiating my approach from other theoretical approaches to mysticism.18 
Nelstrop, Magill, Onishi classify the dominant academic schools of thought regarding 
mysticism into four sometimes overlapping categories: perennialist, contextualist, 
feminist, and performative language approaches. These variously overlapping categories 
invoke the approaches of figures like William James, Steven Katz, Caroline Walker 
Bynum, and Michael Sells respectively.19  
The four approaches vary in their ambition and scope ranging from a Jamesean 
emphasis on the ineffable or unifying experiences of individuals to Katz’s strong 
emphasis on a specific tradition’s formation of mystical texts and his strong rejection of 
the possibility of pre- or non-discursive experience.20 Feminist approaches have tended to 
                                               
18 Louise Nelstrop, Kevin J. Magill, and Bradley B. Onishi, Christian Mysticism: An 
Introduction to Contemporary Theoretical Approaches (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. 
Ltd, 2009). 
19 See Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of 
Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); William 
James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. Edited by 
Martin E. Marty (New York, N.Y: Penguin Books, 1982).  
20 There is further debate between those who doubt whether ineffability is a coherent 
concept. For the latter see Timothy D Knepper, Negating Negation: Against the 
Apophatic Abandonment of the Dionysian Corpus (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014); Katz, 
“Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism” In Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. 
Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). For those for whom it is 
central, see for example Denys Turner, The Darkness of God Negativity in Christian 
Mysticism (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995; and John Hick, 
“Ineffability,” Religious Studies 36, no. 1 (March 2000): 35–46). This disagreement 
centers on the question of whether it is possible to “experience” something ineffable if 
experience is something constituted by mental or social structures like language. It seems 
reasonable to imagine the infinite as extending beyond the capacity of specific languages 
even as we invent new techniques of annotating what lies beyond their finite reach. The 
question is whether or not we have anything to say, which is where the concept of 
experience might bridge the gap between what is sensible and what is sayable: on James’ 
account, we are able to experience that of which we cannot speak.  Similarly to Kant’s 
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focus on particular cases and historical trends rather than on comprehensive theories of 
mysticism as such. The status of imagery, the body, affect, and reception of women’s 
writing—particularly in the late-medieval period—have been primary foci of this school. 
Of the four, the performative language readings of Sells and Turner are the most limited 
in scope, working across a narrow band of texts from the Christian and Islamic mystical 
traditions. These readings analyze how some texts use language to enact linguistic failure 
as a rhetorical approximation of the divine ineffability they affirm. 21  
  This project depends most on the last approach. While the performative language 
approach is not burdened either by perennialist homogeneous experiences or a 
contextualist theory of mind that precludes them, the literary focus can suffer from a lack 
of historical context. It tends not to register accounts of actual intense experiences or 
visions—even those reported by the writers it examines. It is also noteworthy that the 
performative approach also lacks an immediate capacity for the ethical and political 
                                               
circumscription of reason, the question is, I think, about the reach of the category of 
experience rather than a theological or metaphysical debate.  
21 While each of these approaches offer evaluation of and sensitivity to certain textual 
features, they are sometimes at odds with each other. For example, the contextualist 
school’s emphasis on the formative and foundational role of tradition in mystical texts 
registers more detail and distinction than other forms of analysis that focus on ineffable 
experiences—possibly a result of William James (1902), Evelyn Underhill (1920), and 
Aldus Huxley’s  influence on the field for a considerable portion of the 20th century. 
Likewise, the perennialist school’s attention to experience meets with some hostility from 
some members of the performative camp for whom extraordinary experience is a major 
distraction from the work of some apophatic texts. While there may be merit in exploring 
Denys Turner’s claim that the category of experience is a wholly modern imposition that 
leads to a misreading of Christian spirituality, the performative language approach (and 
this project) will leave aside larger claims about the experiences of individual mystics 
(Turner, Darkness, 2-8).  
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critique. Such absence of a political and ethical traction corresponds with a moral 
ambiguity embedded in the novels. McCarthy’s texts are both historically local and lack 
reports of actual experiences, so interpretive approaches that emphasize rigorous 
analyses of those categories will not find much data. By concentrating on the unfolding 
of linguistic acts—especially its negative movements—Sells’ approach avoids 
predetermining either the morality of a text’s content or the metaphysical backdrop of 
extraordinary experiences.  
Other literary readings of mystical texts are germane to this project but are not 
identical with its approach. For example, some theoretical approaches that share similar 
objectives to my own are Stanley Fish’s analysis of self-consuming artifacts and 
Derrida’s différance. My approach is like Fish’s in that the texts I analyze perform tasks 
of meaning that alter the reader at the expense of their own “success.” Fish writes that, 
“[a] self-consuming artifact signifies most successfully when it fails, when it points away 
from itself to something its forms cannot capture.”22 For Fish, the uncapturable “it” is 
moral in content, it is an action or state of the soul, not an image or even a named event. 
This variety of ‘failure’ features consistently in McCarthy’s novels and I argue that 
McCarthy’s texts qualify for a similarly “mystical” designation. Fish’s texts self-consume 
in that their immediate success is undermined by their second-order indexical value, 
pointing their reader to a higher good than they can describe or manifest in language. 
McCarthy’s novels, however, have a broader target, if a more vague one. While Fish’s 
                                               
22 Stanley Eugene Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century 
Literature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 4. 
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reading priorities are moral rather than metaphysical, the explicitly Platonic and 
Augustinian structure of self-consumption is useful to the performative approach I 
employ in this project and is comfortably adapts to a more theologically relevant framing.  
 Derrida’s apophatic tack similarly explores and exploits self-destructive openings 
in the semiotic structures of text. While a more contemporary theoretical approach, I have 
found Derrida’s method less helpful for this project because it relies on a semiotic model 
that tends to downplay the reader’s role in literary performance. Although reading with 
an eye toward semiotic ‘différance’ makes texts and meaning less cooperative to certain 
political or metaphysical meaning-goals, the actual operation of the device tends to 
neglect the necessary and messy involvement of unpredictable readers. Moreover, 
Derrida’s metaphysical interpretation of his own semiotics is too ascetic to support the 
actual apophatic traditions discussed here. For Derrida, negative or apophatic theologians 
like Dionysius, 
are always concerned with disengaging a hyper-essentiality beyond the finite 
categories of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastening to 
recall that God is refused the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge 
his superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being.23  
 
Derrida’s own writing performs a species of apophatic “paring down” of metaphysical 
concepts, but the final result is shaped by what, specifically, is unsaid. Thus, with only 
différance with which to imagine their world, it seems likely that Pseudo-Dionysius, 
Hadewijch, Eckhart, and Boehme would not have written what and how they did. The 
                                               
23 Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, Trans., University 
of Chicago Press, 1982, 6. See also, “Sauf la nom” in On the Name, ed., Thomas Dutoit, 
trans., David Wood, John Leavey, Jr. P, and Ian McLeod (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1995). 
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shape of their texts depends on all manner of tradition, revelation, imagery, narrative, 
speculations, and guesses about what it is they cannot say, regardless of their final 
veracity. Derrida’s corpus is well-read as one unique contour of a western apophatic 
tradition among the above-mentioned authors rather than a lens through which to read 
them, their Neoplatonist forerunners, or their modern siblings.  
That said, Derrida’s use of Christian mysticism’s negative tradition also supports 
the adoption of apophatic literature and techniques for social and ideological ‘unsayings.’ 
Examples of this can be found in William Franke’s Philosophy of the Unsayable and 
Catherine Keller’s Cloud of the Impossible.24 These projects find in apophasis and 
negative theology resources for dismantling unhealthy or violent social structures 
sustained by claims to transcendent truth articulable by dominating forms of power. For 
these thinkers, mysticism offers an opportunity to free ourselves of morally and 
intellectually corrosive discourse by an apophatic clearing of falsehoods or ideological 
idols. While these are fruitful projects, it should be noted (as both briefly do) that 
apophasis as such is not intrinsically conducive to criticism. Negative theology can as 
easily buffer socially operative concepts and traditions from empirical shortcomings.25 
When linked to a revealed authority or text, for example, traditions of ineffability are 
effective insulators against historical or genetic criticisms that might undermine special 
                                               
24 See William Franke, A Philosophy of the Unsayable (Notre Dame, Indiana: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2014); Catherine Keller, Cloud of the Impossible: Negative 
Theology and Planetary Entanglement (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
25 See, for instance, Erich Przywara’s Analogia Entis (2014), in which he argues that the 
doctrine of the analogy of being is, at root, a form of apophasis. Part of the genius of the 
doctrine is that it functions to insulate theological concepts from empirical or logical 
criticism while preserving their relevance to a transcendent referent.  
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claims. From another ethical direction, undirected apophasis might also undermine the 
ethical principles that hold a moral line against sheer power. It is, for these reasons, a 
morally neutral instrument. Likewise, McCarthy’s texts can sometimes support a critical 
negative rhetoric, but they are generally too ambiguous to be relied upon to do univocal 
political or moral work.26 It is prudent to keep in view the moral risks and potential costs 
of wielding a two-sided instrument like “unsaying.” 
Finally, it is important to distinguish apophasis as a rhetorical form and negative 
theology. The negative theology that guides an apophatic rhetoric is not without some 
measure of metaphysical speculation—either explicit or implicit.27 The suspicion of 
metaphysical guarantees is one reason why Derrida is skeptical about whether his anti-
metaphysical form of discourse could be negative theology at all. If aspects of 
“unknowing” rhetoric qualify as a forms of apophasis, they do so by constraining 
pretensions to knowledge about how the world or God works. In other words, such 
rhetoric stops itself from saying rather than un-saying. Negative theology and apophatic 
forms do not always coincide, but negative theology sometimes guides the deployment of 
the apophatic form. For instance, a rhetorical maneuver like apophasis does not 
necessarily entail that a text has in its background a thoroughly imagined theological 
world shaped by a revelatory text. Yet it might. The rhetoric draws attention to certain 
                                               
26 That said, Russell Hillier’s recent analysis of morality within the texts is one of the most 
convincing books on McCarthy to date. See Hillier, Souls at Hazard, 2017.   
27 This seems somewhat true of Amy Hollywood, too, when she warns against 
straightforwardly honorific embodiment readings of female mysticism. See Amy M. 
Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 6.  
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aspects of the world as it is or might be imagined. It is this effect of the rhetoric that gives 
the textual form of an “absent referent” a determinate shape in its performance. The form 
and effect of its execution, not its unspeakable referent, is the reason why the just or 
wrathful “nothings” respectively of Eckhart or Boehme are not interchangeable with the 
form of the soul’s “annihilation” of Porete or with the negations of attributes in 
Dionysius, for instance. The religious and philosophical pressures on each text determine 
why their referent transcends language, which in turn limits or opens their rhetorical 
options when addressing it.  
Apophasis in the Novel Form 
 Along the lines of Fish’s work, several examples of kindred literary analysis aid 
my exploration of the philosophical and theological contours of McCarthy’s rhetoric.  
These have been carried out by Peter Hawkins (Dante), Hope Howell Hodgkins (Graham 
Greene), Stephen Skinner (Joseph Conrad), and Joseph Abbott (apophasis in literature 
generally). A brief description of these studies—all of which understand the religious and 
literary significance of its material to be inextricable fused—adds further literary context 
to the apophatic analysis of this dissertation. 
 Peter Hawkins takes up Fish’s self-consuming dialectical model explicitly in his 
reading of the ineffable and silence in Dante’s Paradiso. He notes that “the language of 
Paradiso is busy with its own elimination, with the conversion of speech into silence.”28 
Hawkins argues that Dante’s poem demands that the reader imagine increasingly 
                                               
28 Peter S. Hawkins, Dante’s Testaments: Essays in Scriptural Imagination (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 223.  
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complex heavenly objects. It then “negates” those images by proposing a truer and 
unimaginable objects beyond them. The ultimate failure of the descriptive performance, 
according to Hawkins, serves to “enlarge our notion of what cannot be imagined.”29 By 
generating increasingly complex imagery for Heaven’s upper spheres, Dante does not 
represent the transcendent object, but rather intensifies or amplifies the immensity of the 
failing imagination itself, expanding the scope of possible failure by example. The 
theological assumption behind this analysis is that failures of greater scales and degrees 
function as better icons and indices for God than would-be successes.  
  Hope Howell Hodgkins locates another distinctively Roman Catholic apophasis 
in several of Graham Greene’s novels, specifically in the “paradox, aphasia, 
inconclusiveness, irony” of his prose style as well as in his “trademark world-denying 
seediness.”30 For Greene, the deliberate distancing of referent from the language of the 
novel serves a discernable theological purpose. Hodgkin’s argues that each of Greene’s 
prose elements isolates a concept that eventually terminates in God, manifest as 
transcendent and mysterious Christian Charity. The geometry of Greene’s cosmos is 
Dantean in that vices and the lesser virtues contain the inherent structure of the higher 
virtues, however distorted. The moral virtues represent the proper shape of a higher 
reality that pulls characters into its orbit with unseen force. Howell Hodgkins argues that, 
for Greene, both avarice and the erotic begin in crime or transgression but reach their 
                                               
29 Ibid.   
30 Hope Howell Hodgkins, “The Apophatic Heart: Graham Greene’s Negative Rhetoric,” 
Renascence 59, no. 1 (2006): 54. 
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natural termination in the unfathomable charity of God—outcomes surprising to Greene’s 
characters and possibly also to the readers he guides to that end.  
 Stephen Skinner notes a similar prose trajectory in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, if 
not similar themes. Conrad struggles against the inadequacy of language to address or 
reference a perceived truth, so prose narrative is a method of gesturing at such truth 
indirectly. It is an instrument, writes Skinner, of “deferral, isolation and, crucially, 
obscurity,” used as a wedge to open and temporarily sustain uncertainty and strangeness. 31 
Skinner argues that the culmination of Conrad’s “textual auto-erosion” should result in an 
ambiguous affect rather than a specific meaning.32 Following an approbative assessment 
of apophasis’ moral potential, Skinner writes that, “[i]t is the obscurity that enrobes the 
text that is the seedbed of radical development, rather than the text itself.”33 By this 
reading, Heart of Darkness is not only a form of political criticism, it should, according 
to Skinner’s reading, also produce an equivalent cognitive or spiritual effects in its 
reader. 
H. Porter Abbott’s analyses of apophasis in novels (particularly his readings of 
Toni Morrison and Henry James) focuses on the rhetoric and style used to convey 
mystery. Abbott argues that because the human brain is hardwired to construct coherent 
narratives, rhetorical roadblocks and poetic detours in narrative have a cognitive function, 
namely, the approximation of mystery in the course of normal experience. Abbott argues 
                                               
31 Stephen Skinner, “Obscurity, Apophasis, and the Critical Imagination: The Unsayable 
in Heart of Darkness,” Conradiana 42, no. 1–2 (2010): 94. 
32 Ibid., 103. 
33 Ibid., 104.  
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that the literary task of holding together disparate worlds in one narrative space is “an 
experience that replicates our best understanding of inexpressible states we experience in 
the actual world of our lives,” but notes that this “becomes exponentially harder to 
achieve as a narrative gets longer and more detailed.”34 In other words, in proportion to 
the degree an imagined literary world becomes determinate, its capacity to hold together 
and sustain disparate and failing meanings drops off. However, when successful, 
apophatic rhetoric slows or interrupts the reader, producing what Abbott calls the 
“palpable unknown,” heightening the cognitive experience of unknowing in order to 
engage it.35 Abbott’s recognition of the cognitive effect of apophatic rhetoric is similar to 
the performative approach outlined below. He represents a wing of apophatic discourse 
that detects transcendence in a lower stylistic register because, for the authors in question, 
language itself collapses more rapidly than medieval Christian theologians supposed. 
Abbott and the writers he engages have doubts about any language’s capacity to 
adequately represent not only what transcends sensed reality but significant swaths of our 
mundane experience as well. Nevertheless, Abbott detects in literary apophasis an 
aesthetic and cognitive workaround to those limitations not altogether distinct from those 
deployed by strains of European, North-African, and Middle-Eastern mysticism.  
I raise these examples not merely to buttress the feasibility of the current 
argument but also to adopt their broad discoveries moving forward. Hawkins’ enlarging 
unimaginable, Hodgkin’s unspeakable but value-laden reality, Skinner’s internalized 
                                               
34 H. Porter Abbott, Real Mysteries: Narrative and the Unknowable (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 2013), 102. My emphasis. 
35 Ibid., 3.  
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strangeness, and Abbot’s palpable unknown—are fragments of literary wisdom that can 
be fruitfully applied alongside to Sells’ approach to mystical texts. They are possible 
practical and even spiritually significant outcomes to narratives that are aware of and 
strain against their own limits.  
Similarly to the narratives examined above, McCarthy’s prose behaves peculiarly 
in that it is preoccupied by what exceeds language, yet it does not commit to a set of 
symbols and narratives to guide its progress toward a specific end—as Dante’s 
theological vision, for example, does. This lack of explicit commitment could be 
interpreted as yielding to vapidity, nihilism or, as James Wood puts it in his review of No 
Country for Old Men, mere “metaphysical cheapness.”36 However, like the literary 
performances described by Hawkins, Hodgkins, Skinner, and Abbot, McCarthy’s novels 
attempt to engage transcendence from the language-side of the divide, cobbling together 
scraps of traditions in an attempt to reconstruct a sign of transcendence without the 
benefit of revelation or an explicit metaphysics to guide its shape. The result, to mangle 
insights by Hawkins and Abbot, is a palpably enlarged sense of what is not imaginable.  
Approaches to McCarthy’s Mysticism 
 
Several McCarthy scholars have engaged the significance of metaphysics in his 
novels. These writers have explored such clues as the passing allusions to God in specific 
novels to more detailed analyses of Jacob Boehme, whose presence is explicit in Blood 
Meridian’s epigraph and subtitle.37 A wide variety of philosophical assertions and schools 
                                               
36 James Wood, “Red Planet” The New Yorker, July 25, 2005.  
37 To name only a few, see Arnold, Sacred, 2002; Ellis, No Place for Home, 2006; 
Donoghue, Denis, “Reading Blood Meridian,” in The Sewnee Review 105, no. 3 (Summer 
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have been attributed either to individual novels or to McCarthy himself. For example, in 
theme and dialogue, the novels have a tendency to dwell on the roles of the will, fate, and 
freedom. All of this has alerted secondary commentators to potential religious and 
philosophical speculation occurring within McCarthy’s prose.38 Some find a thread of 
ideological consistency in McCarthy and declare him committed to it. For example, it is 
possible that Boehme and McCarthy share a worldview or that in McCarthy’s worlds 
Boehme’s cosmos is an imaginary metaphysical reality.39 As Crews puts it, albeit with a 
                                               
1997): 401–18; Mundik, Bloody and Barbarous God, 2016; Hillier, Morality, 2017; Todd 
Edmondson, Priest, Prophet, Pilgrim: Types and Distortions of Spiritual Vocation in the 
Fiction of Wendell Berry and Cormac McCarthy (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2014); Julian 
Murphet, “The Cave and The Road: Styles of Forgotten Dreams,” in Styles of Extinction: 
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, Julian Murphet, Julian, and Mark Steven, eds. (London ; 
New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012).  
38 Descriptors as varied as “apocalyptic,” Stacey Peebles, “On Being Between: 
Apocalypse, Adaptation, McCarthy” European Journal of American Studies 12, no. 3 
(November 27, 2017); 
 2017) “dualistic,” “Gravers False and True,” 2001; “Gnostic,” Mundik, Bloody and 
Barbarous God, 2016 and Luce, Reading the World, 2010; “deterministic,” Ty Hawkins, 
“The Eruption of the Sordid: Cormac McCarthy’s Resistance to Modern Ideology.” 
Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 55, no. 4 (August 8, 2014): 437–51 and 
Robert Kottage “Mysteries of the Meridian Revealed: McCarthy's Anachronistic Tarot” 
in Cormac McCarthy’s Violent Destinies: The Poetics of Determinism and Fatalism, eds. 
Brad Bannon and John Vanderheide (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 
2017); nihilistic with “no first principles, no foundational truth, Heraclitus without 
Logos,” Bell, Achievement, 151; “Calvinistic,” Kirk Essary, “‘We Languish in 
Obscurity’: The Silence of God as Atavistic Calvinism in Cormac McCarthy’s Fiction.” 
Soundings 97, no. 3 (2014): 265–96; “sacramental” Potts, Signs of Sacrament, 2015; 
broadly religious, Arnold, “Sacred” 2001 and Edmondson, Priest, Prophet, Pilgrim, 
2014; post-secularly religious, Amy Hungerford, Postmodern Belief: American Literature 
and Religion since 1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); “apocryphal,” 
Manuel Broncano, Religion in Cormac Mccarthy’s Fiction (New York: Routledge, 
2016); and finally those who understand the novels to engage in underdetermined 
heteroglossy (Metress, “Via Negativa,” 2001; and finally those who find no single, 
integrated conclusion (Jarrett, Cormac McCarthy, 1997). 
39 This raises the interpretive question of whether or not fictions are “worlds.” It may be 
that certain genres of “realist” fiction presuppose a connection with the non-fictive 
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touch of irony: “So says Jacob Boehme. So says Cormac McCarthy.”40 The unstated 
supposition of such readings is that they tacitly agree with Sartre’s claim that “’a fictional 
technique always relates back to the novelist’s metaphysics.’”41 There is something in the 
preoccupation, style, and diction of the narration and characters that suggests a 
philosophical or religious origin.  
 Some secondary writers have come to the conclusion that McCarthy’s prose is 
proposing something explicitly mystical.42 Jay Aaron Beavers’ rich study of Suttree 
selects Karl Barth as an apophatic response to metaphysical speculation. Like many who 
detect mystical or deconstructive tendencies in McCarthy, Beavers’ essay focuses 
                                               
including a shared physics, cosmology, etc. Such imaginative logics do not always play a 
relevant interpretive role, but the analysis of them is not interpretively inert in a fictional 
frame in which the rules are broken. The straightforwardly Gnostic interpretation put 
forward by Leo Daugherty, for instance, reads McCarthy as imagining a world in which 
the imagined cosmos of Gnosticism obtains. See “Gravers False and True: Blood 
Meridian as Gnostic Tragedy” in Perspectives on Cormac McCarthy, Arnold, Edwin T., 
and Dianne C. Luce, eds. (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1999). 
40 Crews, Books, 162.  
41 Lucas Thompson. “Reverse Engineering Cormac McCarthy’s Sentences.” The Cormac 
McCarthy Journal 15, no. 1 (2017): 94. 
42 Edwin Arnold’s suggestion of McCarthy’s mysticism is more general and thus disposed 
to remain relatively unexplained and under explained. The aim, for Arnold, is not the 
satisfaction of knowing some aspect of the transcendent, but rather awe at it: “For it is not 
that he says there is no mystery. Quite the opposite. The mystery McCarthy propounds is 
that we are blind to the mystery that is the very stuff of our existence.”42 The Border 
Trilogy is, for Arnold, the culmination of the mystery of being. The existential 
engagement with that mystery on the part of the characters and, by proxy, the reader, is 
the goal. See Edwin Arnold’s “Naming, Knowing and Nothingness: McCarthy’s Moral 
Parables” in Perspectives on Cormac McCarthy, eds. Edwin Arnold and Dianne C. Luce, 
(Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1999), 66. Likewise, Susan Tyburski’s 
essay on The Road and Sunset Limited likewise cites Pseudo-Dionysius and Cloud of 
Unknowing stating that they “argued that God could only be encountered by stripping 
away the physical and mental trappings of this world, and immersing oneself in 
darkness42” Like the “divine gloom” in Dionysius, which “Leaves us to ponder the basis 
of our faith.” See Tyburski, “Divinity,” 123.  
   
 
22 
primarily on strict negation of divine presence within the text, which indicates the 
incomprehensibility of divine revelation to the characters within Suttree. The eruptions of 
transcendent within the world of the text, Beavers argues, occurs for the characters rather 
than for the reader. They are “indicated by absence.”43 Beavers’ suggests that Suttree’s 
limited perception is indicated by the failure of eyes within the narrative and the murky 
suppressions of the Tennessee River such that, “an absence or lack […] operates as a 
point of revelation.”44 At first, the negation seems thorough in the extreme: “An act of 
witness or revelation about this God will necessarily appear as a void, or as Barth puts it, 
‘a crater formed by the explosion of a shell.’”45 Yet the rhetoric used by both Barth and 
Beavers is not wholly negative. It belies an imagined shape of the transcendent object 
that steers the negation: “[McCarthy] also gestures towards the hope that this failure may 
itself be the means by which a transcendent God reveals himself.”46 The male, Christian 
form of transcendence may be a familiar shorthand for a transcendence in-principle, but it 
also suggests that it may contain intelligible specifics that are scaled to human 
understanding. In that sense, there is much in Beaver’s analysis of McCarthy that 
survives the shell and still remains visible within the crater.  
Christopher Metress’ essay on Outer Dark articulates a basic premise of this 
dissertation, namely, that an apophatic method is present in McCarthy’s novels. Metress 
also reads the would-be nihilism that Vereen Bell saw in Outer Dark as a version of the 
                                               
43 Beavers, “Darkness,” 98. 
44 Ibid., 101. 
45 Ibid., 96. 
46 Ibid., 112. 
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via negativa or the way of unknowing. When read this way, Metress notes, the 
exaggerated double-negatives in Outer Dark parody the classical via negativa: “’I never 
give nobody nothin. I never had nothin.’”47  However, the near-comical breakdown of 
affirmative logic in some of Outer Dark’s dialogues vie for attention more than they do 
mystical work. Metress notes that McCarthy’s long list of metaphysically evocative 
similes “does not, of course, prove that McCarthy is a Christian writer, but it does suggest 
that he wants his readers to be attentive to, if not preoccupied with, the metaphysical 
presences in his seemingly anti-metaphysical universe.”48 How exactly it is that 
McCarthy’s universe is anti-metaphysical is not clear. However, McCarthy’s apophatic 
method, Metress suggests, “is inviting us to bring to the novel our metaphysical 
preoccupations in order that he might strip away and subvert our preconceptions.”49 To 
this end, Metress places Culla’s way of nothingness (“via nihilo”) in contrast with the 
various ways of unknowing represented by the blind men in the novel.50 The blind man 
walking a road toward swampy dead end, according to Metress, troubles Culla Holme. 
The blind man is meant to trouble us, too, and “unfix” our ideologies.51  
Metress emphasizes the via negativa as form of unknowing and suggests that 
McCarthy’s method is an intentional dismantling of ideological commitments either in 
the direction of the ultimately meaningful or meaningless. Metress leaves open the 
question of how McCarthy is supposed to know that our preconceptions are inadequate in 
                                               
47 Metress, “Unknowing,” 151-2. 
48 Ibid., 150. 
49 Ibid., 150. 
50 Ibid., 152. 
51 Ibid., 154. 
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the first place. Likewise, it is not clear how the via negativa occurs except, again, by 
Culla’s dialogue with a blind man who, as Culla knows, is on his way not to a more 
adequate or profound state of knowing, but to the swamp where it dead ends. In other 
words, if blindness is a metaphor for the way of unknowing, it is not univocally 
recommended by McCarthy. 
Much of what follows in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation will concur 
with Metress’ argument that a type of negative theology exists within McCarthy’s novels. 
While the presence of apophasis needs further demonstration, my main goal will be to 
address exactly how it functions using McCarthy’s other novels as a guide. I suggest that 
the metaphysical frameworks elicited in McCarthy’s novels are not asserted but rather 
raised as possibilities. Even the ironic presence of metaphysical or religious traditions in 
the texts only works if those traditions retain some plausibility. In other words, they are 
present in the text, expounded both by philosophical villains and sages, because they 
might be true. The function of their exposition, I argue, is to also draw attention their own 
limits and self-negate. 
Language and Assertion in McCarthy 
 
A significant problem for any interpretation of McCarthy’s novels is his prose’s 
range of assertion. This is particularly the case when the narration or “sage” character 
begins either to describe or argue in the high-register religious or philosophical prose for 
which McCarthy is famous. For a mystical reading of McCarthy, the question arises as to 
whether McCarthy is intimating a metaphysics that might help determine how and to 
what language can refer or not? Unless McCarthy adopts the kind of explicit 
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metaphysical mysticisms discussed below as a means to limit the role of language vis-à-
vis some transcendent other, any mysticism of language runs the risk of being arbitrarily 
applied. 
McCarthy’s texts are slippery on this question. Much of the religious and 
philosophical speculation within McCarthy’s novels occurs in similes or, as Christine 
Chollier observes, in his pervasive use of the even more indeterminate comparison “like 
some.”52 Examples of this are everywhere in the novels: Outer Dark’s “like some witless 
paraclete beleaguered with all limbo’s clamor” (OD 18) or “like some creature rapt and 
besorced by witches’ music, demon piping” (OD 187); “Like some grim tellurian wraith” 
(S 32), “like fugitives from some great fire at the earth's end” (BM 23); “he waded out 
into the river like some wholly wretched baptismal candidate” (BM 29); “stark and black 
and livid like a land of some other order out there whose true geology was not stone but 
fear” (BM 49);  
The thunder moved up from the southwest and lightning lit the desert all about 
them, blue and barren, great clanging reaches ordered out of the absolute night 
like some demon kingdom summoned up or changeling land that come the day 
would leave them neither trace nor smoke nor ruin more than any troubling dream 
(BM 49);  
 
“larval to some unreckonable being” (BM 60); “[i]tinerant degenerates bleeding west-
ward like some heliotropic plague” (BM 82); “like supplicants at the skirts of some wild 
and irate goddess” (BM 95); “as if sucked by some maelstrom out there in the void, some 
                                               
52 See Christine Chollier’s “‘A Thing Wholly Alien’: Focalization, Disposession and 
Nescience in The Crossing” in Cormac McCarthy: Uncharted Territories/Territoires 
Inconnus, edited by Christine Chollier (Reims: Presses universitaires de Reims, 2003). 
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vortex in that waste apposite to which man's transit and his reckonings alike lay 
abrogate” (BM 101), “they looked like wardens of some dim sect sent forth to proselytize 
among the very beasts of the land” (BM 195); “like the imbreachment of some ultimate 
alchemic work decocted from out the secret dark of the earth's heart” (BM 203); “like hot 
scurf blown from some unreckonable forge howling in the waste” (BM 224). Examples 
like this are too numerous to continue listing here. 
 McCarthy’s narration raises concepts and entities but adjusts the rhetoric to avoid 
dealing in facts or claims. Comparisons to abstract categories such as “like” or “some” 
restricts these imaginative flights to one side of analogical or subjunctive rhetoric. To 
describe something as “like a great ponderous djinn” is not to posit the referend (BM 
101). Similarly, to describe a homeless man, as having “kneaded his boney hands and 
watched the shapes flame took among the sticks of wood as if some portent might be read 
there,” is to doubly cast doubt on the subjunctive (S 146). It is “as if” he “might,” not that 
he can or that he does. Within the plotted novel, as Jay Ellis points observes, when the 
rhetoric does not confine such high-register names to an analogical frame, such sentences 
often occur within a narrative setting that render them dubious: dreams, delusions, 
drunkenness or within the narrator’s interpretive imagination.53  
Apart from muffling propositional force, McCarthy’s similes block application in 
favor of imaginative consideration. Christine Collier keeps a long list of similes that do 
not function as bearers of information. In McCarthy’ frequent use of the qualifier “some” 
or the focus on a “secret,” she writes,  
                                               
53 Ellis, No Place for Home, 5. 
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[t]he Emphasis is laid on what is invisible, unheard, unseen, what has disappeared 
without a trace, what has fallen into oblivion: what is thus impossible to refer to, 
for the narrator, impossible to know for the narratee. Therefore, the simile is 
apparently prevented from playing its role as a purveyor of information.54  
 
Chollier helpfully notes that a sizable portion of the simile’s supposed reference is 
skillfully removed. “Thus similes undermining traditional landmarks found in reference 
(‘Representations that seemed to have no referent in the world although they once may 
have’ […]) or in the origin of speech combine with a semantic enterprise suggesting an 
unknown, lurking realm of evil and threat.”55 That ambient dread is an aesthetic outcome 
of these similes is plausible. Less speculatively, though, it may simply be a sign of 
limitation, which, as Chollier quoting Linda Woodson, quoting linguist Bridget Drinka, 
puts it “’the “as if” creates a sort of dream-like other reality, sets up another realm which 
doesn’t exist, could not exist, but whose potential existence we are asked to 
contemplate.’” 56 In other words, McCarthy locks such suggestive passages out of any 
possible referent while asking the reader to contemplate them anyway. Such a 
subjunctive can be interpreted in more than one way. The “as if” can either be a marker 
of language’s (or reason’s) endless circularity or a hypothetical construction of what such 
a reality might mean. The latter option, I suggest, is that of which a fictional apophatic 
                                               
54 Chollier, “Focalization,” 130-1. 
55 Ibid., 138, (TC 135). 
56 Chollier quotes Drinka further, saying that “’the function of ‘as if’ seems to be to focus 
on the unrealness, the subjunctive nature of what the clause is referring to, not with a 
result coming after it…. There is no result here—just the setting up of an imagined, 
unfulfilled simile, looking back on what was just mentioned, reflecting on a possible but 
very unlikely interpretation of it’” (Ibid., 131-2).  
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performance would consist: a hypothetical image of failing conventional and 
representational signs that suggest an external breaking point. 
However, against the notion that McCarthy’s similes strain to reference an 
external transcendent other, some strains of McCarthy scholarship take such referential 
failure as a sign of literature’s circularity and discursive vanity.57 According to this 
argument, McCarthy’s texts neither make claims nor do they strain toward something 
ineffable. Rather, the texts’ references are their own tradition or their own imaginative 
constructs. Within the discourse of the novel, as Amy Hungerford puts it,  
all the discourses held out by the judge as candidates for explaining the world—
science, evolution, metaphysics, philosophy, religion—are in his hands, and in 
McCarthy’s hands, only the rhetoric of narrative shape. What matters is one’s 
ability to impose one’s words and shape the world out of them.58 
 
By this argument, McCarthy’s book is a book both “made out of books” and about 
books.59 As Rick Wallach argues, this is exactly what the figure of Judge Holden 
represents: a three-hundred and thirty-six pound (Wallach notes one for each page of 
Blood Meridian) blank page upon which the book is written.60 Writing and language go all 
the way up and down, cosmically speaking.61 This is a difficult argument to defuse 
                                               
57 Amy Hungerford indexes much of Blood Meridian back to this conceit, see 
Hungerford’s final Open Yale Course Lecture on Blood Meridian. See Amy Hungerford, 
"ENGL 291: The American Novel Since 1945," lecture, Yale University and New Haven, 
CT., Accessed February 24, 2019, https://oyc.yale.edu/english/engl-291/lecture-18. 
58 Amy Hungerford, Postmodern Belief: American Literature and Religion since 1960 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 95. 
59 “Books are made out of books” quotation is from Richard Woodward’s interview, 
“Cormac McCarthy’s Venomous Fiction,” The New York Times, April 19, 1992.  
60 See Wallach, “Evil Archon,” 133. 
61 See Linda Woodson makes the connection to Foucault in “McCarthy’s Heroes and the 
Will to Truth,” in Cambridge Companion to Cormac McCarthy, ed. Steven Frye (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Woodson also observes the performative 
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because such a sizable portion of the novels’ religiously and philosophically suggestive 
constructions come in the irreducibly comparative form examined above. They do seem 
at times to refer to their own artistry rather than to actual objects.  
 However, while McCarthy’s comparative rhetoric can be reflexive, that 
reflexivity has other, more subtle rhetorical functions that dovetail with my argument. 
With Chollier, Dana Phillips notes that McCarthy’s similes intensify the hypothetical 
significance of the thing described, but tend not to refer beyond those things as a symbol 
might.62 For example, the narration of Blood Meridian describes the judge and his abused 
slave, James Robert, with a vague comparison to objects with saturated significance—but 
only by comparison: “Like things so charged with meaning that their forms are 
dimmed” (BM 294, my emphasis). The narration compares a strange thing with 
items even more obscure and so tangentially raises the question of what kind 
“things” are thus charged and whether one has encountered them. The narration does 
not claim that the strange pair are charged with meaning, only that their forms are 
dimmed in like manner.63 In the next paragraph, the narration makes a similar claim 
without the simile: “Those who travel in desert places do indeed meet with creatures 
surpassing all description” (BM 294). However, the “indeed’ refers back to and 
                                               
aspects of McCarthy’s texts, in which courage is instantiated in lieu of knowing. We can 
perform (will) where we cannot know.   
62 Dana Phillips, “History and the Ugly Facts of Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian,” 
American Literature 68, no. 2 (June 1996): 450.  
63 If they are charged with meaning, it likely comes from projection. As Crews points out, 
the passage is a quotation from Foucault’s “Things themselves become so burdened with 
attributes, signs, allusions that they finally lose their own form.” See Madness and 
Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: Random House, 
1988), 18.  
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confirms the string of comparisons leading up to a statement of fact: the judge and 
the handicapped slave, John Robert, are, in that moment, beyond the adequacy of 
language used to describe them.  
 Phillips takes these rhetorical devices to mark of how unanthopomorphic 
McCarthy’s prose tends to be. “Some” and “as if” seem to rely on a subjective sense of 
similarity. Yet, according to Phillips, analogies and similes intensify attention on the 
object without making either a full-blown proposition or positing a symbolic double-
meaning.64 I will say more about McCarthy’s relationship to de-anthropomorphic 
language in Chapter 3 of this study. For now, Phillips’ reading of McCarthy’s ambiguous 
allusions indicates that much of the explicitly religious, philosophical, or even 
transcendental terms in McCarthy is misleading if read either as blunt assertion or as 
mere celebration of literature’s circularity. Rather, the thing itself is the object of intense 
and specific scrutiny.  
While there is a great deal of rich and thorough work on the presence of 
metaphysical and religious content in McCarthy’s texts, it is not clear whether they 
amount to first principles or ideological commitments. Kenneth Lincoln may put this 
more strongly than I am yet prepared to when he claims that McCarthy’s “hyperreal 
visions” see not around but “‘into’ things.”65 Yet the intense scrutiny and the flagging of 
possible internal significance to objects that Phillips describes aligns with the broad 
pattern of McCarthy’s rhetoric. This is not to say that there is no metaphysics at all in 
                                               
64 Phillips, “Facts,” 450.  
65 Kenneth Lincoln, Cormac McCarthy: American Canticles, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 25.  
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McCarthy. Rather, the novels could be understood not as a partisan project, but as a 
polyvocal inquiry that develops over time by repetition and adjustment. 
Finally, some characters resist their consignment either to mere ideological 
signposts or purely literary objects. In one throwaway dialogue between John Grady and 
the girlfriend who is in the process of dumping him, Grady claims: “It's just talk, Mary 
Catherine. I got to get on.” Mary Catherine’s claim, “ What if it is just talk? Everything's 
talk isnt it?” is rapidly – and remarkably rebutted – by Grady’s retort: “Not everything.” 
(APH 28) This exchange constitutes one instance of John Grady’s early attempts to play 
the man of action rather than of words. But the line also contests some of the 
manipulation of language by other characters in McCarthy’s novels, including the 
narration. Not everything is just words, not everything is discourse, not everything is a 
subjunctive or counterfactual. There are counter arguments to this within the texts as well 
and these will be engaged in Chapter 5 of this project. For now, the point is simply that 
there is some intratextual resistance to all words being reduced to just words, and the 
discourse and literature itself raises the possibility that they are more than mere empty 
chatter or whistling in the dark.  
Method 
 As I indicated above, the methodological approach of this dissertation leans 
heavily on Michael Sells’ comparative investigations in Mystical Language of Unsaying.   
Sells’ performative approach to mysticism identifies shared features of apophatic 
performance within Christian and Islamic devotional texts and compares them in search 
of meaningful differences. Such differences illuminate the diverse techniques used to 
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emphasize divine transcendence across time, geography and tradition. Sells argues that 
the textual performance of linguistic-collapse offers unique linguistic contours instead of 
vague terms like “transcendence” or simple lapses into silence.66 The fine and distinct 
shades of individual instances also produce different registers of intensity and—
probably—different qualities of response in readers and interpreters. Using Sells’ as a 
model, the meaningful edges of what is supposed to be unsayable, the means of unsaying 
rather than the unsaid, assume the bulk of analytical focus.  
Sells’s central comparative device is a set of general apophatic rhetorical themes. 
They are 1) metaphors of emanation and overflow; 2) logic that decouples the ontologies 
of the normal and the transcendent, removing the latter from standard definitions of 
being; and 3) imaginative tension between the mundane and the transcendent, in which 
the dialectical tension suggests a paradoxical overlap between the two.67 These 
interpretive categories permit Sells to gather a wide range of Christian and Islamic 
theological texts with disparate confessional and contemplative goals then note key 
differences across examples. Sells’ demonstrates that apophatic discourse tends to share a 
set of overlapping resemblances without reducing it either to the interpretive categories or 
conflating their referent.  
                                               
66 Even silence is not always just silence. Peter Hawkins helpfully points out that for 
Augustine, the culmination of theology is a dissolution of language into rapt silence. See 
Peter S. Hawkins, Dante, 221 and his source, Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, “St. Augustine's 
Rhetoric of Silence,” Journal of the History of Ideas 23, no. 2 (April-June 1962): 175-
196. Likewise, Diarmaid MacCulloch’s study, Silence: A Christian History, (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2013), is a remarkable exploration of the significance of the absence of 
speech in Christian thought.  
67 Michael Anthony Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 6. 
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Mystical texts render irreducible moments of reading Sells calls apophatic 
“meaning events,” semantic constructions that culminate in the collapse of their own 
internal logic.68 In Sells’ formulation, the meaning event is neither intelligible content nor 
the mere negation of such content. Rather, the event occurs when intelligible content 
folds back on or unsays itself through its own logical structures. Instead of an experience 
of mystical union, for example, the apophatic texts produce a linguistic analogy to the 
breakdown of social and logical discursive categories and boundaries. The performative 
aspect of Sells theory is that the text as an instance of language enacts the limits of its 
own discourse rather than only asserting them. 
A primary mode of unsaying within each interpretive category is the development 
of complex paradoxes. Paradox is not mere contradiction, but rather simultaneously 
entertained but contradictory outcomes of validly combined and plausible premises. Put 
most abstractly—and un-interestingly—it would simply appear to be stubbornly adhering 
to the stated contradiction “P and –P” where both are reasonably plausible. For Sells, a 
semi-apophatic escape from the paradox’s discomfort is to resolve it by splitting the 
contradiction into two separate frames of reference. The theological example Sells 
provides is Eckhart’s famous fragment, “let us pray to God that we may be free of 
‘God’.” Sells notes that the translation evades the paradox by injecting a mild irony into 
the text by placing inverted commas around one of the two “gods.”69 This interpretive 
distinction resolves the paradoxical claim by distinguishing between God as God is to us, 
                                               
68 Ibid., 9.  
69 Ibid., 2. 
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and God as God is to Godself.70 By contrast, Sells interprets the text as maintaining an 
internal tension that cannot be resolved except by its own destruction. The text, according 
to Sells, unsays itself. The paradox intensifies until the logical collapse of the claim or its 
lapse into silence. On the scale of a larger apophatic text, the rhetoric of negation 
intensifies by dialectic, constructing layers of proposition and imagery that ultimately 
collapse or, to use Sells term, “unsay” themselves. 
Hawkins, Fish and the examples above indicate that theologically relevant 
apophatic forms appear in other genres as well. When employed in narrative form, as it is 
in Hawkins’ Dante or Fish’s self-consuming artifacts, the aesthetic momentum of the 
negation of plausible imagery generates signs designed to fail, but only after the reader 
has passed through the internal tensions to which they finally succumb. The ultimate 
termination of the text may be apophatic negation, but the result is supposed to be the 
moral or spiritual transformation of the reader. In this sense, mystical texts operate 
similarly to the elaborate but incomplete discussions of Socrates in several of Plato’s 
texts. To instantiate the discursive failure of a dialectic shows the insufficiency of 
definition in favor of a model of philosophy as a lived task. It may not—and most often 
does not—result in a statement of doctrine signifying knowledge-of and object, but rather 
it produces a species of literary experience that supports a spirituality of lived 
uncertainty. Such claims about extra-literary effects of texts on readers is an empirical 
one and are possible outcomes rather than essential components of this argument. 
However, to understand the logic of the texts examined here, it is helpful to frame them 
                                               
70 Ibid., 1.  
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not merely as elaborate clockwork, but as pieces of literary technology that, at least in its 
religious forms, are obviously designed for moral and spiritual effects in readers. While 
the specific outcomes for which apophatic texts aim are sometimes opaque, a recurring 
theme within them is that darkness or ignorance is illuminative in its own right and that it 
corrects a misleading sense of cognitive custody of the divine. In other words, apophatic 
rhetoric is often designed to clear the semiotic air of presumptive clutter so that one can 
properly worship or engage that which, to put this in McCarthy’s language, “cannot be 
spoken but only praised” (APH 161-2).  
In order to focus on such religious functionality, I have adjusted Sells’ 
comparative instrument—already tuned to register theological imagery and metaphor—to 
detect forms of apophatic discourse within the prose style of a set of contemporary 
novels. Several of these adjustments also more clearly demonstrate the reasons why 
Jacob Boehme—a primary source for McCarthy and frequently mentioned in passing as a 
“mystic”—should be considered an apophatic figure. The primary function of this 
scheme will be to interpret McCarthy by the use of four primary apophatic rhetorical 
devices: 1) excess of and limit in naming; 2) emphasis on origins understood as both 
grounds and abyss; 3) the contortion and reconfiguration of space and physical bodies; 
and 4) finally the dialectical failure within the narratives themselves. These categories are 
introduced below and subsequent chapters are organized accordingly.  
 Sells analysis also pairs fruitfully with a pragmatic theory of signs that registers 
indexical as well as representational and conventional signs. To that end, I pair Sells with 
C.S. Peirce’s triadic theory of signs in order to discuss the type of reference produced by 
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the inherently broken imagery of apophasis. In apophatic mysticism, this process is the 
manipulation of finite representations of and references to the transcendent and breaking 
them, rendering them indicative signs of transcendence. Unlike an icon (representation) 
or symbol (a strictly conventional sign) in Peirce’s semiotic model, an indexical sign has 
a “causal” relationship with its referent. 71 It is not necessarily similar to the thing for 
which it stands nor is it an arbitrary semantic conferral like a proper noun. Rather, 
indexes “participate” in the things for which they stand. Peirce gives the example of a 
weathervane, which provides an indication of a wind’s direction by means of the wind 
itself.72 The fabrication renders the index perspicuous to the visual sense. Likewise, the 
pattern of shattered glass on a floor might also indicate the direction and speed of an 
object thrown through it. By its form, the indexical sign indicates something about its 
formation, even though it may be ambiguous in its raw form. Likewise, the type of sign 
produced by logical breakage points “toward” a breaking cause. Unlike icons and 
symbols, indexes can be comparatively blunt instruments compared to say, the 
identification of conventional naming or the representation of images. They do, however, 
offer a means of reference when the referent itself loses determinacy. The application of 
this semiotic system is a simplification of R.C. Neville’s theory of religious signs.73 
                                               
71Charles S. Peirce, “What is a Sign” in The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical 
Writings Vol. II, Nathan Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel, eds. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), 8. 
72 Peirce, What is a Sign?, 8. 
73 Robert C. Neville, Ultimates: Philosophical Theology, Volume 1 (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2014). 
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If Peirce is correct, the apophatic index does not jeopardize the common religious 
and metaphysical requirement that the divine remain, in principle, beyond human 
comprehension. The mystical writer is at pains to arrange language in such a way that it 
directs attention to the exact shape of language as transcended. As an index, in other 
words, an apophatic sign may effectively refer to the process of transcendence or 
transcending rather than function as a representative sign of the transcendent itself.74  
I suggest that the plurality and the emphasized collapse of the many metaphysical 
possibilities in these stories serve as an apophatic sign (or signs) that likewise serve as 
indices for transcendence. Since any thoroughgoing un-saying would, after all, not leave 
much verbal evidence intact, a meaningful sense of “unknowing” would need to at least 
begin with an intelligible discursive shape. Such a shape must indicate some interpretive 
direction. In their collapse, in other words, apophatic un-sayings take on particular shapes 
and patterns.75 While these patterns may or may not align with a specific extant tradition, 
their indicative shape can only appear in the specific context in which they are 
performed. Thus, this project aims to trace the edges of a fictional unsaying without 
necessarily mapping the result onto a single tradition. Rather, McCarthy’s genre of 
                                               
74 The indexical mode of some signs solves, at least in part, the illustrative disagreement 
between Cusanus and Gregory below. God is not “present to” the signs of God in the 
world. Rather, the results of divine action are also indexes that provide some information 
about the relationship of God to the world. The theological information we have other 
than revelation may be a type of metaphysical signcutting or tracking based on initial 
special information. However, because indexes are quite vague, the 
revelation/metaphysics combination can be vulnerable to charges of special pleading. 
75 This aligns closely with Katz’s criticism of too closely conflating mystical experiences 
across traditions. The entry point into apophatic silence is a portal with specific 
contours—everything from cultural context down to diction and punctuation that likely 
shape the specific experience of the text. 
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apophatic text strikes a middle-ground between the presentation of a metaphysical model 
in narrative-form and the reduction of all such models to mere words. In other words, 
McCarthy neither inflates a metaphysical world nor completely punctures the possibility 
of evidence for one. 
 Finally, because McCarthy repeats themes and even whole phrases over different 
novels, I have found it useful to highlight repetitions of forms and figures and their 
developments across texts. Since this analysis extends beyond the limitations of a single 
narrative, even a limited intertextual approach might seem to belie the argument for a 
narrative apophasis. However, if the performance of apophasis is the text itself, then a 
critical exploration like this one is necessarily an abstraction from the texts’ actual 
function. The intertextual approach highlights patterns of rhetoric that appear across 
narratives, which, while likely more effective in their narrative environment, are less 
visible in isolation.  
 The chapters devoted to these adapted categories of narrative apophasis as they 
appear in each of the five chapters will function as follows.   
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 will examine both the methodical over-naming in McCarthy’s narration 
and in the plotted dialogue, especially where the dialogue explores how words—
especially names—function and fail. This chapter focuses on a polarity extending from 
limits of naming as language’s basic constituent and its hyperbolic extremes. This chapter 
also examines how the novels’ dialogues also function as discursive banisters that make 
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explicit reference to how and why words fail to reach their referential targets within the 
non-dialogic portions of McCarthy’s texts.  
Two well-known and historically disparate figures in Western mystical thought, 
Augustine and Wittgenstein, hold naming as the basic exemplar of language’s referential 
power. It is at once easy and impossible, since any sign can be arbitrarily assigned to any 
entity but no assignment is more appropriate or intrinsic than any other sign and no one 
sign can (probably) exhaust the conceivable significance of its object.76 Maison and house, 
for instance, are easily translatable signs for culturally grounded objects with common 
features: a shelter suitable for long-term habitation. The vagueness of the sign’s reference 
is its capacity for easy, broad application to objects, but it necessarily depletes its 
capacity for comprehensive reference to any specific object. Still, even proper nouns like 
Versailles do not exhaust the vast features of the finite object itself. Since doubts about 
the reach of language drive apophatic discourse to find alternative means of speaking and 
writing about the infinite or transcendent, apophatic engagement with referential limits 
tend to focus on the edges of even the most basic indexical pronouns like this or that, 
particularly as they pertain to limit-concepts like God, justice, or ultimate origin. 
 The preoccupation with the limits of discourse is one mode of performing a 
transcendent referent that cannot, by definition, be adequately named. Pseudo-Dionysus’ 
                                               
76 Saussure also emphasizes the arbitrariness of specific sounds and letters as assigned to 
objects, but is less thorough than Wittgenstein in noting how the common association 
between nouns across languages is translatable precisely because of a common form of 
life that ground the languages. See A Course in General Linguistics, Wade Baskin, Trans. 
(La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 2002). The arbitrariness of names and words is present in 
Peirce, but only with reference to symbolic signs.  
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Divine Names, for example, straightforwardly adds the prefix hyper- to the most basic 
divine “names” like being, life, power and wisdom.77 Each conceptual name admits of an 
extended meditation in which either its analogical meaning can be explained (e.g. 
kingship in terms of control over a region) or terminates in a paradoxical hymn.78 In each 
movement, the semantic result is an indexical sign that embraces the intelligible name 
while gesturing beyond or over it.79 The Dionysian meditator eventually, “breaks free,” 
from names and concepts, “away from what sees and what is seen, and he plunges into 
the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing” wherein the mind “knows beyond the mind 
by knowing nothing.”80 In contrast to Dionysius, Jacob Boehme could be said to so over-
name nature that the semantic density of the imagined cosmos collapses under its own 
absurd weight. The result of Boehme’s nominations is a verbal black hole in which basic 
categories like good and evil are pressed so closely together that they become 
indistinguishable—especially at their concentrated point of origin. Both strategies use a 
type of hyperbole—literally, throwing-beyond—to emphasize contrasts between the 
capacities of language and a supposedly infinite God.  
Chapter 2 
                                               
77 Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. 
Colm Luibhéid and Paul Rorem, (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 10.3, 937d for an 
example of this in his meditation on time and eternity. 
78 Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, 2.3, 640b. 
79 It should be noted that Dionysius’ texts are less an attempt to move beyond linguistic 
limits than to emphasize them. His “unsaying” is much more of a ritual exercise than a 
frustration with the ineffable.  
80 Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. 
Colm Luibhéid and Paul Rorem, Trans. (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 1.3 1001d. 
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 Chapter 2 examines themes of origins, grounds, and their termination in abyssal 
imagery. McCarthy’ idiosyncratic rhetoric around the concept of origins adapts aspects of 
Sells’ category of emanation and overflow, but expands it to include the radical negation 
of the abyss. Emanation is one model used to reflect on ultimate origins, particularly if 
we think of that search as following a chain of causation that can be traced back to some 
meaningful source—a deity, an agent, plan, principle, or law.81 Exemplars of these 
symbols are familiar in the western traditions through Plotinus’ influence on Christianity 
and Islam. It is visible in Plato’s radiant Good, Mechthild and Eckhart’s Godhead, 
Boehme’s restless Unground, the magnetic beauty of God of Dante’s beatific vision, 
Hadewijch’s or Sufi understandings of divine love, Spinoza’s divine substance natura 
naturans, Heidegger’s Being, and Paul Tillich’s being itself. While not every example of 
the logic of grounds includes what gets loosely termed a “mystical” side, it seems clear 
that a significant portion of the European and West-Asian philosophical traditions that 
employ it also include two buried propositions: The first is that the vast chain of 
causation from beginning to end, whether logical or natural, can only be indirectly 
understood through what appears; and 2) the contemplation of or imaginative 
engagement with the origins of appearances affects one’s life. While it is not always 
necessary to engage these propositions (the political philosopher employing the principle 
                                               
81 As Nancy Kreml argues, McCarthy’s narration in All the Pretty Horses vacillates 
between two contrasting styles: a transparent style that ventures almost no causal 
relationships and an opaque style that aggressively interprets a specific causal chain. See 
her “Implicatures of Styleswitching in the Narrative Voice of Cormac McCarthy’s All the 
Pretty Horses.” In Codes and Consequences: Choosing Linguistic Varieties, edited by 
Carol Myers-Scotton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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of sufficient reason makes use of the metaphor of “grounds” but does not necessarily 
make much of either its significance or ambiguity), it is notable that much of the Western 
philosophical, logical, and mystical traditions are entangled at their roots.82 
The concept of origin is so ubiquitous in the Western mystical and philosophical 
traditions that it may seem too general to function as an analytical tool. However, the 
logic of grounds is at its heart a metaphor. The interpretive category demonstrates how 
McCarthy employs the ordinary metaphor of logical grounds—the rationality of the 
principle of sufficient reason that assumes effects precipitated by causes—to work 
backward toward an origin.  
Chapters 3 and 4 
Chapters 3 and 4 will focus on the disfiguration and refiguration of physical space 
and of bodies. In Sells’ formulation, apophatic distortions and contortions of space fall 
into the categories of decoupling the transcendent from normal ontology (time and space) 
and imaginative tension between mundane and transcendent realities. Apophasis in this 
category manipulates basic components of imagery, representation, and narration—time, 
space, linear causation, and the prioritizing of entities. This form of negation pressures 
readerly expectations, bending the normal toward the strange or alien. For Sells, this 
                                               
82 Hannah Arendt notes that Kant’s early use of ground language overtly disintegrates 
around the stability of metaphysics: “he quite freely admits that ‘it was [his] fate to fall in 
love with metaphysics’ but also speaks of its ‘bottomless abyss,’ its ‘slippery ground,’ its 
utopian 'land of milk and honey’ (Schlaraffenland) where the ‘Dreamers of reason’ dwell 
as though in an ‘airship,’ so that ‘there exists no folly which could not be brought to 
agree with a groundless wisdom.’" See Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (San Diego, 
CA: Hartcourt, 1981), 9.  
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technique signals a “referential openness” that undermines habitual modes of reasoning.83 
For Sells, the spatial metaphors embedded in prepositional conventions offer apophasis 
conceptual seams at which to loosen, refit and re-stitch language without drawing 
attention to its violations of grammatical rules.8485 
McCarthy’s novels unsay aspects of their own spatial depiction by distorting 
either the representation of landscape itself or the means by which to navigate it. While 
the transcendent side of the spatial tension is not always explicit, the process of 
defamiliarizing space and time is driven primarily by a prose style that bends to refer to 
something that may or may not be there—for example: God, evil, justice, or hope. In 
Chapter 3, I examine how this distortion occurs on the sentence-level. Spatial distortion 
occurs in the peculiar use of prepositions, by either extended conjunctive clauses, or by 
eliminating conjunctive clauses altogether in favor of sentence fragments. Stylistic 
variants like these subtly obstruct the novels’ spatial representation so that the text 
distorts what is plausibly imaginable and thus “says” what it cannot fully represent. 
                                               
83 See Sells, Unsaying, 8, 209.  
84 See also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2003). Since Sells only cursorily addresses the mechanics of 
prepositional play, Lakoff and Johnson’s examination on the metaphorical structure of 
conventional language offers a framework for a further account of how apophatic 
discourse might actually function on a more subtle discursive scale than, say, a Plotinus 
or a Porete, who are directly dealing with concepts like God and Soul.  
85 The term is credited to Victor Shklovsky in his essay, “Art as Device,” which is apt here 
because of its concern with form. However, Tolstoy (a primary source of examples for 
Schklovsky) already does a fine job in reflections in What is Art of making the familiar 
conventions of commercial art seem alien simply by drawing attention to certain features 
and social forms of artistic practice. See Viktor Shklovsky, “Art, as Device,” Alexandra 
Berlina, Trans., Poetics Today 36, no. 3 (September 2015): 151–74; and Leo Tolstoy. 
What Is Art? trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (Penguin Classics. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1995).  
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Chapter 3 will also examine spatial distortion on the level of narrative. In the stories, 
landscape and especially represented landscape on maps within the plotted novel also 
tend to fail to do the referential work for which they are designed. Chapter 4 extends the 
analysis of physical distortion and negation to represented bodies and their physical 
experience of pain. Because the qualitative experience of pain is potentially infinite, its 
verbal expression challenges the limits of language to communicate itself.  
Chapter 5 and 6 
Chapters 5 and 6 take the apophatic categories gleaned in chapters 1-4 and 
examine their deployment in explicit discussions around the limit concepts common to 
apophatic rhetoric, for example, the nature of time, will, justice, and God. McCarthy’s 
books are filled with doctrines, philosophical positions, arguments and interpolated 
stories that contain more doctrines, assertions, and arguments. Play between multiple 
narrative frames occurs on the level of the plotted novel as well, both in its interpolated 
narratives (dreams, fables, and memories) and in the monologues.86 The interpolated 
narratives generally have some kind of argumentative value, whether as some internal 
moral or as a logical value derived by the story-teller or dreamer. Frequently, though, 
narratives and monologues are left hanging in the broader story, not explicitly interpreted 
or even recalled by the character to whom they were told. These internal stories have 
thematic overlap, yet they are not philosophically consistent with each other. They do 
not, therefore, represent some univocal doctrine or position on their major questions. By 
                                               
86 Jarrett’s term for the dreams and parables in Blood Meridian and The Crossing 
especially. See Robert L. Jarrett, Cormac McCarthy, (New York : London: Twayne 
Publishers, 1997), 146. 
   
 
45 
examining them as instances of apophatic performance, the novels’ interpolated 
narratives and arguments deploy the thematic categories examined in previous chapters 
and unsay themselves before both the listening character and the reader.  
 Yet if none of the many voices in these books stand either for the truth or for 
some official authorial position, then what good are projects (like the present one) that 
assemble aggressive analytical frameworks to machinate over these texts?87 Isn’t a 
dissertation-sized claim to “mystical” or “apophatic” significance throughout this corpus 
exactly this type of theological positioning?88 My hypothesis is that McCarthy’s style of 
apophaticism is what resists the type of positioning one might expect from analysis 
driven by disciplinary divisions of the contemporary academy. Even a cursory look at the 
secondary literature on McCarthy yields a number of possible isms to which McCarthy is 
said to belong. But while the novels—especially their narration, and dialogue—engage 
explicitly with metaphysics, ethics, and anthropology, no single ideological position (e.g. 
gnostic, Christian, nihilist, or an eco-theologian) wholly dominates the field of discourse 
across novels. McCarthy’s novels make a fruitful case-study in the possibilities of 
narrative apophasis because he uses so many of the theological and philosophical 
strategies mentioned above to produce an imaginative rhetoric that both strains its own 
                                               
87 Vereen M. Bell, The Achievement of Cormac McCarthy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988), 135. 
88 This lack of positioning is what both Shelly Rambo and James Wood find to be a 
moral/artistic weakness. See Shelly Rambo, “Beyond Redemption? Reading Cormac 
McCarthy’s The Road after the End of the World,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 
41, no. 2 (2008): 99–120; and James Wood, “Getting to the End,” The New Republic, 
May 21, 2007.  
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language and directly addresses its own failures.  
 This study is situated within an intersection of literary and mystical studies in 
which instantiations of textual failure direct attention to both the limits of language and 
the possibilities of its transcendence. By adapting Sells’ comparative categories of 
apophatic discourse to McCarthy’s internal literary methods, McCarthy’s novels reveal 
referential limits which are, in their enactment, signs of transcendence. While signs are 
traditionally addressed in honorific tones, the end-results of McCarthy’s apophasis are 
ambiguous. Chapter 6 addresses the personal, epistemological, and potentially 
metaphysical costs of pursuing language to its referential limit and examines figures with 
which McCarthy addresses them.  
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Chapter 1: Naming and Language in Christian Mysticism and McCarthy 
In the closing pages of The Crossing, Billy Parham tells a traveling stranger of his 
dead younger sister: “Her name was Margaret” (TC 419). This innocuous statement of 
fact is preceded much earlier in the novel by a local Sherriff reading the same girl’s birth 
certificate: Margarita Evelyn Parham [….] How come her to have a Mexican name?” (TC 
168). While the later edition of the name might imply an ethnic or racial bias on Billy’s 
part, he says a few lines prior that that “my mama was from off a ranch up in De Baca 
County. Her mother was a fullblooded Mexican didnt speak no english” (TC 419).89 Why 
the anglicization of the name, then? Billy never says. But McCarthy’s novels have a 
subtle and sensitive response to the specifics of names, who knows them, and how they 
factor into the function of language as a whole, even when their significance is not ever 
wholly revealed. This chapter examines the role of language in traditional apophatic 
theology and demonstrates McCarthy’s undermining of language through the use and 
abuse of names.  
In both the Christian theological tradition of divine ineffability and in McCarthy’s 
rhetoric, the relative instability of names is a component but not the whole of apophatic 
unsaying. My contention is that names in McCarthy and apophatic theology are both 
vitally important and ultimately dubious. On the theological side, divine names offer a 
useful synecdoche for the status of language and reference within Christian mystical 
                                               
89 While I do not know precisely what to make of McCarthy’s non-capitalization of 
“english,” it seems consonant with notes in his Blood Meridian papers that commit to 
naming living entities: a handwritten note reads “CAP IF ITS ALIVE.” (Wittliff 
Southwestern Writers Collection, Box 7, Folder 6, Texas State University, San Marcos). 
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discourse. Likewise, a basic theme of Christian apophatic theology is the problem of 
adequately naming the attributes or essences of what supposedly transcends concepts, 
ideas, or images. Before directly engaging McCarthy’s novels, briefly foregrounding the 
basic preoccupations of the Christian Neoplatonic form of mysticism provides a context 
for the mystical tradition McCarthy absorbs through writers like Boehme. This 
comparison yields distinctive differences in McCarthy’s adaption of narrative apophasis 
that, I argue, is present and active throughout his novels.  
 The paradoxical negation of relevant names immediately places any discourse in 
jeopardy. Laozi’s famous formulation, “Tao called Tao is not Tao. Names can name no 
lasting name” illustrates the problem of names in a discussion of transcendence.90 Names 
are limited precisely because their function is to limit reference (x and not y) but we do 
not know what we are talking about unless we at lease provisionally delimit it from other 
possible referents. Yet in the case of a referent that has no attributes, for example, names 
are useless. Names may break by being too weak, but more often, they fail by being too 
rigidly applied. The breaking of names does not identify or convey information, but 
gestures toward what exceeds their limits.   
 Mysticism simultaneously operates within and outside of the bounds of normal 
discourse such that run-of-the-mill distinctions necessary for meaning-making break 
down around their object. The type of mysticism sought in this project presupposes some 
features of language that are not always fully articulated but exist in the philosophical and 
                                               
90 Laozi, Tao Te Ching, trans. by Stephen Addiss and Stanley Lombardo (Boston, MA: 
Shambhala, 2007), 1. 
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experiential currents of even larger traditions. Those ancient traditions do not always 
draw strict distinctions between discourses on language, intelligibility, and metaphysical 
speculation. Their concrete rhetorical instances of apophasis occur by degrees and with 
diverse goals. Thus, it is precisely the variance of assumptions and goals within the 
streams of apophatic thought that produce the rich array of final shapes found in 
individual instances of “unsaying.” The form of discourse tends to indirectly reveal the 
contours of what individual authors take to be transcendent of world and of language.91 
The Greek background of Neoplatonist thought already takes names as a 
foundational for language, but a component with an ambiguous range of significance. For 
example, Heraclitus’ (c. 475 BCE) boundaries between theories of language and 
metaphysical reasoning about how reality works are porous. Heraclitus’ central term, 
logos, for example, is supposed to represent a principle that constrains the constant flux 
of change into a relatively coherent flow. Yet the word has difficulty representing more 
information than a generalized noun as a name. Logos, of course, is vague enough to take 
on deep moral and religious meaning later in its history. Yet from the beginning, as Carol 
Poster has demonstrated, Heraclitus borrows available rhetoric within the religious, ritual, 
and poetic streams of thought available to him. He acknowledges their limitations. 
However he also suggests that an investigation of language itself can yield, according to 
                                               
91 A weak reading of Katz’s constructivism would be that all forms of mystical experience 
takes an intelligible shape within the tradition it occupies. I cannot comment on possible 
or impossible forms of experience. However, it seems reasonable to emphasize that the 
linguistic and conceptual scaffolding for the discourse around transcendence takes a 
determinate shape in their expression. 
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Poster, “information that is not exclusively or trivially linguistic.”92 Heraclitus’ use of 
language itself develops an implicit “rhetorical and hermeneutic consequences of an 
ontology of flux.”93 That is, even in a corrupted or vulgarly literal state, the figurative 
interpretation of language can yield some aspect of logos that it dimly reflects.  
Aristotle, by contrast, begins with the premise that names are arbitrary 
delimitation of symbols.94 After establishing that natural kinds can be parsed by 
discernable features (form, etc.), they can be arbitrarily named in language but remain 
more or less intelligible as differentiated kinds.95 For Aristotle, names carry no truth value 
other than as a conventional means of conveying conventionally labeled information in 
the construction of propositions.96 They carry meaning, but they do not in themselves 
assert anything. Plato, especially in Cratylus, is likewise less sanguine about the ability of 
nouns to do more than place-hold in the absence of understanding. Socrates is not 
satisfied with conventional symbols that apply only partially to phenomena under 
investigation. Names, if taken too seriously, can be fetishized when they are taken to 
refer to an innate property of the named object rather than a given one. In the Craytlus 
Socrates is less interested in the essence of names than in pointing out that their 
epistemological usefulness is usually post hoc labeling rather than the result of special 
                                               
92 Carol Poster, “The Task of the Bow: Heraclitus’ Rhetorical Critique of Epic Language,” 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 39, no. 1 (2006): 15. 
93 Ibid., 2.  
94 See Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione, John L. Ackrill, Trans. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), Chapter 2.  
95 See David Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (New York: Clarendon Press, 
2002). 
96 Aristotle, Poetics, Part 4; see also Poster, Heraclitus, 15. 
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knowledge in the moment of appellation. The true difficulty of coherently defining and 
skillfully applying names is the final theme of the failed debate, but it is clear that the 
dialogue bears directly on the religious meaning associated with the imagined function of 
names. 97 The names of things, like the names of the Gods, directly convey information 
about what they are. 
As Christianity absorbed Neoplatonism through figures like Augustine (354-430 
CE), the theological application of names becomes more tenuous. As notions of 
transcendence intensify, names are both overly specific and universally applicable. If on 
Augustine’s Neoplatonist model, God is the source of all things, 
All things can be said about God, and nothing is said about God worthily. Nothing 
is more widespread than this deficiency. You seek a suitable name; you do not 
find it. Whatever way you seek to speak, you find he is all things. What similarity 
is there between a lamb and a lion? Both were said of Christ. ‘Behold the Lamb of 
God.’ How the lion? ‘The lion of the tribe of Juda has prevailed.’98  
 
The problem of naming God for Augustine, then, is not necessarily mute silence in the 
face of overwhelming transcendence. Rather, the problem is that too many signs 
accurately apply to God both because God is the creative source of all and because 
seemingly contradictory names for God are revealed by Christian and Hebrew Scriptures.   
Similar developments can be found in Gregory of Nyssa (d. 395 CE) who also deploys a 
Hellenistic philosophical frameworks to interpret the revelatory documents of 
Christianity. Le Grys explains that in Gregory’s strong distinction between created and 
uncreated being, divine names do not overlap. Language names those things with 
                                               
97 See Plato’ Craytlus, 407d. 
98 Augustine. Tractates on the Gospel of John, Trans. John W. Rettig (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 49-50, (Tractate 13 on John 3:22-29). 
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duration in time and extension in space. Mundane names support understanding by 
dividing up differences in the spatial and temporal fabric of reality.99 For Gregory, as Le 
Grys summarizes, “[t]he names for God that have been given to us by divine revelation 
are not adequate, but they are nevertheless indispensable for our initiation into the divine 
mystery.”100 That is, God can be known through God’s determinate operations in the 
world, but not by reference to God’s non-temporal and non-spatial essence. This is the 
interpretation of ineffability that takes as unknowable God as Godself. This claim is then 
qualified by the argument that God can still be known insofar as God reveals or expresses 
within texts, history, or nature. For Gregory, God can still be provisionally named and 
referred to with conventional language. Names add a “partial glimpse” provided by the 
condescension of God to reveal aspects of the divine within the finite world.101 Within this 
framework, the ineffable essence of God can confront the spiritual virtuoso, like Moses, 
who, according to Nyssa, 
boldly approached the very darkness itself and entered the invisible things where 
he was no longer seen by those watching. [….] He teaches, I think, by the things 
he did that the one who is going to associate intimately with God must go beyond 
all that is visible and (lifting up his own mind, as to a mountaintop, to the 
invisible and incomprehensible) believe that the divine is there where the 
understanding does not reach.102  
 
                                               
99 James Le Grys, “Names for the Ineffable God: St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Explanation,” 
The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 62, no. 3 (1998): 336.  
100 Ibid., 335. 
101 Ibid., 341.  
102 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses: Gregory of Nyssa, trans. Abraham Johannes 
Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 43 (§46). 
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Intimacy with the divine essence can be “known” insofar as one ascends to the 
incomprehensible.103 Gregory’s qualified apophaticism begins in the intellect and aimed 
toward the failure of conventional understanding. Nevertheless, divine names still refer 
more or less accurately and informatively to God insofar as they refer to certain causal 
relationships in the world. To that extent, divine names are derived by revelation, but are 
also to some degree empirical. As I will discuss below, the theologically controlled 
relationship of words to objects is one that McCarthy absorbs and transforms. For 
instance, The Road’s “nameless dark” may be nameless for reasons closer to those listed 
above than for purposes of literary ornament (TR 9).  
The pseudonymous of the Syrian monk, Dionysius the Areopagite (c. 5th-6th 
century CE), explores the means by which determinate knowledge comes to be known 
when its source is, in principle, unknowable. For Dionysius’ The Divine Names, 
knowledge and language refer only to things (beings). God, as creator of beings, cannot 
be included in the category of being. God is then properly referred to as beyond both 
being and truth. “Beyond” is a type of intralinguistic hyperbole to indicate the non-
membership of God as referent of the predicated class. However, recalling Augustine, 
Dionysius says “[t]ranscendently it contains within itself the boundaries of every natural 
knowledge,” which “theologians [to] praise it by every name—and as the Nameless 
One.”104 Because God contains all beings, God can be provisionally “clothed in terms of 
                                               
103 Gregory’s union is distinct from later developments of mystical union in which one 
knows the divine essence as one becomes it, either in one’s will (e.g. St. John of the 
Cross) or in one’s essence (e.g. Eckhart). 
104 Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, 596a. 
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being” by perceptual symbols of Scripture governed by the concepts of Scripture 
(Goodness, One, etc.) which The Divine Names explores. In other words, names apply 
but, as in Gregory, only proximately. The Mystical Theology briefly explains both 
Dionysius’ method, which is a descending affirmation of divine names from high 
conceptual names to low perceptual names, then a process of denial ascending back 
upward toward “hyper” concepts that “throw” reference beyond the commonplace 
understanding of the concept. The Divine Names makes “assertions” when “we began 
with first things” and then “moved down through intermediate terms until we reached the 
last things.”105 The affirmations of the last things intensify the immanence of God within 
intelligible and (presumably perceptible) objects before launching a similar series of 
denials back “upward.”106 The termination of negations at the peak of abstract 
intelligibility are likewise surprising, but emphasizes the distance of even abstract 
conceptual forms from the divine Cause: 
But now as we climb from the last things up to the most primary we deny all 
things so we may unhiddenly know that unknowing which itself is hidden from all 
those possessed of knowing amid all beings, so that we may see above being from 
that darkness concealed from all the light among beings.107  
 
Both texts demonstrate that the Cause of all things is “beyond” both affirmative and 
negative discourse and that the final result is an epistemological darkness in which names 
do not apply.108 
                                               
105 Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, 138/1025B. 
106 It is unknown if the Perceptible Names was an actual document or an embedded fiction 
within Mystical Theology.  
107 Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, 138/1025B.  
108 The extent to which this applies to the concept of “cause” in Dionysius is a matter of 
some dispute. The assertion, however, constitutes an indirect claim that there is a type of 
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 Dionysius describes the joint work of the reader and writer as “sculptors who set 
out to carve a statue. They remove every obstacle to the pure view of the hidden image, 
and simply by this act of clearing aside they show up the beauty which is hidden.”109 This 
type of denial, “abstraction,” “clearing-aside” or “removal,” as the translators sometimes 
render aphaeresis, is how Dionysius gestures toward the Cause without committing to 
descriptive signs.110 The reference metaphorically avoids the transcendent in a space in 
which the Cause can be “next to it, but not of it,” other points of determinate reference.111 
In other words, the shapes of discourse, both in The Divine Names and The Mystical 
Theology, is arranged for the primary purpose of apophatic writing: “to praise the 
Transcendent One in a transcending way, namely through the denial of all beings.”112 
Luibheid’s translation is important here. The means of praise is transcending, not 
                                               
knowledge available beyond articulation or intelligibility. To the extent that the 
transcendent way requires the assumption of total ineffability of the divine Cause is also 
disputed. For example, as Timothy Knepper argues (contra Turner), the writings of 
Pseudo-Dionysius do not necessarily negate the divine names it proffers, but carefully 
reaffirms the priority of some names over others. Further, Knepper also argues that the 
very notion of absolute ineffability is incoherent and that the whole of the Dionysian 
corpus is a hyperbolic reaffirmation of the church’s ritual hierarchy. Similarly, Thomas 
Carlson’s interpretation of the prefix “hyper” in Mystical Theology takes the “beyond” 
terms as  
neither affirmative nor negative but point beyond the alternative between 
affirmation and negation. This beyond of the categorical alternative of affirmation 
and negation points to that which comes radically before: the ‘beyond,’ which 
signals an ‘endless’ end, indicates also the irreducible priority of the Cause over 
all thought and language—over truth itself. 
See Thomas A. Carlson, Indiscretion: Finitude and the Naming of God (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 187. See also Knepper, Negating Negation, 2014.  
109 Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, 138/1025B. 
110 Ibid., 138n11. 
111 Mystical Theology, 1048 A-B, as quoted in Carlson, Indiscretions, 187.  
112 Ibid., 138/1025A. 
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transcendent language. There are no magic words or sacred concepts at play, only a 
method of logical artifice around revealed and philosophical names for God. As Wesley 
Wildman notes, even the positive flow of names is designed to mitigate the dominance of 
any single name. “Attachment to individual names fades in the cacophony of naming,” 
writes Wildman, so that even logical preferences on certain names and concepts can be 
bracketed before the explicit negations begin.113 The practice of over-naming and 
hyperbole play a role in apophatic rhetoric even while the negations (aphairesis) 
indirectly affirm the shape of what is next to or beyond their referential targets.114 
                                               
113 Wesley J. Wildman, In Our Own Image: Anthropomorphism, Apophaticism, and 
Ultimacy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 105. 
114 It is worth noting that the writings of Dionysius do figure substantially in the works of 
Thomas Aquinas whose own writings in apophatic discourse bear an important influence 
on the subject of ineffability and transcendence. Thomas’ brief texts on analogy may bear 
more weight than Thomas was prepared to give it, yet the recent theological discourse on 
Thomistic analogy has been considerable and secondary interpretations of these 
formulations are voluminous. Leaving aside the many complex interpretation of the 
principle, it has also been argued that Thomas’ idea of analogy is properly apophatic even 
while both conventional, information-bearing language and hyper-essential qualities can 
be aptly predicated of God. Because one side of analogy is infinite, the type of analogy of 
proportion between two terms is impossible in principle. Thomas instead suggests that 
analogy is possible as the analogy of the ratios of four terms, one side finite, the other 
infinite (X-Y:P-Q). Since one side of the analogy is infinite, however, it is not clear how 
it conveys information about the divine even by proportionate ratio. Some proponents of 
its philosophical deployment have also suggested its role as a properly apophatic 
doctrine. That is, by proportion, the operation of analogy demonstrates divine 
ineffability. Thomas’ writing on analogy is disproportionately small compared to 
subsequent discussions of the issue. I raise it here as yet another tradition that strains 
against the tension between its claims of transcendence and the possession of actual 
knowledge about the infinite’s quiddity or “whatness” by revelation. See the translator’s 
introduction to Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm, 
trans.  John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2014), 113, which reads: “analogia entis signifies what is decisive 
in ‘every similarity, however great,’ is the ‘ever greater dissimilarity.’ It signifies, so to 
speak, God’s ‘dynamic transcendence,’ i.e. that God is ever above and beyond 
‘everything external to him and everything that can be conceived.” See also Laurence 
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 Nicolas of Cusa (1401-1464 CE) deals with the problem of naming in response to 
an ontology of excess and overflow. Cusanus’ “coincidence of opposites” in the divine 
can be understood as an intensification of Augustine and Dionysius’ inclusion of all 
things within their divine origin—even contradictions. Cusanus’ God transcends the 
duality of opposites by including them within the rich ontological origin of Godself 
without tension or complexity. Cusanus’ implicit theory of language, as described by 
Duclow, can be found in Cusanus’ notion of God-as-not-other or non-aliud, which is the 
divine transcendence of the coincidence of opposites. Duclow writes that “[a]s the 
definition of definition, the non-aliud is not one concept or name among others, but rather 
signifies the transcendental ground or principle for every concept and name.”115 In other 
words, names, by definition, differentiate. In God, since such distinctions are not 
possible, the logical consequence is that God cannot be named. In Duclow’s 
interpretation of Cusanus’ 
 the non-aliud directs our gaze from the vocabula of reason to the verbum which 
is the precise name of God. A turn toward divine transcendence and creativity 
thus occurs within reflection on language; that is, far from positing a closure to 
metaphysics and theology, the linguistic turn here coincides with a transcendental 
turn.116 
 
Duclow’s distinction between vocabula and verbum (perhaps derived by Cusanus from 
Philo of Alexandria) is not one that Cusanus explains in detail. However, it does indicate 
                                               
Paul Hemming, “Analogia Non Entis Sed Entitatis: The Ontological Consequences of the 
Doctrine of Analogy,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 6, no. 2 (April 
2004): 119. 
115 Donald F. Duclow, “Masters of Learned Ignorance: Eriugena, Eckhart, Cusanus,” 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 269. 
116 Ibid. 
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a familiar distinction between human language and an unknown language that has its 
origin in the undifferentiated divine for whom logos and language are one. The non-
aliud, then, is not the “precise” name of God, but rather a negative sign that expresses the 
concept of an absolute name, not the name itself.117 The term is, according to Cusanus, 
“among our most precise symbols for expressing the ineffable verbum in speech.”118 Thus 
Cusanus is not able to affirm Gregory’s form of divine reference that does not attempt to 
name God in God’s essence, but by the infinite God’s finite operations in the world. As 
he says to the Pagan in Dialogue On the Hidden God: 
that you know that a human is not a stone does not result from a knowledge by 
which you know a human and a stone and their difference, but it results from 
accident, from a difference of their ways of operating and their shapes, to which 
when you discern them, you impose different names. For it is a movement in 
differentiating reason that imposes names.119 
 
But Cusanus says that such names cannot be true of God because in such acts the divine 
is “present in its works, not absolute unity but unity in number and plurality.”120 God being 
an absolute and simple unity does not admit of distinctions, which require an aliud. By 
contrast, Cusanus’ Christian says “I know that everything I know is not God and that 
everything I conceive is not like God, but rather God surpasses all these,” for “that which 
is named is small. That whose magnitude cannot be conceived remains ineffable.”121 In 
this dialogue, Cusanus’ Christian may object even with Gregory’s notion that revealed 
                                               
117 Duclow, Ignorance, 270. 
118 Ibid., 274. 
119 Nicholas of Cusa, Selected Spiritual Writings, H. Lawrence Bond, Trans. (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1997), 210. 
120 Ibid., 211. 
121 Ibid. 
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divine names can apply to God, arguing in On Learned Ignorance that only the proper 
name of God—the tetragrammaton—refers only to the absolute “maximum” of all things, 
not to specific acts in history or nature.122 He immediately suggests that even proper names 
apply only as diminished names, “thus if the affirmative names apply, they apply to God 
only in relation to creatures; not that creatures are the reason why such names apply, for 
the maximum can hold nothing from creatures, but affirmative names apply according to 
God’s infinite power in relation to creatures.”123 Nevertheless, the tetragrammaton 
remains—technically—an ineffable name of God, a proper noun for a concept that cannot 
be understood as defined.124 125 
 There is an important difference between a theory of names that conveys 
information about parts or attributes and an attitude toward names that understands the 
                                               
122 Ibid., 121. This would be the case if Gregory is understood as speaking about God’s 
operations in the world as grounding the maximum of things like goodness, power, love, 
etc. then  
123 Ibid., 122. 
124 Ibid., 124. 
125 To the extent that such metaphysics are intelligible, the limits of their language are 
somewhat clear. Real essences anchor real definitions which tether real references to 
conventional names. In other words, proper names can be coherently given to identifiable 
individuals, categories can apply names across individuals as long as they have 
overlapping features that justify their treatment as a kind. These are relatively stable, if 
highly fallible conditions. Quite often, we are confused about which names apply to what 
objects. To the extent that there is no explicit sense of familiarity, a guiding science, or a 
hypothetical metaphysics with which to guide our applications of and interpretations of 
names, the resulting references can be highly ambiguous. For example, even within a 
single theological tradition’s constraint of interpretation, Nicolas of Cusa’s doctrine of 
learned ignorance met serious criticisms of pantheism. Members of the tradition both 
detected the ambiguity of the applicability of all names to God and attempted to correct it 
using shared commitments to doctrine and revelation See Nicholas of Cusa and Johannes 
Wenck, Nicholas of Cusa’s Debate with John Wenck: A Translation and an Appraisal of 
De Ignota Litteratura and Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, Ed. Jasper (Hopkins. 
Minneapolis: A.J. Banning Press, 1988). 
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word, sound, or utterance itself as directly associated with the divine. In the latter 
concept, the proper noun itself has unique referential power. This is true of the name of 
God in the long and complex development of Kabbalah and is only partially developed in 
its brief intersection with the Christian magical tradition, exemplified by figures like 
Paracelsus and Boehme.126 Nearly contemporary with Boehme was Isaac Luria (1534-
1572) who draws on the idea, dating back to first century middle-Platonism, that “all 
language proceeds from a name,” specifically the name of God.127 Far from nouns as mere 
conventional place-holders, the language itself bears special connection with its referent, 
which in the Kabballah was true of both speech and its written form. As Scholem writes, 
“[t]he script, which for the philologist is only a secondary and otherwise rather useless 
image of real speech, is for the kabbalist the true repository of its secrets.”128 Language 
and writing as such are charged with the power of the original texture of names.129 
 Kabbalah is too expansive of a tradition to expound in detail. Yet brief encounters 
with the tradition may have been all that Jacob Boehme had during his lifetime (1575-
1624 CE). Boehme indicates that a (probably Christianized) version of Kabbalah is yet 
one more tool of thought to climb toward further revelation.130 Like physical chemicals, 
language and meaning are also “sensed” in that words have certain inherent phonetic and 
meaningful qualities. While related, it is worth noting the urge of both alchemy and 
                                               
126 McCarthy cites Paracelsus’ terminology at least once in notes on Blood Meridian 
(Wittliff Southwestern Writers Collection, Cormac McCarthy, Box 7, Folder 6).  
127 Scholem, Gershom. Origins of the Kabbalah. Edited by R. J. Zwi Werblowsky. 
Translated by Allan Arkush. Princeton University Press, 1987), 277. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., 267. 
130 See Weeks, Boehme, 204-5.  
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Kabbalah to reduce the material or verbal to their essential potencies.131 This shared 
assumption—that there is something fundamental, important, and attainable at the core 
of both language and matter—is a structural premise that blurs familiar distinctions 
between language, science, and magic. Boehme thus draws on the ancient idea—
criticized by Socrates—of a noun’s special or proper relationship to its object. While 
Boehme sometimes emphasizes this relationship in writing, particularly when using 
Hebrew script, most of his texts focus on alchemical qualities, which draw on basic 
principles that emphasize sound and taste over the more complex codes of writing. In 
either case, aesthetics—the sensation and feeling of speech and script—Boehme 
considers fundamental constituents of meaning.  
For Boehme, all language contains the traces of an original nature-language 
“natursprach,” in which the actual sounds of words correspond with natural substances, 
“according to their qualities and innate.”132 Boehme’s approaches to names raises the basic 
question of what a name actually mean? Boehme believes that some names are not mere 
conventions for phenomena or natural kinds. Certain words and names carry essential—
sometimes magical—properties within their phonetic qualities rather than their 
orthography, script, or numerical value as in the Kabbalah from which Boehme was also 
drawing.133  One example of Boehme’s alchemical-etymological-phonetic parsing of Latin 
                                               
131 Peter Forshaw Chapter in Magee, Glenn Alex, ed, “The Cambridge handbook of 
western mysticism and esotericism” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
Language, for Boehme, also contains inherent meanings as derived from primal “nature 
language” see Weeks, Boehme, 77-78.  
132 Jacob Boehme, Aurora, eds. Eric Bowers and C.J. Parker, trans. John Sparrow (Online 
Publisher: Kraus House, 2016), 20.88-89.  
133 On influences from the Kabbalah, see Weeks, Boehme, 147. 
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and German to reveal an original “natursprach” can be found in Six Theosophical Points, 
McCarthy’s source for his direct quotation in Blood Meridian:  
If life desire is sulphur in itself, then is Phur out of Sul its darkening; but if it 
desire only Sul, then it receives the power of the light, and in the power the light 
with its property. For in Phur, viz. in fierce wrathful nature, life cannot remain 
clear as a mirror, but in Sul it can ; [sic] for the life of man is a true mirror of the 
Deity, wherein God beholds himself.134   
 
Andrew Weeks points out that the details of Boehme’s philological method is opaque in 
most cases, but his theory reveals the conceptual kernel that takes more explicit shape in 
a doctrine of natural “signatures” or correlation between material quality and meaning. In 
that scheme, the qualities concentrated in matter also express themselves in the sounds 
produced by mouths and lungs. Like a spell, in Boehme’s nature language the meaning of 
some words is embedded in their articulation or performance. An original syllable of 
natursprach exposed in the utterance, according Weeks, “both means and is the quality 
that it denotes.”135 Unlikely as such magical syllables may seem, Boehme’s concept of 
nature with intense points of qualitative coextension between matter, meaning, and 
performance intensifies language’s power and the significance of its failure. It can take 
speakers and hearers exactly as far into the creation of the universe as the original 
quellegeister (source-spirit) of sound, but not beyond. Such built-in limitations do not 
prevent Boehme from speculating further, however.  
In Aurora, Boehme nevertheless mines straight into the moral substance of the 
claim that all proceeds from God: “you must not therefore conceive that in God there is 
                                               
134 Jacob Boehme, Six Theosophic Points and Other Writings, trans. John Rolleston Earle 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1971), 65. 
135 Weeks, Boehme, 76-78.  
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good and evil, for God himself is the good, and hath the name from good, which is the 
triumphing eternal joy: Only all the powers which you can search out in nature, and 
which are in all things, proceed from him.”136 While this is consonant with an Augustinian 
privation model of evil, Boehme naturalizes violence and wrath as morally neutral 
“forces” that stem directly from the Godhead as “powers.” As his writings progress, 
Boehme finds that evil may manifest positive power, even if defined as a sort of chemical 
imbalance of the wrathful or bitter elements. As he digs deeper into his own imagery of 
the inner the divine life, God, turns out to be God only insofar as God is related to the 
determinate world of revelation. Prior to creation, however, the moral character of God is 
far less distinct. Boehme calls the violence of creation in the primal movements of the 
divine will the “Turba Magna.”137 As Boehme proceeds closer to the indistinct qualities of 
the inner divine life that precedes creation, he imagines the stillness of God as the 
bitterness of frustrated indistinctness. Here language simply has nothing to reference but 
pure qualities of sense and emotion. The fire of desire, which wrathfully responds to the 
tepid bitterness, proceeds the three principles (the trinity) of creation, and is the cause of 
all nameable things.138 There are technically no names prior to these primal qualities, 
though Boehme is not always consistent about keeping this rule.139  Like McCarthy, 
                                               
136 Boehme, Aurora, 2.63. 
137 Boehme, Six Theosophical Points, 147-9. 
138 Ibid., 41. 
139 Crews notes that two overt philosophical influences on Blood Meridian, Jacob Boehme 
and the German Zen student, Eugen Herrigel, can both be understood as finally 
producing indexical signs or interpreting them. Crews notes that the Zen concept of 
satori, which Herrigel interprets as the realization of things being equal, likely influenced 
McCarthy’s famous “optical democracy” of Blood Meridian’s desert (BM 259). For 
Herrigel, this equalization of things points (or indicates) backward toward a common, 
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Boehme’s own works are difficult to systematize. He often contradicts himself in 
subsequent formulations of similar ideas. Andrew Weeks ends his exhaustive study of 
Boehme noting that the reformulations and revisions of his own models may be “read as 
a conventionalized puzzle rather than as a reported vision or philosophical exposition.”140 
According to Weeks, each plastic effort to express the divine vis-à-vis nature fails, and 
each attempt to solve the puzzle also exhausts the puzzle. The failure is a kind of lesson 
that directs one’s interpretation away from the sign and toward the world and the moral 
life. 
This brief survey serves as a point of reference for the devotional and 
philosophical background of one strain of Christianized Neoplatonist apophatic writing. 
It is not meant to argue that apophaticism as such requires one specific understanding of 
names or answers to a single governing principle for how names interact with their 
metaphysical referents. However, it should be clear that when apophatic rhetoric is 
deployed, it often serves a distinct religious or philosophical position. Within a religious 
tradition that guides the interpretation of apophatic signs, its purposes and outcomes are 
somewhat more or less reliable. The examples demonstrate that the shape of apophatic 
rhetoric is determined in some part by the premises about the reach of language vis-à-vis 
the representation of divine reality. For example, Boehme’s move to make evil an active 
                                               
undifferentiated origin (Crews, Books, 187). Crews notes that McCarthy’s notes indicate 
that he consulted the Berdyaev essay that introduces the English edition of Six 
Theosophical Points. (Crews, Books, 157). Berdyaev emphasizes Boehme’s “signatures” 
or traces of spiritual truth within physical nature, and which also includes the imprint of 
evil in the world.  
140 Weeks, Boehme, 171.  
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power in nature follows a logic that requires the principles of nature to be rooted in God, 
which are more or less proximate to the source of creation. In that sense, the 
metaphysical framework sets limits on nameable entities, that is, of substances, essences, 
or forms that can stand real reference. Boehme inherits this general framework from a 
Neoplatonic tradition that ranks being in orders of relative intensity. The resultant 
spirituality imagines the orders of being to be a chain or a ladder up (or, in Boehme’s 
case, down) which one can imaginatively climb.141 Dionysius’ Divine Names and Mystical 
Theology likewise guide the reader up and down this chain in order to intensify certain 
transcendent aspects of God. More systematically, Cusanus removes any single name’s 
adhesive quality with the relatively simple principle of non-aliud combined with the 
premise that slicing the world into determinate, distinctive entities is precisely the 
function of names—used to pick out and identify individuals and distinct, determinate 
categories.  
While the above examples help to illuminate the features of apophatic rhetoric, 
they contrast with a literary body like McCarthy’s that lacks a univocal doctrine to limit 
it. The above direct and genetic influences are significant because it is not clear exactly 
which metaphysical models serve as firm points of orientation to the negative language 
employed in McCarthy’s novels. Likewise, the religious and philosophical background of 
even anonymous authors like Pseudo-Dionysius, for example, can be located within a 
specific tradition with determinate commitments and boundaries. As discussed above, Jay 
                                               
141 See Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). The geography of Dante’s Divine 
Comedy is an another imaginative rendering of this ontological model. 
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Aaron Beavers detects forms of indication via absence in Suttree and Blood Meridian, but 
interprets the broad indication as a specific form of transcendence put forward by Karl 
Barth. McCarthy, however, seems content with representing worlds that are only 
ambiguously hospitable to specific philosophical and theological frameworks. In that 
sense, McCarthy’s worlds may simply be realistic in the sense of being metaphysically 
vague and allowing any number of interpretations. As will be demonstrated by 
application and expansion of the above survey, there is evidence in the novels for a 
plurality of possible metaphysics. Yet all such frameworks are  contestable and the novels 
do contest them explicitly. For the purposes of this project, however, it is important both 
to demonstrate both the similarities—like a preoccupation with names—that launch the 
question, as well as the even more numerous disparities that texture McCarthy’s 
apophatic narrative style.  
Names, Doubts, Hyperbole in McCarthy’s Novels 
 
Names are the first stage in the argument for an apophatic narrative rhetoric in 
McCarthy for several reasons. First, because naming is a basic limiting-aspect of any 
discourse, but also because so many entities in McCarthy go conspicuously unnamed or 
overnamed: the kid (later the man), the judge (Holden, we find out), black Johnson and 
white Johnson stand in contrast with the fully named but irrelevant lists of dead in injured 
(Blood Meridian); the bearded one, the “nameless one,” and Harmon (Outer Dark); Black 
and White (Sunset Limited); Ben and Big Ben (The Stonemason), the man, the boy (The 
Road). By contrast, we see a proliferation of names in Suttree and No Country for Old 
Men. Cornelius “Bud” or “Buddy” Suttree (Buddy Suttree is possibly a mangled form of 
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bodhi-sattva) along with the whole tangle of nicknamed characters of McAnally Flats are 
consonant with both Suttree and his narration’s struggle over the particularities and 
diffusions of selfhood.142 Within the basic narration of the novels, Jay Ellis notes that 
McCarthy uses names mostly to differentiate between speakers, and even then not always 
very clearly. Otherwise, characters are generally identified through context and by 
gendered pronouns.143  
Both McCarthy’s high-register vocabulary and tendency to neologize reflect a 
respect for the capacity of names to do real referential work and, at times, emphasize 
their limitations. McCarthy’s focus on nomenclature is more consistently specific when 
the reference is to non-animate objects. The desert landscape in Blood Meridian, the 
pollution of the Tennessee River in Suttree, horse tackle in the Border Trilogy, are all 
described with exacting precision. Ellis notes that the technical and consumer 
nomenclature in No Country for Old Men is conspicuous and even a little silly. For 
example in the first few pages of the novel, Llewelyn Moss notes that “[t]he shotgun had 
a short barrel and it was fitted with a pistol stock and a twenty round drum magazine” 
and “[t]he third vehicle was a Bronco with a lifted suspension and dark smoked 
                                               
142 Ellis, No Place for Home, 132. Ellis makes use of William C. Spencer’s observation of 
the bodhisattva connection. Suttree explicitly deals with his struggle to assert his own 
haecceity (thisness), as opposed to the quiddity (whatness) of family and role: “I’m like 
me” (S 18).  
143 Ellis also makes thorough analysis of possible encoded autobiographical information in 
the names of some characters, also observing the punctuated effects of withholding 
character names and suddenly offering one. A poignant instance of this is the naming of 
Sarah Borginnis in Blood Meridian who morphs from “Sarah Borginnis,” to “the 
Borginnis woman,” to simply “The Borginnis” (BM 253-4). See Ellis, No Place for 
Home, 9.  
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windows.”  Likewise, he notices (or else the narration is preoccupied by) the trivial 
details of the “shortbarreled H&K machinepistol with a black nylon shoulderstrap,” 
which is lying on the lap of a man shot and dying of blood-loss and thirst, but who is of 
secondary importance (NC 12-3). Moss the fugitive likewise shops for new clothes with 
an almost preening emphasis on brand and style—“Larry Mahan’s,” “Stetson,” and 
“Wrangler”—in insecure competition with the far more expensive branding of Anton 
Chigurh and Wells (NC 190-1, 290). When contrasted with the life and death stakes of 
the book, the preoccupations with specifications of gear-type and brand-name ring 
especially hollow.144  
The reach of names—and potentially of language itself—corresponds with the 
type of world in which they exist or which they construct. Through the explicit evocation 
of a referential void or by the arguments of the villain philosophers, however, the 
McCarthy’s names render their own references provisional or unstable. For example, in 
Steven Shaviro’s case for a monistic metaphysics in Blood Meridian, the Judge Holden is 
imagined as the spokesperson for nature. In the Spinozistic world for which Shaviro 
argues, there are no real natural distinctions between determinate entities and therefore 
nothing to be truly named except by provisional human distinctions. The thematic 
violence of the novel emphasizes that there is no pattern beyond that ultimate unity 
“forced” by conflict and therefore no determinate meaning can be ascribed to it.145 
                                               
144 Ellis pages referencing Moss’s obsession with gear, shopping, brand. See Ellis, No 
Place for Home, 235.  
145 Steven Shaviro, “’The Very Life of the Darkness’: A Reading of Blood Meridian,” in 
Perspectives on Cormac McCarthy, Arnold, Edwin T., and Dianne C. Luce, eds. 
(Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1999), 149. 
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According to the judge, everything beyond the world-substance unified by a “nameless 
rage” will face into “a night that is eternal and without name” (BM 151, 331).146 Likewise, 
in the judge’s commentary on history and destiny, he evokes a similar coincidence of 
opposites to that of Cusanus, though torn from a theological context of ultimate charity: 
A man seeks his own destiny and no other, said the judge. Will or nill. Any man 
who could discover his own fate and elect there-fore some opposite course 
could only come at last to that self-same reckoning at the same appointed time, 
for each man's destiny is as large as the world he inhabits and contains within it all 
opposites as well. This desert upon which so many have been broken is vast and 
calls for largeness of heart but it is also ultimately empty. It is hard, it is barren. 
Its very nature is stone (BM 343, emphasis mine). 
 
Theo Finigan argues that Judge Holden finally concludes that indeed all paths and wills 
do indeed lead to “nill.”147 One’s descent into a night or brief inscription on stone leads to 
the same conceptual soup in which distinctions, paths, and individual destinies crumble. 
Because this is the conclusion of the judge who may also be, according to Rich Wallach, 
the book’s archon of language and writing, the “nill” is also a possible end to all 
discourse, whether apophatic or not. 148  Any life’s fragile thread of meaning eventually 
dissolves into nothing—at least, according to the judge. The question Vereen Bell raises 
in his famous book on McCarthy and nihilism raises is whether or not the judge’s 
                                               
146 The night, however, references the judge’s dancing bears of language discussed further 
below. 
147 See Theo Finigan, “’Archives of Our Own Divising’: Structural Fatality in Cormac 
McCarthy’s Blood Meridian, or The Evening Redness in the West” in Cormac 
McCarthy’s Violent Destinies: The Poetics of Determinism and Fatalism, Brad Bannon 
and John Vanderheide, eds. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2017).  
148 Rick Wallach, “Judge Holden, Blood Meridian’s Evil Archon” in Sacred Violence: 
Volume 2, eds. Wade H. Hall and Rick Wallach (El Paso, TX: Texas Western Press, 
2002). See also  Daugherty, “Graver’s False and True,” (2002).  
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nihilistic conclusion is the only one available.149 These are the stakes McCarthy places on 
the fate of names and their meaning.  
Also at risk in McCarthy’s destabilization of names are the basic elements in the 
natural formation and social maintenance of names. Chris Danta observes of The Road’s 
association of the sun with language: “With the loss of proper access to the sun comes the 
loss of the concepts we derive metaphorically from this sun,” as stable source of light and 
regulated point of reference.150 While The Road is the most aggressive of the novels in its 
erasure of names, pressure on the concept appears on almost every novel in some form, 
explicit or implicit. The judge’s practice of archival erasure of particulars is a good 
example. The judge’s method of drawing, notating, and then destroying particulars works 
as a form of control only if the features that contribute to their common, conventional 
names are annihilated and logged only in a secret book. Such socially grounded 
conventions must always be entrusted or “tabernacled,” as the judge puts it, in another 
person or witness (BM 146). Considering the types of character McCarthy introduces as 
potential stewards of names, the resulting emphasis lands on this vulnerable fact of 
names—one must trust other people maintain them. The closing lines of The Orchard 
Keeper likewise suggest the decomposition of this trust in social memory: “On the lips of 
the strange race that now dwells there their names are myth, legend, dust” (OK 246). For 
a story about friendship between a boy and the murderer of the boy’s father—all 
                                               
149 See Bell, Achievement, 1988. 
150 Chris Danta, “The Cold Illucid World: The Poetics of Gray in Cormac McCarthy’s The 
Road,” in Styles of Extinction: Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, eds. Julian Murphet and 
Mark Steven, eds. (London ; New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2012), 15. 
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unknown and unnamed to the characters—such losses may either be a blessing or a 
horror.  
  Examples of the above varieties of pressure on naming and, by extension, on 
language, abound in McCarthy. The instances examined here are not an exhaustive 
account of them, but serve as occasions in each novel of a consistent anxiety about the 
status and stability of names. In many cases, McCarthy simultaneously emphasizes their 
fragility, their possible overextension, and hints at the conditions of their transcendence. 
The problem of naming, both individuals and natural categories is explicit in 
Outer Dark. In the first campfire dialogue between Culla and the three men—“the 
bearded one,” Harmon, and “the silent one”—the issue of names is raised by the bearded 
one, who chides Culla for being secretive about his. When Culla reveals his surname, the 
bearded one brags that he never gave “the silent one” a name: “He wanted me to give him 
one but I wouldn’t do it. He don’t need nary. You ever see a man with no name afore?” 
and then asks Culla if he would like to know his name (OD 174). He declines, though the 
man muses: “I expect they’s lots would like to know that” (OD 175). He goes on to say 
that “Some things is best not named, the man said. Harmon here—he gestured toward the 
squatting figure—that’s his right name. I like for him to set and listen even if he cain’t 
understand much” (OD 175). After listening to Culla answer’s answers to questions about 
his journey, the bearded one interrupts him: “I wouldn’t name him because if you cain’t 
name something you can’t claim it. You cain’t talk about it even. You cain’t say what it 
is. I got Harmon to look after him if they do fight. I keep studyin him. He’s close, but I 
keep at it” (OD 177-8). The bearded one introduces yet another vaguely pronounced 
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entity, “they,” a mounted figure who seems to stalk the river alongside the three. The 
scene is as confusing to Culla as it is to the reader, who discovers that the three figures 
who haunt Culla are themselves haunted by this fourth, nameless figure.  
Later, when Culla stumbles upon the three men again, they have murdered a 
tinker who was the surrogate caregiver to Culla’s incestuously conceived child—whom 
they now possess. Culla asks the bearded one:  
What’s his name? 
He ain’t got nary’n. 
No. I don’t reckon. I don’t know.  
They say people in hell ain’t got names. But they had to be called somethin to get 
sent there. Didn’t they.  
That tinker might of named him.  
It wasn’t his to name. Besides names dies with the namers. A dead man’s dog 
ain’t got a name. He reached and drew from his boot a slender knife.  
Holme seemed to be speaking to something  
in the night beyond them all. My sister would take him, he said. That chap. We 
could find her and she’d take him.  
Yes, the man said.  
I been huntin her. (OD 235) 
 
The passage refers directly back to Culla’s exchange with his sister Rinthy at the novel’s 
opening. In this earlier dialogue, Rinthy, hoping to visit the child’s gravesite with flowers 
(Culla has lied about the child’s death), asks Culla where he buried it:  
Flowers, he said. It ain’t even got a name.  
She was twisting her hands again and he came from the table where he had been 
leaning and started past her.  
Culla ...  
He stopped at the door and looked at her. She hadn’t even looked around.  
We could give it one, she said.  
It’s dead, he said. You don’t name things dead. (OD 31) 
 
Here, names are a moral liability. The bearded one’s preoccupation with names by which 
to render a claim is what, apparently, licenses his murders throughout the book. No one is 
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responsible for the unnamed, just as the unnamed cannot be held responsible. Names 
apply only loosely to the living and, as a rule, never to the dead. They count for claims, as 
the bearded one suggests, but appear elsewhere as socially basic—for identifying 
property or for doing good business: “I like to know a man’s name when I hire him,” says 
one of Culla’s employers (OD 43). If Joshua Pederson is correct and the three are the 
allegorical rendering of the Christian Trinity in its most fickle and abusive modality, the 
theatrics of the Holme child’s eventual murder is a human sacrifice—one literally 
consumed by the mute branch of the unnamed trinitarian God.151 
 Alternative interpretations for this grisly scene indirectly support an apophatic 
reading. For example, Christopher Nelson argues for Outer Dark’s categorization as a 
horror because it depicts violence without nameable categories like reasonable causes or 
motives. Nelson cites Vereen Bell, who argues that McCarthy’s characters appear to be 
like mere specimens of Homo sapiens “before the bicameral brain enabled us—or 
                                               
151 Joshua Pederson, The Forsaken Son: Child Murder and Atonement in Modern 
American Fiction (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2016), 111. The passage 
combines a nearly ritual human sacrifice of the unnamed child with an act of 
cannibalism, ostensibly by a trained disabled adult: “Harmon was watching the man. 
Even the mute one stirred. The man took hold of the child and lifted it up. It was 
watching the fire. Holme saw the blade wink in the light like a long cat’s eye slant and 
malevolent and a dark smile erupted on the child’s throat and went all broken down the 
front of it. The child made no sound. It hung there with its one eye glazing over like a wet 
stone and the black blood pumping down its naked belly. The mute one knelt forward. He 
was drooling and making little whimpering noises in his throat. He knelt with his hands 
outstretched and his nostrils rimpled delicately. The man handed him the child and he 
seized it up, looked once at Holme with witless eyes, and buried his moaning face in its 
throat” 235-6). 
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compelled us—to sort things out.”152  Violence has no purpose, no articulate reason 
behind it. It is doubly frightening when erupting from unpredictable, unnamed sources. 
Outer Dark feeds its sense of horror by denying signals of internality, as Nelson notes. 
“The riders who most strongly embody this menace are not named, because naming 
would both locate the menace and suggest potential insight.”153 An identifiable agent 
“inside” a body with responsibilities to a community “outside” is a minimum component 
of social trust. According to Nelson, Outer Dark does not simply withhold those 
reassuring identifiers, it raises the question of whether or not language has the capacity to 
identify some kinds of bodies and minds in the first place.154 Because the novel offers few 
names with which to grip such a determinate identity, their absence suggests that “most 
things are not just unknown, but unknowable and therefore unable to be spoken,” 
including both identity and intention.155 The novel’s horror at least partially derives from 
this sense of linguistic powerlessness on the part of not only the characters but of the 
reader. The ambient feeling that results is that figures and characters could be anyone and 
do anything.  
Nelson’s analysis of Outer Dark’s nameless violence contrasts with the 
ambivalence between evil and action in No Country for Old Men. As noted above, the 
male characters in No Country place their trust in highly specific and named gear to 
                                               
152 This idea comes from Bell, Achievement, 2; cited by Christopher R. Nelson, “A Style of 
Horror: Is Evil Real in Cormac McCarthy’s Outer Dark?” Critique: Studies in 
Contemporary Fiction 53, no. 1 (January 2012): 32, 36. 
153 Ibid., 35. 
154 Nelson, Horror, 38. 
155 Ibid., 63. 
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survive—though they generally do not. Anton Chigurh kills for money or power and 
explains it with appeals to a deep—perhaps insane—sense of determinate causation and 
fate that he can name, know, and reduce to the binary yes/no of a flipped coin. The horror 
that troubles Ed Tom Bell in No Country for Old Men is named with repeated specificity:  
Chigurh  
Sugar? 
Chigurh. Anton Chigurh. (NC 152)  
 
Yet Bell avoids Chigurh by preoccupying himself with speculation on  the nameless 
forces that produce Chigurh: a perceived cultural malaise, a vague decadence driving 
society backward into the primitive mode Nelson describes.156 Ed Tom feels terror at the 
specific, but settles back into blaming the vague: people going around with “bones in 
their noses” whom, he speculates, “cant tell the difference between rapin and murderin 
someone and chewin gum” (NC 295, 196). Bell’s politics tends to reference apparently 
unmotivated and unnamed violence back to clichés about the country that’s “goin to hell 
in a handbasket” (NC 196). Bell’s complex assessment of his own moral cowardice is a 
textual feature Hillier has skillfully highlighted. A key and only somewhat conscious 
aspect of that cowardice on Ed Tom’s part is his habitual refusal engage his own 
perceptive horror as something other than a cultural problem with determinate but 
vaguely defined groups of people to blame. Both mutually compounding habits keep him 
insulated from the costs of mounting meaningful moral resistance to evil. 
Blood Meridian’s narration emphasizes the economy of names, language, and 
moral resistance, yet the progress of the novel finds them similarly strained. The first 
                                               
156 Ibid., 32. 
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page of the novel signals the inadequacy of names to their basic referents. For example, 
of the father of the novel’s chief character, the kid, the narrator says 
He lies in drink, he quotes from poets whose names are now lost. The boy 
crouches by the fire and watches him. Night of your birth. Thirty-three. The 
Leonids they were called. God how the stars did fall. I looked for blackness, holes 
in the heavens. The Dipper stove. The mother dead these fourteen years did 
incubate in her own bosom the creature who would carry her off. The father never 
speaks her name, the child does not know it. (BM 1) 
 
The father, the quoted poets, the mother, and the child are all nameless. The only actual 
name in the passage is the reference to the Leonid meteor shower of 1833, which was at 
the time interpreted by some as the judgement of God.157 The pattern is: a “he” with no-
name, poets with no-names, the name of an “act of God,” God, the name of a stellar 
constellation, no-name, and finally no-name again. The contrast between nameless 
referents to named ones is stark and its scale is cosmic. God has names, celestial bodies 
have names, people do not.  
 On the status of language and names, the narration of Blood Meridian and the 
character of Judge Holden are sometimes in consonance, sometimes in competition. The 
direct claim of the judge is that: “Words are things” (BM 89). As spoken, they are 
certainly objects, extant vibrations with conventional meanings that generate responses in 
a social world. In context, words are imperatives and performatives that are ritually 
                                               
157 Linda Emley shares an account of a Tennessee slave, Amanda, who witnessed the 
shower: “But then the white folks started callin’ all the slaves together, and for no reason, 
they started tellin’ some of the slaves who their mothers and fathers was, and who they’d 
been sold to and where. The old folks was so glad to hear where their people went. They 
made sure we all knew what happened, you see, they thought it was Judgment Day.” 
Linda Emley, The Richmond Daily News Online, https://www.richmond-
dailynews.com/2012/12/in-1833-the-sky-fell-but-life-went-on/.   
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bestowed upon certain individuals, like Sargent Aguilar in the scene, whose witness as 
representative of the law is necessary to legitimize the otherwise criminal gang. The 
judge explains the encounter with reference to history, destiny, authority, and ritual. 
However, since in the end, “the judge doled coins into Aguilar's palm” (BM 90), the 
performed ritual diminishes into a bribe just as our interpretation of the judge may reduce 
him to a mere charlatan. Words may be somewhat more sturdy as things, but the 
narration exposes that they can also be bought and sold. Yet in this, too, McCarthy’s 
novels are not univocal. In a contrasting episode, Billy Parham cynically refers to bribery 
in Cities of the Plain, “[y]eah. And I know what talks, too.” When rebuked by the 
dialogue’s police captain for the insinuation, he attempts to un-say it, “if that’s true, I take 
back what I said” (COP 243). The judge and Blood Meridian’s narrator similarly vie over 
the status of language and writing—the former erasing and inscribing in his ledger, while 
the latter is an inscription that subtly questions the legitimacy of words that are for sale—
and cheap.  
 That said, even the judge’s own positions on language appear contradictory. He 
vacillates between a hyperbolic approbation of language and ironic dismissal of his own 
project. It is difficult to square his response to another gang-member’s appeal to 
scripture—“books lie”—and the notion that all things can be reduced to writing and that 
the world is a book—“and a false book is no book at all” (BM 122, 147). He goes on, 
“Whether in my book or not, every man is tabernacled in every other and he in 
exchange and so on in an endless complexity of being and witness to the uttermost edge 
of the world” (BM 147). As in Outer Dark, the names written in the book require a 
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witness to maintain their meaning. Without a witness, there is no convention or rule 
that keeps a name naming the referred-to object, category, or kind for which it is 
supposed to stand.158 But the judge’s ambition—he claims—is to be the only witness to 
the particulars, the categories, and the kinds that he destroyed or are already extinct.  
 The judge’s ledger is a synecdoche for knowledge: “Whatever in creation exists 
without my knowledge exists without my consent” (BM 207). It is a census-book for a 
“suzerain,” as he claims, a document of imperial will over beings, which will “rout out” 
every last entity and make it “stand naked before him,” much like an Adam giving names 
to the animals (BM 207).159  Judge Holden’s use and abuse of language and logic is 
masterful to the point, at times, of toxic form of a generic Enlightenment era thought.160 
Yet representation, notes, and writing are the primary means of the ulterior project beside 
the gang’s espoused goal of systematic murder. The judge’s use of the ledger toward 
purported dominance over nature has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.161 More 
important here is the archetypal presence of this type of documentation as persistent and 
ongoing. In one passage describing the judge’s note-taking, Blood Meridian’s narration 
                                               
158 The figure of the “witness” is not necessarily a corrective, but a legitimator. It could be 
read as a variation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument: “'obeying a rule' is a 
practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible 
to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same 
thing as obeying it.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M 
Anscombe, trans. (New York: Prentice Hall, 1958), 81 (§202). 
159 See Genesis 2:20. Also see Snyder, Phillip and Delys, “Modernism, Postmodernism, 
and Language: Cormac McCarthy’s Style” in The Cambridge Companion to Cormac 
McCarthy. Steven Frye, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), . 
160 Hillier, Morality, 39, 48; Potts, Signs of Sacrament, 54. 
161 See, for example, Dorson, Demystifying the Judge, 111; Hillier, Morality, 78; Jarrett, 
Cormac McCarthy, 79-81;  Potts, Signs of Sacrament, 52. 
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shifts suddenly to the present tense about half-way through its paragraph and then back 
again. 
The judge all day had made small forays among the rocks of the gorge through 
which they'd passed and now at the fire he spread part of a wagonsheet on the 
ground and was sorting out his finds and arranging them before him. In his lap he 
held the leather ledgerbook and he took up each piece, flint or potsherd or tool 
of bone, and deftly sketched it into the book. He sketched with a practiced ease 
and there was no wrinkling of that bald brow or pursing of those oddly childish 
lips. His fingers traced the impression of old willow wicker on a piece of pottery 
clay and he put this into his book with nice shadings, an economy of pencil 
strokes. He is a draftsman as he is other things, well sufficient to the task. He 
looks up from time to time at the fire or at his companions in arms or at the night 
beyond. Lastly he set before him the footpiece from a suit of armor hammered 
out in a shop in Toledo three centuries before, a small steel tapadero frail and 
shelled with rot. This the judge sketched in profile and in perspective, citing the 
dimensions in his neat script, making marginal notes (BM 146). 
 
The switch in tense occurs in a style similar to Blood Meridian’s “pale-suttler,” and the 
that of the hounds in Suttree’s closing paragraph, both of which both evoke endemic 
aspect of the human condition—disease and death.162 Likewise, the final lines of Blood 
Meridian also switch abruptly to the present tense. “He is dancing, dancing” might 
indicate that the judge is also writing, writing (BM 349, emphasis mine).163 The novel’s 
                                               
162 “The dust the party raised was quickly dispersed and lost in the immensity of that 
landscape and there was no dust other for the pale sutler who pursued them drives 
unseen and his lean horse and his lean cart leave no track upon such ground or any 
ground. By a thousand fires in the iron blue dusk he keeps his commissary and he's a 
wry and grinning tradesman good to follow every campaign or hound men from their 
holes in just those whited regions where they've gone to hide from God” (BM 46) and 
“[s]omewhere in the gray wood by the river is the huntsman and in the brooming corn 
and in the castellated press of the cities. His work lies all wheres and his hounds tire not. I 
have seen them in a dream, slaverous and wild and their eyes crazed with ravening for 
souls in this world. Fly them” (S 471). 
163 It is worth noting that the end of Boehme’s Aurora or Morning Redness in the Rising of 
the Sun, reads: “The devil also dances at this gate, for it is the prison wherein the new 
man lies hid, and wherein the devil lies captive,” the prison is “bolted up again by the 
fierceness of God’s wrath,” (27.98-99).  
   
 
80 
narration colludes with the character of the judge to suggest that even the reader may be 
haunted by an enduring archetype, this time of encroaching and inescapable textuality in 
which names are owned and managed by the judge.   
Yet while the judge is a scribe, his business is also erasure. He destroys the 
originals of things represented in his ledger, but also other forms of writing. This is the 
case of his obliteration of the petroglyphs of the Hueco Tanks in Texas: 
The rocks about in every sheltered place were covered with ancient paintings and 
the judge was soon among them copying out those certain ones into his book to 
take away with him. They were of men and animals and of the chase and there 
were curious birds and arcane maps and there were constructions of such singular 
vision as to justify every fear of man and the things that are in him. Of these 
etchings-some bright yet with color-there were hundreds, and yet the judge went 
among them with assurance, tracing out the very ones which he required. When 
he had done and while there yet was light he returned to a certain stone ledge and 
sat a while and studied again the work there. Then he rose and with a piece of 
broken chert he scappled away one of the designs, leaving no trace of it only a 
raw place on the stone where it had been. (BM 180) 
 
The comment on the unconscious “fear of man and the things that are in him” is 
consonant with McCarthy’s recent non-fiction essays on language and the unconscious.164 
The judge’s destruction of the painting would seem to speak against his previous rhetoric 
on the subject of memory and stone:  
For whoever makes a shelter of reeds and hides has joined his spirit to the 
common destiny of creatures and he will subside back into the primal mud with 
scarcely a cry. But who builds in stone seeks to alter the structure of the universe 
and so it was with these masons however primitive their works may seem to us. 
(BM 152) 
 
                                               
164 See “The Kukulé Problem,” Nautilus, April 20, 2017 and  “Cormac McCarthy Returns 
to the Kukulé Problem,” Nautilus, November 30, 2017. See also Julie Sedvidy’s response 
“A Linguist Responds to Cormac McCarthy,” Nautilus, May 25th, 2017.  
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 But the judge is slippery. He does not say that the alternative “cry” that alters the 
structure of the universe makes any difference or that the rain will not eventually erode 
all of the deeds of every life (BM 207-8). There is no sense in which building in reeds and 
hides alters the universe any less than building in stone. But the judge encourages the 
intent to resist “the common destiny,” even though it is not clear precisely why other than 
as a pure exercise of will.165 
 The judge’s paradoxes notwithstanding, Blood Meridian’s narration sometimes 
aligns itself with Holden’s hyperbolic deflation of language and names by inflating 
historical scales. In other words, the narration draws attention to time by naming epochs 
so vast that they could not possibly support the specific contexts needed for language and 
writing. For example, the narrator describes the gang as 
Like beings provoked out of the absolute rock and set nameless and at no 
remove from their own loomings to wander ravenous and doomed and mute as 
gorgons shambling the brutal wastes of Gondwanaland in a time before 
nomenclature was and each was all (BM 180)  
 
This passage will be dealt with more extensively in Chapter 3, however the ironic 
anachronistic reference to Gondwanaland imagines a named time prior to the 
existence of any names where distinctions were less sharp than those delimited by 
                                               
165 The proto-Nietzschean aspect of the judge has been commented on frequently. For 
thorough examinations, see Potts, Signs of Sacrament, Chapter 2; Shaviro, “The Very 
Life of the Darkness,” 149-50; Linda Woodson, “’The Lighted Display Case’: A 
Nietzschean Reading of Cormac McCarthy’s Border Fiction,” in Philosophical 
Approaches to Cormac McCarthy, ed. Christopher Eagle (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
However, the judge seems more like an amalgam of possible arguments more than he is 
reducible to any one of the many he puts forward. See, for example, the Darwinian 
reading of Christopher Douglas, “‘If God Meant to Interfere’: Evolution and Theodicy in 
Blood Meridian.” Religion & Literature 45, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 83–107. 
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“nomenclature.”166 Similarly, the judge and John Robert are described as figures “whose 
very portent renders them ambiguous. Like things so charged with meaning that their 
forms are dimmed” (BM 294). Such things may or may not ever exist as true references 
to the words. However, the passage is one of the few indications in the novel that 
language might be overwhelmed with meaning rather than simply drained of it.  
 Finally, Blood Meridian’s closing scenes deal with language, the creatures that 
use it, and their role in the unfolding of history. The significance of language again 
expands and then contracts again, suggesting both its importance and fragility. The 
passage is ambivalent about what the eventual failure of language indicates about 
either language or about the world without it: 
 The judge set the bottle on the bar. Hear me, man, he said. There is room on the 
stage for one beast and one alone. All others are destined for a night that is 
eternal and without name. One by one they will step down into the darkness 
before the footlamps. Bears that dance, bears that dont. (BM 345) 
 
The judge’s reference is to Madam Bovary’s narration’s claim that “[h]uman speech is 
like a cracked kettle on which we beat out tunes for bears to dance to, when we long to 
move the stars to pity.”167 Note, though, that the bear in the scene is already shot dead. 
                                               
166 Rick Wallach points out that the name was not coined until 1912. See Rick Wallach, 
“Cormac McCarthy’s Metaphors of Antiquity and Deep Time” in Cormac McCarthy: 
Uncharted Territories/Territoires Inconnus, edited by Christine Chollier (Reims: Presses 
universitaires de Reims, 2003). 
167 Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, Lydia Davis trans. (New York: Penguin Books, 
2014), 146. 
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 Hungerford has argued that this scene’s discourse on language refers to the 
McCarthy’s own literary ascent through the achievement of the scribal judge.168 Yet, as 
Rich Wallach argues, the eventual total enclosure of the man, and the reader, in the text-
body of the judge is the nightmare result of Blood Meridian. The blank, scribal judge 
gathers us “in his arms against his immense and terrible flesh” and shoots “the wooden 
barlatch home behind him” (BM 347). It is possible that the judge is correct, that we, like 
the man, are trapped in language’s “tentshow whose ultimate destination after many a 
pitch in many a mudded field is unspeakable and calamitous beyond reckoning” (BM 
256). That “night, eternal and without name,” is one possible image of what remains 
outside the limits of speech. But McCarthy’s subsequent novels suggest that the 
judge’s is not the only way of reckoning with the fragility of language and its 
potential costs.   
All the Pretty Horses, for example, contains several decisive moments around the 
limits of conventional names, most of which center around association with Jimmy 
Blevins. The name is a pseudonym absorbed by an adolescent character from the radio 
preacher, Jimmy Blevins, whose mass-marketed name and Gospel Hour reaches 
internationally and, if rumors are true, even cosmically—“did you know that they can 
hear it on Mars?” (APH 297). But, according to the relevant Jimmy Blevins, “[t]hat's 
another Jimmy Blevins” (APH 44). Blevins adopts the name because, as is apparent to 
Rawlins, someone is hunting him, his gun, and his horse. Yet the name taken to protect 
                                               
168 See Amy Hungerford, "ENGL 291: The American Novel Since 1945," lecture, Yale 
University and New Haven, CT., Accessed February 24, 2019, 
https://oyc.yale.edu/english/engl-291/lecture-18. 
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his actual identity later becomes, “the assassin Blevins,” who is shot in retribution for 
murder and horse theft (ATP 165). By the time John Grady returns to Texas, the only 
trace of Blevins is the name’s diffusion and replication via radio. John Grady’s 
conversation with the true Jimmy Blevins yields only more possible referents: 
Did you know a boy about fourteen years old named Jimmy Blevins? 
[….] Boy named Jimmy Blevins? You mean just plain Jimmy Blevins?  
Yessir.  
No. No. Not that I recollect. There's any number of Jimmy Blevinses out there in 
the world but its Jimmy Blevins Smith and Jimmy Blevins Jones. There aint a 
week passes we dont get one or two letters tellin us about a new Jimmy Blevins 
this or Jimmy Blevins that. Aint that right darlin?  
That's right reverend.  
We get em from overseas you know. Jimmy Blevins Chang. That was one we had 
here recent. Little old yeller baby. They send photos you know. Snapshots. What 
was your name?  
Cole. John Grady Cole. (APH 295) 
 
 The name as a proper noun becomes meaningless as a sign for a specific person, which 
leaves no trace of the boy who took his given name to his grave.  
 Other characters own their names with varying degrees of power. John Grady, in 
contrast to Belvins, is forthright about his name in almost all circumstances. Yet the name 
is the point of reference that gives Duena Alfonsa significant control over his fate both in 
la Purisima and in the prison. Alfonsa’s own story is likewise one of being determined by 
family, blood ties carried by proper names. To Alfonsa, these are just some of the 
arbitrary forces that determine much of her own history:  
For me the world has always been more of a puppet show. But when one looks 
behind the curtain and traces the strings upward he finds they terminate in the 
hands of yet other puppets, themselves with their own strings which trace upward 
in turn, and so on. In my own life I saw these strings whose origins were endless 
enact the deaths of great men in violence and madness. (APH 231) 
 
   
 
85 
In Alfonsa’s interpretation of the history of the Madero family and her own, the forces of 
culture, idea, and blood-lines all conspire to pare away sentimental ideals. In both 
interviews, the story she tells John Grady is of her experience as a young person who 
thought ideas could be imposed upon reality with political will and charisma. Francisco 
and Gustavo Madero made the attempt and were murdered in the process. Don Hector 
dismisses the core of their beliefs because of suspect origins—"that people can be 
improved in their character by reason” as “a very French idea” (APH 346). The ethnic 
attribution of ideas are also the puppet strings that Alfonsa traces back to Spain where 
blood, she says, not reason or language, confirms the truth. “In the Spaniard's heart,” she 
claims, “is a great yearning for freedom, but only his own. A great love of truth and 
honor in all its forms, but not in its substance. And a deep conviction that nothing can be 
proven except that it be made to bleed” (APH 230). This is the counter position to her 
early belief (and that of the Maderos) that “everything seemed possible” (APH 233). But 
the ultimate constraint on possibility, she identifies, is Mexico itself: 
Francisco was the most deluded of all. He was never suited to be president of 
Mexico. He was hardly even suited to be Mexican. In the end we all come to be 
cured of our sentiments. Those whom life does not cure death will. The world is 
quite ruthless in selecting between the dream and the reality, even where we will 
not. Between the wish and the thing the world lies waiting. I've thought a great 
deal about my life and about my country. I think there is little that can be truly 
known. My family has been fortunate. Others were less so. As they are often 
quick to point out (APH 238). 
 
Alfonsa’s “Mexico” is a metonym for the most proximate set of constraining puppet 
strings she perceives: blood and violence regress into unnamed sources. Put another way, 
both blood and violence are the results of the world paring away live possibilities in favor 
of a limited few. She speaks of other constraints as well. Society and reputation are more 
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subtle but still efficacious constraints. They are verbal analogies to violence. As she says 
to John Grady in their early confrontation:  
 I think that I had no wish to break things. Or perhaps only those things that 
wished to break me. The names of the entities that have power to constrain us 
change with time. Convention and authority are replaced by infirmity. But my 
attitude toward them has not changed. Has not changed. (APH 136) 
 
Alfonsa perceives a category that transcends its local names. The only constant is 
constraint on both desire, its object, and the determinate world that separates them: 
“Between the wish and the thing the world lies waiting.” The world is a blade severing us 
from the end-referents of our imagined projects. Its conventions and names are irrelevant 
to the power it wields in the dark between concepts.  
 Many of McCarthy’s narrative “teachers,” are skeptical about the ontological 
status of such alternative worlds or hypothetical futures imagined out of counter-factual 
choices. History, the march of events has little mercy in the destruction of possibility—
the might-be—which leave an illusory trace—the-might-have-been.169 Alfonsa couches 
her criticism of dead possibilities in terms of the experimental control groups, which 
remain constant while the shifting conditions of the experiment take shape. This can only 
be done by isolating categories of things in order to see what might-have-been had the 
                                               
169 Just as “there is no might have been” according to Alfonsa, and for the judge “past that 
was differs little from the past that was not” (BM 344), or for the man in The Road “there 
is no other tale to tell” and then the question, “How does the never to be differ from what 
never was?” (TR 32). For the apt vocabulary of “teachers,” see Dennis L. Sansom “God, 
Suffering, and Human Destiny in the Border Trilogy: Learning from the ‘Teachers’” in 
Cormac McCarthy’s Violent Destinies: The Poetics of Determinism and Fatalism, Brad 
Bannon and John Vanderheide, eds. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 
2017).  
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variable not been introduced. To do so, you need natural kinds or intelligible named sets. 
She says that  
[t]here is no one to tell us what might have been. We weep over the might have 
been, but there is no might have been. There never was. It is supposed to be true 
that those who do not know history are condemned to repeat it. I dont believe 
knowing can save us. (APH 239) 
 
In other words, in history there are no kinds, no groups, only those arbitrarily-named 
individuals whose stories that stretch backward in an unending regress of origin. The 
infinite possibilities shaved off in the process of actualization cannot be known, only the 
large shaping forces that lop of their most fragile edges. “What is constant in history,” 
she says, “is greed and foolishness and a love of blood and this is a thing that even God—
who knows all that can be known—seems powerless to change”  (APH 239). Alfonsa’s 
appeal to the limit conditions of these forces indicate that knowledge of them is irrelevant 
to they are. 
 The forces Alfonsa cites are not synonymous with fate or destiny. The parochial 
names given to the forces of history are arbitrary unless reduced the core vices of 
humanity listed above—greed, stupidity, aggression, and predation. When John Grady 
asks if, for her, this amounts to fate, 
She waved her hand. It's not so much that I dont believe in it. I dont subscribe to 
its nomination. If fate is the law then is fate also subject to that law? At some 
point we cannot escape naming responsibility. It's in our nature. Sometimes I 
think we are all like that myopic coiner at his press, taking the blind slugs one by 
one from the tray, all of us bent so jealously at our work, determined that not even 
chaos be outside of our own making. (APH 241) 
 
Alfonsa’s use of “nomination” is suitably ambiguous. It may be fate itself or what it 
names—its denominations—to which Alfonsa does not subscribe. Yet she also rejects its 
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lawfulness—perhaps playing on the Latin roots similarity to the Greek—nomos. The 
forces we call fate are fierce and chaotic, but not irresistible. Alfonsa exhibits some 
acceptance that only so much of the world can be changed, but she is also conscious that 
agency plays a role in the forces themselves. Out habit for locating responsibility in 
agency is one of the forces in which we participate but also cannot escape.   
 The nominations of all of these elements matter immensely. Alfonsa is able to 
pluck the two Americans out of prison after they had lost their identities (their driver’s 
licenses) to Captain Raul. In each instance, Alfonsa claims to have one thing in mind: 
Alejandra’s reputation—her good name. To the extent to which names receive 
responsibility over and against a determined fate or law of history, Douglas Hillier and 
others commenting on morality in McCarthy have deftly written. Here, it is important 
that these pressures on naming and names continue to vex both the characters and, 
perhaps, readers as well.  
As with many of the philosophical sages in McCarthy’s texts, it is not clear to 
what extent the protagonist listener understands or internalizes what they offer.  John 
Grady refuses and resists some aspects of fate, but when finally faced with the realities of 
the lost family name he carries as a given middle-name and a history indifferent to the 
loss, his acceptance verges on despair: 
He stood hat in hand over the unmarked earth. This woman who had worked for 
his family fifty years. She had cared for his mother as a baby and she had worked 
for his family long before his mother was born and she had known and cared for 
the wild Grady boys who were his mother's uncles and who had all died so long 
ago and he stood holding his hat and he called her his abuela and he said goodbye 
to her in Spanish and then turned and put on his hat and turned his wet face to the 
wind and for a moment he held out his hands as if to steady himself or as if to 
bless the ground there or perhaps as if to slow the world that was rushing away 
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and seemed to care nothing for the old or the young or rich or poor or dark or pale 
or he or she. Nothing for their struggles, nothing for their names. Nothing for the 
living or the dead. (APH 301) 
 
After pantomiming a blessing on or stabilization of his broken world, John Grady ends 
the novel indulging a brief nostalgia directed toward a group of Apache who, to his eyes, 
have somehow managed to slow their world. When he appears again in the third book of 
the trilogy, Cities of the Plain, he is quiet, diminished, although still equipped with a 
somewhat arcane sense of justice. Nevertheless, in an attempt to repeat without mistake 
his courtship of Alejandra, he exposes a thread of false-hope on which he wagers both 
despair and suicide. 
 The Crossing, the trilogy’s second book, deals with the fragility of language and 
names in a long series of philosophical episodes. In each, the novel’s main protagonist, 
Billy Parham, is silent. If read in order of publication, John Grady’s story is interrupted 
by the chronologically earlier events of The Crossing. But Billy’s development from 
book to book is difficult to track, particularly given his cynical machismo in Cities of the 
Plain in which the two characters finally meet. 
 The initial action of The Crossing centers around the Parham’s attempt to trap a 
wolf. One of the stylistically eccentric aspects of The Crossing is the narration’s 
purported free-indirect access to the wolf’s thoughts in which she follows the landscapes 
according to names on maps.   
The wolf had crossed the international boundary line at about the point where it 
intersected the thirtieth minute of the one hundred and eighth meridian and she 
had crossed the old Nations road a mile north of the boundary and followed 
Whitewater Creek west up into the San Luis Mountains and crossed through the 
gap north to the Animas range and then crossed the Animas Valley and on into 
the Peloncillos as told. (TC 24) 
   
 
90 
 
The “as told” is the narrator noting Mr. Parham only lines before, retelling how the half-
named ”youngest Oliver boy” had described his backward tracking of the wolf (TC 16). 
The generic result of the passage manifests as something between intraspecies lore and 
the speculative interpretation of an overly confident narrator: 
The wolves in that country had been killing cattle for a long time but the 
ignorance of the animals was a puzzle to them. The cows bellowing and bleeding 
and stumbling through the mountain meadows with their shovel feet and their 
confusion, bawling and floundering through the fences and dragging posts and 
wires behind. The ranchers said they brutalized the cattle in a way they did not the 
wild game. As if the cows evoked in them some anger. As if they were offended 
by some violation of an old order. Old ceremonies. Old protocols. (TC 25) 
 
After the wolf again passes through the landscape of English place names, the narration 
moves from species-memory to the direct narration of the wolf’s internal responses to 
modern New Mexican hunting: 
She crossed the Bavispe River and moved north. She was carrying her first litter 
and she had no way to know the trouble she was in. She was moving out of the 
country not because the game was gone but because the wolves were and she 
needed them. When she pulled down the veal calf in the snow at the head of 
Foster Draw in the Peloncillo Mountains of New Mexico she had eaten little but 
carrion for two weeks and she wore a haunted look and she'd found no trace of 
wolves at all. She ate and rested and ate again. She ate till her belly dragged and 
she did not go back. She would not return to a kill. She would not cross a road or 
a rail line in daylight. She would not cross under a wire fence twice in the same 
place. These were the new protocols. Strictures that had not existed before. Now 
they did. (TC 25) 
 
The wolf cannot know the nouns used in the paragraph to mark off conventional 
boundaries, but she is nonetheless wary of the artificial barriers like roads or rail lines. 
Later in the book, Billy argues that “the wolf knew nothing of boundaries,” to which the 
discussant replies that the boundaries still remain, likewise indifferent to the wolf (TC 
119). While narrator’s supposed entrance into the consciousness of an animal is 
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infrequent in McCarthy, it is less subtle than its occasional direct and free-indirect 
incursions into human consciousness. The exaggerated anthropomorphization of the 
wolf—down to using minutes on the coordinate map—is an ironic contrivance. The 
names on the map are absurd and irrelevant given the novel’s insistence on the ancient 
instincts of the wolf—instincts that would likewise not include “protocols” in the strict 
sense. The narration exposes and contrasts itself with the age of the wolf as a 
representative of an ancient species, which in turn heightens the contingency of the signs 
contained on names and maps. 
 Constructed signs in The Crossing are always fragile. By the time the wolf dies 
and Billy resumes his journey home, he has absorbed some of the same historical 
contrasts employed by the narrator earlier in the novel which he quietly internalizes: 
“Along the face of the stone bluffs were old pictographs of men and animals and suns and 
moons as well as other representations that seemed to have no referent in the world 
although they once may have” (TC 135). The petroglyphs are not the same as those in 
Blood Meridian, though their referents have been effaced by the loss of social memory in 
which to ground them.170 In the high vantagepoint of the passage, Billy sees and 
momentarily reflects on the historical anachronisms in the landscape: 
He sat in the sun and looked out over the country to the east, the broad barranca of 
the Bavispe and the ensuing Carretas Plain that was once a seafloor and the small 
pieced fields and the new corn greening in the old lands of the Chichimeca where 
the priests had passed and soldiers passed and the missions fallen into mud and 
the ranges of mountains beyond the plain range on range in pales of blue where 
                                               
170 These also appear in Cities of the Plain in which a group on mountain lion hunters “sat 
against a rock bluff high in the Franklins with a fire before them that heeled in the wind 
and their fingers cast up upon the rocks behind them enshadowed the petroglyphs carved 
there by other hunters a thousand years before” (87). 
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the terrain lay clawed open north and south, canyon and range, sierra and 
barranca, all of it waiting like a dream for the world to come to be, world to pass. 
He saw a single vulture hanging motionless in some high vector that the wind had 
chosen for it. He saw the smoke of a locomotive passing slowly downcountry 
over the plain forty miles away. (TC 135) 
 
By the time Billy and John Grady meet in Cities of the Plain, Billy’s internal revelation 
of the vastness of time and space are not immediately relevant. The evidence for such 
internal range is muted by Billy’s reliance on cliché and posturing that seem to have 
crystalized his sensitivity to his semi-conscious desires. Such posturing is the evidence 
for the claim of McCarthy’s weakest villains, Eduardo the pimp, that a form of delusional 
transcendent is what drives the cowboys south: “They [Americans] drift down out of your 
leprous paradise seeking a thing now extinct among them. A thing for which perhaps they 
no longer even have a name. Being farm boys of course the first place they think to look 
is in a whorehouse” (CP 249). What is it exactly? Eduardo does not say, but only 
observes the clumsy search for an economic or colonial answer to a perceived absence. 
Yet other characters in McCarthy give a myriad of inarticulate “answers” to the 
problem.171 John Grady and Rawlins provide only vague motives for traveling south, but 
surely the sale of the Grady family ranch and the increasing irrelevance of cattle-ranching 
by horse are factors in the decision. When Billy actually decides to bring the wolf back to 
Mexico, his reasons are opaque, but no such economic factors apply (TC 63). While in 
neither case is a brothel the first place the characters look, there is an ambient notion that 
something lies southward that will satisfy restlessness or remedy loss. Yet from a higher 
                                               
171 Brewton makes this point and notes the Judge’s deflationary answer that no such 
mystery exists. Brewton, Landscape, 141. 
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visual or historical perspective, that thing is apt to lose significance unless nurtured and 
maintained.  
Eduardo’s criticism of the “pale empire” notwithstanding, the sense of 
encroaching loss he identifies as a form of naïve nostalgia is a dominant quality in Cities 
of the Plain (CP 253). Mr. Johnson, the aging father in-law of Mac, who helps run the SK 
Bar Ranch that borders creeping Federal claims of eminent domain, reflects on the ease 
with which ranchers poisoned the last of the southwestern wolves: “it had always seemed 
to me that somethin can live and die but that the kind of thing that they were was always 
there” (CP 126, emphasis mine). The idea of individual death is intelligible, but 
extinction, the death of an entire category or kind is less so. “I didn’t know you could 
poison that,” says Mr. Johnson (CP 126). Julien Murphet writes, “McCarthy’s narratives 
know that you can, and that the poison is already pumping through the arterial system of 
Being. It is poison of creeping namelessness[…].”172 It is a namelessness intimated by 
Alfonsa and performed by the judge. It suggests both unstoppable forces operating in 
unnavigable space and a source of ambiguous dread. 
The extinction of both proper names and nameable natural kinds is the explicit 
premise of The Road. Names fade in a world that gradually loses the distinctions that 
support them. The unnamed survivors are hunted by an encroaching, “nameless dark,” an 
entropic “shrinking down” that might “catch us” (TR 9, 88, 233). Like so many characters 
in McCarthy, the man imagines he and his son as “hunted animals trembling like ground-
                                               
172 Murphet, “Cave,” 114. 
   
 
94 
foxes in their cover” (TR 130). As namelessness creeps throughout the world, The Road’s 
characters and narration withhold their names as if to protect them from the coming dark.  
 The Road’s depicts the world in a state of physical aphairesis or the removal of 
contingent parts. Particular differentiations are slowly paired away to reveal an unlabeled 
unity within: gray—and the dozens of synonyms for gray throughout the novel. When the 
man threatens to shoot a roving cannibal in the head, he threatens to accelerate this 
process, saying the man would not hear the shot that will violently un-differentiate his 
anatomy. “To hear it you will need a frontal lobe and things with names like colliculus 
and temporal gyrus and you wont have them anymore. They'll just be soup” (TR 64). The 
removal of the technical names of contingent attributes to reveal something fundamental, 
primal, or basic is not always total. In some cases the remainder is more potent than the 
accidental and extraneous—the love between a parent and child, for instance, is what 
remains. But in most cases, the removal of complex parts leaves nothing but soup. Where 
there was once complexity and differentiation of function, social role and meaning, now 
there is only “gray and nameless day” (TR 122). 
As Stacy Peebles has noted, both the popular and religious meaning of the term 
apocalypse are operative in The Road: unveiling and ending. The first is necessary to 
reveal what actually exists, which, as it turns out, may not be anything:    
He tried to think of something to say but he could not. He'd had this feeling 
before, beyond the numbness and the dull despair. The world shrinking down 
about a raw core of parsible entities. The names of things slowly following those 
things into oblivion. Colors. The names of birds. Things to eat. Finally the names 
of things one believed to be true. More fragile than he would have thought. How 
much was gone already? The sacred idiom shorn of its referents and so of its 
reality. Drawing down like something trying to preserve heat. In time to wink out 
forever. (TR 89)  
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The process of removal, of sheering, reappears several times in The Road and a 
corresponding passage to this one—“no less a blessing for being shorn of its ground”—
will be discussed in Chapter 2. In the extended passage man’s “feeling” is that there is 
nothing below “the raw core of parsible entities,” that is, things that are distinct things 
from their names but to which names refer. “Parsible,” a neologism for a grammatical 
action, is a term invented to be a metaphor for what once were real distinctions. Without 
such distinctions, The Road imagines the decline of language outside the “witness” of the 
social practices used to maintain the habits and memories around rule-based language 
use: “He tried to remember the rules of childhood games. Old Maid. Some version of 
Whist. He was sure he had them mostly wrong and he made up new games and gave 
them made up names. Abnormal Fescue or Catbarf” (TR 53). The remnants of the rules of 
language reduce to bare signals, indicators which, according to the man, are also fading 
from use: 
They began to come upon from time to time small cairns of rock by the roadside. 
They were signs in gypsy language, lost patterans. The first he'd seen in some 
while, common in the north, leading out of the looted and exhausted cities, 
hopeless messages to loved ones lost and dead. By then all stores of food had 
given out and murder was everywhere upon the land. [….]. Out on the roads the 
pilgrims sank down and fell over and died and the bleak and shrouded earth went 
trundling past the sun and returned again as trackless and as unremarked as the 
path of any nameless sisterworld in the ancient dark beyond. (TR 180-1) 
 
Humanity’s return to a violent state of nature in The Road is exacerbated by the loss not 
only of sociability, but of nature itself. The man’s brief history of the loss of sign and 
signal ends with the simile (“as”), which compares with any number of infinite, 
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indifferent, and unnamed possible worlds. The higher scales of nature like cosmic orbits 
carry on without regard for the planet forgetting its passing organic citizenry. 
Yet despite the man’s brief summary of post-history, names and signals are not 
yet completely lost. The Road simply refuses to provide them: “He coughed till he could 
taste the blood and he said her name aloud” (TR 54). The narration reports the utterance 
as if the name itself has to be violently purged from the lungs. Other names occur but in a 
corroded or ironic form, such as the derelict boat from Tenerife (one of the Canary 
Islands of Spain), “Pájaro de Esperanza,” or Bird of Hope, wherein the man sees “[a] mae 
west floating in the seepage” (TR 225). The reference is to the object, not the name, 
however. By removing the capitalization—not an authorly habit since capitals remain in 
both the boat’s name and Ely’s—the reference is evacuated of its proper noun, the actual 
Mae West.173  
Ely is the only named person in the book, a contrast that Allen Josephs suggests 
may escalate the name’s possible significance as a symbol.174 Yet in his conversation with 
the man, Ely gives little indication that his name was selected with significance in mind. 
Quite the opposite, the name is specifically selected by Ely as not a name: 
Is your name really Ely? 
No. 
You dont want to say your name. 
                                               
173 Linda Woodson helpfully notes that the Mae West reference, combined with the 
memory of “stockings” (TR 19) and the wind-up toy penguin (TR 36) all suggest a 1970s 
timeframe for the novel. See Linda Woodson, “Mapping ‘The Road’ in Post-
Postmodernism,” The Cormac McCarthy Journal 6, Special Issue: The Road (Autumn 
2008): 88. 
174 See Allen Josephs, “What’s at the End of The Road?” South Atlantic Review 74, no. 3 
(July 2009): 22-3. 
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I dont want to say it. 
Why?  
I couldnt trust you with it. To do something with it. I dont want anybody talking 
about me. To say where I was or what I said when I was there. I mean, you could 
talk about me maybe. But nobody could say that it was me. I could be anybody. I 
think in times like these the less said the better. If something had happened and 
we were survivors and we met on the road then we'd have something to talk 
about. But we're not. So we don’t. (TR 171-2) 
 
This is an odd exchange. Something did happen and they are survivors and they did meet 
on the road. And what could these starving people “do” with a name? Ashley Kunsa 
notes that the naming of Ely may be just one small act of resistance to the descent into 
Hell, where, as the bearded one in Outer Dark has already noted, they don’t have 
names—at least not any longer.175 Kunsa’s point remains valid when referenced instead to 
the secret name. Ely’s protection of his true name harkens back to bearded one’s 
suggestion that there is such a thing as a true name, a given name that is not arbitrary but 
somehow truthful and real and is the locus of responsibility for judgment and damnation. 
This suggestion of a true but undisclosed name appears in the novel’s closing pages when 
the boy: “came back he knelt beside his father and held his cold hand and said his name 
over and over again” (TR 281). This is a name to which the reader is never privy—as if 
                                               
175 See Ashley Kunsa, “‘Maps of the World in Its Becoming’: Post-Apocalyptic Naming in 
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road,” Journal of Modern Literature 33, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 57-
74. Kunsa’s rich observations on naming and style in McCarthy notwithstanding, the 
final conclusion of this essay may promise more light than the text warrants. She writes, 
“this is not to say that meaning has gone out of the world. the point here is that the nature 
of the meaning has changed: the method of naming McCarthy uses offers a refiguring of 
meaning in the language of the new, post-apocalyptic world” (63). Kunsa may be too 
optimistic about the possibility of a new world. The Road’s world is not one in which any 
kind of history or even life happens. It seems highly doubtful that any meaning or names 
will endure the event described.  
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the reader also cannot be trusted with it. In a world bent on unnaming everything, it 
makes sense to withhold such a name from The Road’s unremitting excisions.  
 I have argued that The Road is a novel in which names fade because its world 
lacks the distinctions that support them. Without meaningful differences the world is a 
nameless gray blob. Thus the man raises the question, explicitly, whether or not there are 
any real contrasts to be had. Starving, coughing, probably suffering from severe bouts of 
diarrhea, the man attempts to navigate the indistinct landscape back to the small camp he 
has made with the boy:  
The blackness he woke to on those nights was sightless and impenetrable. A 
blackness to hurt your ears with listening. Often he had to get up. No sound but 
the wind in the bare and blackened trees. He rose and stood tottering in that cold 
autistic dark with his arms outheld for balance while the vestibular calculations in 
his skull cranked out their reckonings. An old chronicle. To seek out the upright. 
No fall but preceded by a declination. He took great marching steps into the 
nothingness, counting them against his return. Eyes closed, arms oaring. Upright 
to what? Something nameless in the night, lode or matrix. To which he and the 
stars were common satellite. Like the great pendulum in its rotunda scribing 
through the long day movements of the universe of which you may say it knows 
nothing and yet know it must. (TR 15) 
 
Again, much of the ambiguously metaphysical material in McCarthy that does not occur 
in simile occurs in delusion or dream. The context of this passage likewise casts some 
doubt about the possibility of meaningful exegesis. Yet even the fragmented passage 
yields valid question. The initial description references John Grady same “steadying” 
posture at the close of All the Pretty Horses.176 The rest is, it seems, a set of fragments 
from the man’s imagination. “To seek out the upright” is possibly a misremembered 
                                               
176 Or, for that matter, the blind man’s gesture in The Crossing: “His hands outspread palm 
down on the table before him. As if to steady the world, or himself in it” (TC 284) 
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quotation from the King James Bible. “No fall but preceded by a declination” may refer 
to Gibbon’s history of Rome’s decline and fall in particular, or at least reference the signs 
of crumbling empires in general. If so, the first fragment may be a misquotation or a 
faded memory of either the Prophet Micah or Isaiah, both of whom denounce the 
declination—both into idolatry and unjust economics—of Jerusalem and predict its fall 
(Isaiah 39) and which, incidentally, occurs in II Chronicles (Chapter 36). Both prophets 
use the language of uprightness. One passage in Micah reads, for example, “[t]he good 
man is perished out of the earth: and there is none upright among men: they all lie in wait 
for blood; they hunt every man his brother with a net” (Micah 7:2). A passage in Isaiah a 
divine measure against which to judge the true and the upright: “The way of the just 
is uprightness: thou, most upright, dost weigh the path of the just” (Isaiah 26:7). The 
Road’s passage similarly asks the question, of against what, if anything, is the world to be 
divided and measured?  
The answers given in this passage are fragments as well. The suggested answer to 
the question of uprightness gives another glimmer of a possible “nameless” object that is 
not evacuated of meaning, but is rather saturated with it: “something nameless in the 
night, lode or matrix.” Something nameless, but what? A lode is vein of precious ore, but 
also something one follows, a thread of that ore through the insignificant slag. This sense 
of lode, used in lodestone or lodestar, is likewise a thing to follow through the dark yet 
only visible in the dark.177 This the man sets next to “matrix,” which may include the idea 
                                               
177 OED Online, December 2018, Oxford University Press, 
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/11125 (accessed February 26, 2019). 
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of a source, the holding place or, more literally, the matrice or womb, around which the 
world orbits. Is this moving world orbiting something that is indifferent, indifferently? 
This is an expanded question from the one John Grady’s attempt to balance himself or the 
world. He, according to the narrator, decides in favor of the world’s indifference, lacking 
reference to the other images The Road provides: “Like the great pendulum in its rotunda 
scribing through the long day movements of the universe.” The world is set to orbit 
around some higher order against which we might be measured “upright” or not, a plumb 
that might indicate what is true about the shape of the world. Our world, “of which you 
may say it knows nothing,” must know (my emphasis). The measure against which the 
world is judged somehow also “knows” or is capable of knowing. So says the man to 
himself—or the narration to the reader. The Road raises such possibilities raised without 
confirming them. 
 McCarthy’s focus on the limits of names or basic intelligibility in the face of 
death may obscure a preoccupation with the meaning of origins in terms of both 
individuals and species. Like death, the ambiguity of origin obscures delimitation 
necessary for a precise sense of reference.  More will be said about the logic of origins 
and grounds in the next chapter, however, McCarthy’s third novel, Child of God, typifies 
the rhetorical and conceptual overlap of linguistic limitation and the logic of origins and 
grounds.  
 Unique in McCarthy’s novels is Child of God’s fragmented commentary from 
local community members regarding what appears to be the legend of Lester Ballard, 
most of which focus on the uniqueness and inscrutability of the outcast murderer: “I’ll 
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say one thing about Lester though. You can trace em back to Adam if you want and 
goddamn if he don’t outstrip em all” (CG 81). Such narrative genealogy is an idiomatic 
expression of the question the novel attempts to address: Whence does such a creature 
come? To answer, Lester’s identity is progressively peeled away with his sociality, 
occasionally narrated in post-hoc fragments by his neighbors. As Jay Ellis notes, the 
personal decay of Ballard intensifies with each blow to his head, each of which mark a 
division of the book, and each coincides with his dwindling capacity to maintain social 
relationships. The blows are followed by his un-naming by other characters who (some 
quite justifiably) lay on scorn and shout “various names after him, none his” (CG 43).  
 Lester’s is not the only name that sustains significant mockery within the 
narrative. The story’s comic grotesqueness is similarly illustrated by a dumpkeeper who  
had spawned nine daughters and named them out of an old medical dictionary 
gleaned from the rubbish he picked. These gangling progeny with black hair 
hanging from their armpits now sat idle and wide-eyed day after day in chairs and 
crates while about the little yard cleared out of the tips while their harried dam 
called them one by one to help with the chores and one by one they shrugged and 
blinked their sluggard lids. Urethra, Cerebella, Hernia Sue (CG 26).  
 
These women, whose names are a joke at the expense of a semi-literate hillbilly class, are 
almost immediately made victims of Child of God’s antinomian sexuality (CG 27-8). 
Similarly, both the narrator and Ballard refuse either a name or gendered pronouns to a 
handicapped child Ballard seeks pacify with a live bird long enough to harass the child’s 
mother. When Ballard shows the child the bird  
 It didn’t look. A hugeheaded bald and slobbering primate that inhabited the lower 
reaches of the house, familiar of the warped floorboards and the holes tacked up 
with foodtins hammered flat, a consort of roaches and great hairy spiders in their 
season, perennially benastied with a nameless crud. (CG 77, emphasis mine) 
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The narrator, in mock hesitation of the category of the creature, writes that the bird “spied 
the… what? child? child, and veered off toward the corner” (CG 77). The uncertainty is 
unusual for McCarthy’s narration. When the child, called Billy only by his mother, chews 
off the bird’s legs, it is difficult not to join in the narration’s disgust. Child of God’s 
purpose seems a wry effort to determine toward whom the reader will or will not extend 
the name of child.  
 As Jay Ellis notes, the book measure’s Ballard’s socials status by where he lives. 
Having been evicted from one home by foreclosure he loses his squatter’s shack by fire. 
He finds a third home in a cave. In the darkness Ballard hears his name called by a hostile 
search-party from above: “Ballard’s name faded in a diminishing series of shunted echoes 
down the hole where he had gone” (CG 185). Traces of what remains of the reference, 
“Ballard,” fade into whatever kind sui generis creature he has become. Earlier in the 
novel his own cursing to himself surfaces as an identifiable personality: “[w]hatever 
spoke to him was no demon but some old shed self that came yet from time to time in the 
name of sanity, a hand to gentle him back from the rim of disastrous wrath” (CG 158). 
But the shed husk is ultimately abandoned and the child of God ends up “placed in a cage 
next door but one to a demented gentleman who used to open folk’s skulls and eat the 
brains inside with a spoon” (CG 193). Ballard is hospitalized because there is no 
discernable reason for his individual acts—except perhaps the compounded blows to the 
head that punctuate Child of God’s narrative.  
As noted above, because McCarthy does not allow much indirect access to 
characters’ thought, there has been some doubt as to whether or not McCarthy’s 
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characters have evolved any kind of inner life. But few individual characters are wholly 
given over to a state of nature. Even Blood Meridian’s earless killer, Toadvine, whose 
opening lines are a drunken mantra—“kill kill”—has flashes of moral restraint (BM 9, 
181). However, as Ellis overserves, Ballard’s descent into psychopathy is a process 
containing intelligible events and causes, even if those causes cannot convincingly 
explain the sum of his behavior. Thus the final scenes of the novel depict the dissection 
of his whole person, body and mind, disassembled by a meticulous process of terrifying 
intelligence that cannot explain or understand the man or his actions. All of the parts and 
components are present: “His heart was taken out. His entrails were hauled forth and 
delineated and the four young students who bent over him like those haruspices of old 
perhaps saw monsters worse to come in their configurations” (CG 194). Yet for all the 
search for significance in the parts, they cannot be reassembled into a set of intelligible 
antecedent causes or reasons. Far from being “traced back to Adam,” the child of God 
cannot be traced back to himself or his intentions.  
Conclusion 
  
 Much like the apophatic theologians surveyed in the first portion of this chapter, 
McCarthy’s novels place pressure on names as a constitutive component of reference. 
Names, whether overwrought, damaged, or wholly untethered from their object, draw 
attention to the fragility and limits of reference in certain frames: origins, death, and the 
erasure not just of individual proper nouns but of natural kinds. As The Road asserts 
directly, “the last instance of a thing takes the class with it” (TR 28).  At this scale of 
reference, it seems not accidental that many of the most salient examples of the collapse 
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of names occur in rhetorical proximity to allusions to God. “Books lie” according to the 
judge. But even for him, God does not lie, but speaks indirectly, through “stones and 
trees, the bones of things,” that is, through natural kinds (BM 121). The broken names, 
books, and languages scattered throughout the novels—the bones of things—persistently 
index something that is not ever fully articulate in itself. The index is an oblique approach 
to what remains when direct reference fails, but it refers more forcefully, if less precisely, 
to an object or objects that remain outside of regular discourse. Violence toward 
vulnerable names is the first and perhaps the least subtle of McCarthy’s apophatic 
rhetorical strategies. For the present, I suggest that the above examples represent a case 
for interpreting still more elements of McCarthy’s prose as apophatic devices with similar 
functions.   
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Chapter 2: Origins, Grounds and Abysses 
This chapter examines entwined rhetoric of origins and the logic of both 
epistemological and ontological grounds in McCarthy’s novels. I note the links between 
the central concerns of Gnosticism often attributed to McCarthy and the Neoplatonist 
background of apophatic thought, specifically, a shared concern over the origins of 
determinate being and the difficulty of knowing or speaking about them. I argue that 
McCarthy’s preoccupation with origins as a source of meaning can be more thoroughly 
understood by his frequent use of ground imagery as a conceptual metaphor for origin 
and source. Below, I review applications of the metaphor of grounds in Western 
European mysticism from the medieval period through the sixteenth century texts directly 
referenced by McCarthy. I argue that Blood Meridian and The Road use the vocabulary 
and imagery of grounds as a double-entendre that alternates between both its physical and 
figurative uses in the text. These mutually expansive functions clear habitual modes of 
thought and valuation in a manner employed by figures like Hadewijch, Eckhart and 
Boehme, all of whom employ and negate grounds-imagery. 
Gnosis and Origins 
Of the metaphysical interpretations of McCarthy’s books, those orbiting around 
the term “Gnostic” have been the most common. Interpretive frameworks that adopt 
Gnosticism as a key component are those constructed by Harold Bloom, Maggie Bortz, 
Leo Dougherty, Christopher Douglas, Dianne Luce, and most recently and thoroughly by 
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Petra Mundik.178 The relationship between Gnosticism and Hermetic traditions or later 
developments in esoteric thought like Renaissance astrology, magic, and alchemy make it 
an attractive framework for interpreters who view McCarthy’s textual allusions as clues 
to a governing metaphysics buried in the novels. In what follows I acknowledge this 
allusory network and the scholars who map it, but I also wish to point out a more general 
momentum in McCarthy’s texts that employs the concerns of Gnosticism as an engine—
but not the end—of the rhetoric of the books. In other words, I argue that Gnosticism is a 
vehicle for the themes of origins and knowledge, not means of flagging either 
McCarthy’s or his novels’ ideological allegiances.  
That Gnosticism is an integral feature to McCarthy’s aesthetic in many of his 
novels is difficult to refute. Leo Dougherty, Dianne Luce, and especially Petra Mundik 
have all shown too many direct references to gnostic and hermetic traditions to ignore or 
dismiss. However, the question of their function within the text is an open one I wish to 
address. One option is to take Dougherty’s straightforward position on Blood Meridian, 
which is that Gnostic or dualistic thought is “central” to the text. While this claim is 
shared by Luce and Mundik, the interpretation leads him to decode one of the novel’s 
central characters, Judge Holden, as an embodiment of the fabricated law (nomos) of the 
gnostic demiurge and its demonic forces of nature—Gnostic archons. Within 
                                               
178 Harold Bloom, How to Read and Why (New York: Touchstone Books, 2001); Maggie 
Bortz, “Carrying the Fire: Individuation Toward the Mature Masculine and Telos of 
Cultural Myth in Cormac McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men and The Road,” Jung 
Journal 5, no. 4 (October 2011): 28–42; Leo Dougherty, “Gravers False and True,” 2001; 
Christopher Douglas, “‘If God Meant to Interfere,’” 2013; Dianne Luce, Reading the 
World, 2009; and, most thoroughly, Petra Mundik, A Bloody and Barbarous God, 2016.  
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Dougherty’s imaginative world of Blood Meridian, the judge is a super-demon. This is an 
extreme interpretation, but not an unsurprising one given some of the book’s more 
enigmatic episodes concerning Holden and his seemingly preternatural powers.  
However, to the extent that McCarthy’s novels are Gnostic, they are so by a 
method that questions the issue of cosmic origins and their meaning. The Gnostic 
traditions were frequently concerned with special insight (gnosis) into both the origin and 
terminus of the cosmos and its inhabitants, with the facts of its origins exercising sizable 
influence on the details of the Gnostic cosmos’ denouement. Regardless of whether this 
shared unease with origin qualifies McCarthy’s texts for the label, “Gnostic” does not 
inform us of why his novels might adopt gnostic concerns in the first place. In the 
following section, I argue for an integrative reading that sheds further light on both the 
rhetoric of McCarthy’s novels and some of the logic that underlies their concern with 
origins. 
 The surgery scene in Blood Meridian serves as a good example of the complexity 
of the judge’s identity and the gnostic interpretation of the text as a whole. In the final 
third of the novel, the novel’s narrator recounts the kid’s half-drunk and ether-induced 
dreams as he undergoes an extraction of an arrow from his leg. Dougherty both accepts 
the narration’s account as true and assumes that it references the judge: 
In that sleep and in sleeps to follow the judge did visit. Who would come other? 
A great shambling mutant, silent and serene. Whatever his antecedents he was 
something wholly other than their sum, nor was there system by which to divide 
him back into his origins for he would not go. Whoever would seek out his 
history through what unraveling of loins and ledgerbooks must stand at last 
darkened and dumb at the shore of a void without terminus or origin and 
whatever science he might bring to bear upon the dusty primal matter blowing 
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down out of the millennia will discover no trace of any ultimate atavistic egg by 
which to reckon his commencing. (BM 322, emphasis mine) 
 
Among the more complex passages in Blood Meridian, it is not clear that the propositions 
emphasized above are hallucinated, dreamt, or are drugged interpretations of actual 
visitations. It could be argued that this dreamed proposition could act as an implied 
simile, compiling fragments of associations the novel makes with the judge—
ledgerbooks (BM 139, 146, 207, 254), the egg (BM 136, 340), and in the following 
paragraph, the coiner (BM 257)—all without making a factual claim about them.179 It 
could also be argued that a claim made by the narration is not, by default, accurate. 
Finally, if this fragment is making a true claim about the judge, then the narration does 
much more than suggest that the judge is an archon or even the determinate creator-god 
(demiurge) whose origin is explicable by gnostic mythology. Rather, the text would 
indicate that the “judge” in this dream is indeed without discernable beginning or 
intelligible origin. For Dougherty, this would have to be one of the two principles in the 
dualistic Manichean tradition: light or darkness, good or evil.180 But while the judge—the 
                                               
179 Dougherty’s brilliant and imaginative article, like most unified readings of the novel, is 
troubled by a number of other aspects of Blood Meridian. Dougherty’s reads the 
coldforger as an attempt to cast the face of the judge into cash, which the judge will not 
judge current. He will not let it pass, according to Doughery, because the exchange 
economy only simulates war and so by definition cannot be authentic. The judge’s 
bargain with Toadvine, in which he claims that “everything is for sale” (BM 295). The 
judge, throughout the novel seems entirely comfortable in those highly rationalized terms 
which make the most sense in ledgerbooks—the cash exchange (BM 294). 
180 Given his interest in alchemy, the McCarthy’s interest in Gnosticism seems more in 
line with the nexus of thought coming from Hermeticism and Persian Gnostic texts rather 
than stark Manichean dualism. That said, the archon model for the judge would not work, 
for example, if drawn from an ostensibly dualistic text like The Apocryphon of John in 
which the archons have origins and explanations. See The Nag Hammadi Library in 
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“bloody old hoodwinker”—is many things, an incarnate cosmic principle undergirding 
the whole material reality is an excessive option (BM 263). 
Also central to Gnostic thought is, of course, gnosis and methods for achieving it. 
The Gnostic drive toward special knowledge contrasts with the uncertainty produced by 
the affect and behavior of the inscrutable judge. An example is the scene following the 
kid’s surgery, in which the judge visits the kid in his jail cell. Here, the judge’s secret and 
disappointed affection for the kid is a revelation to which the reader is, according to him, 
a non-initiate. “I'll speak softly,” he says, “It's not for the world's ears but for yours only. 
Let me see you. Don’t you know that I'd have loved you like a son?” (BM 319). But 
we, the readers and presumably “the world,” do hear, even though what he says may 
too opaque to understand without a hypothesis as to what Holden is referring in this 
scene. Blood Meridian’s narrator then makes public the kid’s acquittal by a San Diego 
acalde—another judge—whose words the kid cannot understand, owing to his poor 
Spanish at this point in the novel, but who also speaks to him in “a fatherly manner” 
(BM 320).181 If this is a revelation of gnosis then it has an ironic edge, since even 
though the occasion of the judge’s secret-sharing smacks of secret knowledge, it is 
shared by every reader while the truer “father” remains practically alien to all.  
                                               
English, ed. James McConkey Robinson, tran. Members of the Institute for Antiquity and 
Christianity (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1990), 98-116.  
181 Michael Degener and Joe Mathias were helpful enough to argue that kid’s Spanish 
improves over through the novel’s. He is clearly comfortable with it by the time, at 28, he 
encounters the “Abuelita” in the rocks. It is notable here that the narration veils most of 
the kid’s actual use of the language in paraphrase and obscures any eloquence he may 
possess (BM 328).  
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The judge consistently mocks or dismisses the possibility of higher insight 
(gnosis). For example, following the judge’s examination on “a great femur” and 
extemporized camp lecture on 1840s-era paleontology he says: 
There is no mystery to it, he said. The recruits blinked dully. 
Your heart's desire is to be told some mystery. The mystery is that there is no 
mystery. 
He rose and moved away into the darkness beyond the fire. (BM 263) 
 
This position that beyond appearances there is no special knowledge is anti-Gnostic. 
But while the judge may simply be lying to conceal gnosis, his rhetoric throughout 
the novel is more akin to sophistry, which manipulates language and the truths within 
in a peculiarly misleading way. He is not uninterested in reality, but, as a 
“draftsman,” he records and destroys the appearances of things (BM 146). When 
Holden transitions into a comically erudite attorney, his use of language is more 
overwhelming to his audience than accurate (BM 87-88, 247-9). However, just as 
sophistry’s purest forms are the most difficult to identify, the judge’s lies are likewise 
difficult to pinpoint other than by the listener’s incredulity. The reader is left, like the 
kid, wishing to avoid direct confrontation with the judge and his “craziness” (BM 256, 
261, 296, 318, 320, 343-4).  
It is not difficult to see, then, how the judge could be read as both explicitly 
denying the possibility of special insight into the truth while covertly blocking it. But 
whether the judge is an outright liar is questionable. As Christopher Douglas argues, 
the judge is not lying as he anticipates the basics of Darwinian evolutionary theory 
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(BM 263).182 Neither does he offer a wholly dissembling account of the divine, telling 
one gang member in apparent metaphor for his nightmarish natural theology: “[a]nd 
these are [God’s] words. He held up a chunk of rock. He speaks in stones and trees, the 
bones of things” (BM 122). For all his play with language, the judge works in usable data, 
appearances that can be pulled from the ground itself (BM 134).  
All told, Holden’s facility with the appearances of the cosmos does therefore 
make him a symbol of or an actual Gnostic Archon, an identification that actually 
works against much of the narration’s prose. The fevered-dream passage above 
demonstrates an accomplished cessation in thought produced by the very appearance 
of the judge. One’s limited rationality—the recognition of effects running in linear 
succession backward from intelligible causes—is intimidated by the judge, who 
seems to jam reason’s categories to the point of seizing any possible action. 
“Whatever his antecedents he was something wholly other than their sum, nor was 
there system by which to divide him back into his origins for he would not go,” writes 
the narrator (BM 322). If the judge is a supernatural archon, then Blood Meridian’s 
narrator either does not know it or does not wish to acknowledge it. 
Judge Holden is nevertheless a blank figure in the place of discernable origins. 
While his supposed irreducibility does not render him a cosmic principle, the text’s 
unwillingness to parse his origins is shared by the characters who refuse to challenge 
him intellectually, morally, or physically. Tobin, for example, is avoidant and passive 
                                               
182 Christopher Douglas, “‘If God Meant to Interfere’: Evolution and Theodicy in Blood 
Meridian,” Religion & Literature 45, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 92. 
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when in proximity to the judge (BM 153, 261, 298). Alternatingly deflationary and 
superstitious, Tobin has, in an unwritten episode, also told the kid that the judge is only 
a man who, like all of humanity, has his origins in dust (BM 130, 309).183  
He aint nothin. You told said so yourself. Men are made of the dust of the earth. 
You said it was no pair… pair… 
Parable. 
No parable. That it was a naked fact and the judge was a man like all men (309). 
 
“Face him down if he is so [mortal],” says Tobin, unwilling to decide in favor of his 
previous position. The Kid, still unsure of Holden’s true origins, does not (BM 298).184 
Toadvine likewise aborts an attempt to kill the judge for Holden’s murder of a 
kidnapped child and later quietly (and ineffectually) objects to the gang’s massacre of 
the Tiguas (BM 181). No one is sure enough of the judge’s mortality to mount a 
significant resistance against him. 
Blood Meridian is thus punctuated with uncertainty about the sources of the 
judge’s identity and, by extension, the grounds of his physical and intellectual power. 
                                               
183 Michael Degener and Joe Mathias have also alerted me to the fact that the kid and 
Tobin do not have this conversation within the text of Blood Meridian. See their 
forthcoming Blood Confessional: Cormac McCarthy’s Bildungsroman of the Misbegotten 
Child. Tobin’s allusion could be to a number of biblical passages: Genesis 2:7 “And 
the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the 
breath of life; and man became a living soul”; Genesis 3:19 “the sweat of thy face shalt 
thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou 
art, and unto dust shalt thou return”; ”; Psalm 103: “for he knoweth our frame, he 
remembereth that we are dust”; Ecclesiastes 12:7 “Then shall the dust return to the earth 
as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it” (KJV).  
184 This dread is consistent with Samuel Chamberlain’s quasi-biographical account of the 
rumors surrounding the judge. See Samuel E. Chamberlain, My Confession: 
Recollections of a Rogue (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1956), 271-2. 
While the kid then makes an excuse about being outgunned, but the source of fear seems 
to be the judge’s uncanniness.  
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Without knowledge of those origins, he could be anything. A gnostic reading of the 
judge may justify the inaction of mortals who would be unwise to challenge an demon 
directly, but settling a question that Blood Meridian’s narration and characters cannot 
resolve would seem to work against the novel itself. The narration of Blood Meridian 
goes to great lengths to demonstrate the obscurity of the judge’s origins—obscurity that 
augments the horrible uncertainty of his identity.185 
Gnosticism is one of many traditions that emphasize knowledge as a means of 
salvation. The theme of origins—especially their ambiguous and dangerous nature—
shows up frequently in McCarthy’s work without the overtones of esoteric mythology 
that, while rich, may be confined to only a few of his novels. Outer Dark, in the mode 
of Sophocles, also warns against the dangers of knowing too much about one’s origins 
and swells on the anxieties about what one might find there. Culla Holme is haunted by 
being the incestuous origin of his own son/nephew. His sister and the child’s mother, 
Rinthy, is perhaps one of the few characters able to confront the problem of origins 
without ignoring or evading its ambiguous facts. Throughout the story, both Culla and 
Rinthy are troubled by a taboo sexual relationship that is a violation of their own 
common origin ironically figured by their family name, Holme, which as Hoffmann 
observes, is pronounced “home.”186 The irony of Rinthy’s journey to find her lost child is 
                                               
185 Edwin Arnold (1999) and Russell Hillier (2017) have both noted that Blood Meridian’s 
supposed moral absence, the moral power of the book is the potencies of the moral 
failings throughout. Arnold also argues that the judge is frustrated with the kid’s moral 
neutrality, suggesting that the “flawed place in the fabric of [his] heart” results in a lack 
of commitment as well as inaction (BM 311-2).  
186 See Gerhard Hoffmann, “Strangeness, Gaps, and the Mystery of Life: Cormac 
McCarthy’s Southern Novels,” Amerikastudien / American Studies 42, no. 2 (January 
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that, even as one representative of that child’s ambiguous origins—she herself claims 
no home, that she “ain't even got nowheres to run off from” (101)— and pursues the lost 
child driven by love.  
No Country for Old Men dwells less on the subject of origins than on moral 
stamina in the face of the methodically murderous Anton Chigurh, a Holden-esque 
character who also lacks discernable origin.187 The exception is a brief exchange between 
Anton Chigurh and the Matacumbe crime boss, a brief but remarkable episode in which 
Chigurh seeks an exclusive contract with the book’s nameless kingpin:  
Chigurh smiled. We have a lot to talk about, he said. We'll be dealing with new 
people now. There wont be any more problems.  
What happened to the old people?  
They've moved on to other things. Not everyone is suited to this line of work. The 
prospect of outsized profits leads people to exaggerate their own capabilities. In 
their minds. They pretend to themselves that they are in control of events where 
perhaps they are not. And it is always one's stance upon uncertain ground that 
invites the attentions of one's enemies. Or discourages it.  
And you? What about your enemies?  
I have no enemies. I dont permit such a thing.  
He looked around the room. Nice office, he said. Low key. He nodded to a 
painting on the wall. Is that original?  
The man looked at the painting. No, he said. It's not. But I own the original. I 
keep it in a vault.  
Excellent, said Chigurh (NC 253).188  
 
                                               
1997): 225; Chris Walsh in “There’s No Place Like Holme: The Quest to Find a Place in 
Cormac McCarthy’s Southern Fiction” in Cormac McCarthy: Uncharted 
Territories/Territoires Inconnus, ed. Christine Chollier (Reims: Presses universitaires de 
Reims, 2003),  makes this observation as well.  
187 See Hillier’s extended study of Ed Tom Bell in Morality (2017).  
188 Matacumbe man is a term employed and possible coined by Hillier (Morality) which I 
had not encountered elsewhere but is a useful name with which to discuss this elusive 
character.  
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The significance of Chigurh’s “stance upon uncertain ground” will become clearer in 
light of the remainder of this chapter. But the exchange on the “original” may has a 
number of layers worth noting. Hillier suggests that it indicates Chigurh’s ambition to 
run the cartel—no need to worry about getting blood on the original during his 
imagined coup d’etat.189 It may be that the scene is merely Chigurh’s brazen assessment 
of the market value of the true bill, which is premised on the value of an “original.” Yet 
if nothing else, Chigurh recognizes a latent power vested in one who controls an 
original and satisfied that it is vaulted away from what actually appears in the world. In 
other words, the original and knowledge of it, is hidden away from all save an elect 
few.  
 In a similar vein, The Road’s diminishing future places shifts emotional weight 
toward the memory of an antecedent world. It also briefly flirts with the possibility of 
seeing the world’s secret history more clearly as a result of the disaster. The Road’s 
“man” thinks: “Perhaps in the world’s destruction it would be possible at last to see how 
it was made. Oceans, mountains. The ponderous counterspectacle of things ceasing to be” 
(TR 59). In this ironic fantasy of a world-vivisection, negation may be revelatory of 
origin. Yet whether these origins remain a relevant target of curiosity even at the world’s 
end remains an open question throughout the novel. Likewise, the fragment I examined in 
Chapter 1, “to seek out the upright” has no obvious referent other than as an semi-
conscious—possibly biblical—fragment. The mining term, “lode,” in the same 
paragraph, however, raises the possibility of a relationship between the search for origins 
                                               
189 Hillier, Morality, 199.  
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and the logic of dependence in McCarthy’s ground metaphors. While origin and ground 
can be synonymous, the latter term offers a wide range of rhetorical possibilities that its 
more abstract counterpart leaves untapped.  
Ground Metaphors 
 A buried premise in the search for origins is the awareness that origins are in 
some way intrinsic to explanation. As a more general philosophical category, 
explanations are not necessarily bound to single metaphor. Yet the ubiquity of 
“grounding” as an explanatory metaphor it both a subtle and relevant one for use in, as 
Denys Turner puts it, the mystics’ “remorseless exploitation of the logic of the 
familiar.”190 By destabilizing the flow of commonplace reasoning, mystics like Eckhart 
employ and adjust familiar logic to systematically erode their reader’s rational defenses.  
The habits of living and thinking are rendered part of the spiritual and emotional risks in 
the apophatic discourse.  
As a metaphor, grounding is so ubiquitous in English that it is practically 
invisible.191 The metaphor imagines a dependence structure of causality in which 
antecedents support the events they produce. Suggestive of trustworthiness and stability, 
it renders beliefs as “positions” upon which to stand as a basis for building structures like 
actions and arguments. Reasons are like foundations or stable and trustworthy ground 
                                               
190 Turner, Darkness, 166.  
191 The metaphor is so embedded in academic prose that George Lakoff’s entire book on 
invisible conceptual metaphors, Metaphors We Live By, employs ground-metaphors 
without noting their role explicitly.  
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where we can stand without the insecurity of doubt.192 The intricate metaphor is soothing 
to a particular epistemological emotion more than it states precisely what actually counts 
as stable, justified criterion. Some do, however, elaborate the metaphor. The 
epistemological foundationalism of, say, Descartes, could be described as a search for 
unassailable first principles upon which to build further thought. Kant’s drive to find and 
articulate a sturdy grundlegung for moral value shares a similar instinct.193 An ethical 
thread of foundation metaphor can be found in Jesus’ parable of the builders in Matthew 
7 (24-27). Here Jesus suggests that his own teachings are stable grounds on which to 
build a life of steadfast faith through in inevitable ambiguities of life. In cases from the 
epistemological to the moral, fixity and security contrast with the less desirable states of 
instability and flux.  
The philosophical and legal uses of grounds are more familiar if not more 
straightforward. In fact, the metaphor is the subject of a whole branch of explicit 
epistemological and metaphysical inquiry.194 Without pressing too deeply into the debate 
over the function of grounding language and its problems—the principle of sufficient 
reason can, for example, launch the regressive string of “why?” questions if we imagine 
the whys as demanding further sufficient foundations for our maps of events—suffice it 
                                               
192 John Dewey links certainty and safety in The Quest for Certainty in The Collected 
Works of John Dewey. Vol. 4: The Later Works, 1925 – 1953, Edited by Jo Ann 
Boydston, ed. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008). 
193 Hannah Arendt notes that Kant also saw metaphysics itself as a potential search for 
grounds in which waited only an abyss. The Life of the Mind (San Diego, CA: Hartcourt, 
1981), 9. 
194 An excellent introduction to some philosophical controversies can be found Michael J. 
Raven, “In Defence of Ground,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 4 (December 
2012): 687–701. 
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to say that it remains, within that debate, a plausibly primitive concept for both logical 
explanation and logic itself. In other words, it may be a metaphor that admits of little 
analysis in itself while providing a principle for logic as such. 
Hadewijch’s Abyss 
The theological relevance of grounds imagery inherits much from the 
commonplace but powerful metaphors that regard thought as a structure with  
qualitatively sound or unsound foundations. As Bernard McGinn also notes, the 
metaphor’s transition from a logical metaphor to an ontological one was gradual. The 
application of grounds language to theology in European Christian mysticism flourished 
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and began to shift, as McGinn notes, toward 
conflation of ground with divinity itself. One of the transitional discourses, as McGinn 
points out, is the letters and poems of Hadewijch of Antwerp, a Beguine writer and poet 
in what is now Belgium.195 A closer look at her semantic network around the ground 
metaphor shows a complex set of literary devices that, if they do not directly influence 
Porete, Eckhart, Nicholas Cusanus, and Boehme, form an early strain of their distinctive 
genealogy. If one follows McGinn’s lead and reads the Beguines—especially 
Hadewijch—with an eye toward this metaphor, there appear a number of rhetorical 
features that Eckhart and Boehme adopt later.  
                                               
195 See Paul A. Dietrich, “The Wilderness of God in Hadewijch II and Meister Eckhart and 
His Circle” in Meister Eckhart and the Beguine Mystics Hadewijch of Brabant, 
Mechthild of Magdeburg, and Marguerite Porete, ed. McGinn, Bernard (New York: 
Continuum, 2001), 33-36. 
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For the present argument, it is not my intention to suggest that thematic overlap is 
evidence that McCarthy is directly influenced by Hadewijch or any other mystic for that 
matter other than the explicitly mentioned Boehme. Rather, these texts demonstrate 
McCarthy’s absorption, also, of a specific genealogy of devotional rhetoric that shapes 
the conceptual metaphor of ontological grounds. For example, Eckhart’s model of the 
divine Son’s “birth” in the soul is already present in Hadewijch and only modified insofar 
as Eckhart suggests a fundamental identity between soul and God in their common 
ground. Likewise, Hadewijch’s distinctive use of violence and the sense of taste to 
characterize the soul’s relation to love also presages Boehme’s developmental violence 
and insistence that emotions/qualities are not only aspects of perception but are 
immediately seeded in natural substances and significant of higher truths.196 Some of the 
basic metaphors upon which McCarthy replies have a literary history which renders them 
even more suggestive than they otherwise might appear. They also contain a logic that 
“unsays” itself in idiosyncratic styles.   
Hadewijch’s use of ground imagery is varied, sometimes deriving it from biblical 
reflection, for example, as she develops the metaphor in Ephesians 3:17’s fragment, 
“being rooted and grounded in love.” 197 In other instances she develops it as a courtly 
conflict between the heart or with love for the love of the Beloved.198 In her letter, “The 
                                               
196 Poem 2.4 of Hadewijch, The Complete Works, Translated by Columba Hart (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1980), 131.  
197 Ibid., 66. Letter 10. Biblical quotation from the King James Version.  
198 Ibid,. 71, 93. References to chivalry in Letter 12.53 and courtliness in Letter 21.21 may 
give some indication of a kind of ritual, tournament, or agonistic violence as opposed to 
outright conflict. 
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Twelve Nameless Hours,” she depicts love as a type of didactic torture that introduces 
death and the pain of love without actual death or relief. In The Hours, Hadewijch depicts 
love itself as conflict, an assault on another who, having captured one’s heart, reveals to it 
the dark abyss of its fundamental nature.199 The function of the ground metaphor is closely 
linked with groundlessness or abyss (or gront and afgront, as McGinn notes)—a term I 
examine in the next section.200 Hadewijch pairs ground imagery with the medieval 
personification of divine love and thereby edges on its identification with God. The 
momentum of her reasoning then tends toward love’s negation or the soul’s conflict with 
it. She writes in one letter: 
[…] that God is beneath all yet unabased, means that the depths of his eternal 
Nature sustain all beings and nourish them and enrich them with such wealth as 
that in which God lives—with divine wealth. But because of the most profound of 
the divine depths and the very highest of the divine heights are on the same level, 
God is beneath all, and unabased.201 
 
And continues “[…] I dare not say more about it, because we do not know regarding 
God, how he is all in all.”202 God is the basis and sustainer of all things, but not grounded 
in a fashion available to knowledge. Hadewijch frequently negates the possibility of such 
                                               
199 See Hadewijch, Complete Works, 92 (Letter 20.88). Here Love as both assaulter and 
assaulted, which is a theme also used elsewhere in Letter 17.44 and Letter 19 (83, 89). 
200 See Bernard McGinn, “Ocean and Desert as Symbols of Mystical Absorption in the 
Christian Tradition,” The Journal of Religion 74, no. 2 (April 1994): 175; see also The 
Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300-1500) (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing, 2005), 87. Here McGinn notes that there is no direct evidence of direct 
influence from Hadewijch to Eckhart. Even so, a genetic one mediated through Porete is 
at least plausible given the conceptual and thematic continuities between the Beguines 
and Eckhart.  
201 Hadewijch, Works, 96 (Letter 21.89).  
202 Ibid., 96 (Letter 21.90). 
   
 
121 
a knowable ground in favor of a bottomlessness love. Of one image in The Abyss of 
Omnipotence, she writes: 
There I saw a very deep whirlpool, wide and exceedingly dark; in this abyss all 
beings were included, crowded together, and compressed. The darkness 
illuminated and penetrated everything. The unfathomable depth of the abyss was 
so high that no one could reach it. I will not attempt now to describe how it was 
formed, for there is no time now to speak of it; and I cannot put it in words, since 
it is unspeakable.203 
 
She later refers back to this initial image as a moment “when I knew the truth of Being.”204 
The truth to which she refers fits comfortably within a Neoplatonic interpretation—all 
possibility compressed into an infinite and unspeakable singularity—but with the addition 
of a paradoxically illuminating darkness.  
 In subsequent visions, Hadewijch uses a negated form of ground imagery in the 
figure of the divine abyss, the conclusion of which is ambiguous and fearful. She writes 
in The Perfect Bride of a vision of “the Beloved” seated on a disk above a vast city: 
And the abyss in which the disk ran as it circled about was of such unheard-of 
depth and so dark that no horror can be compared to it. And the disk, seen from 
above, was set with all kinds of precious stones and in the color of pure gold; but 
on the darkest side, where it ran so fearfully, it was like fearful flames, which 
devoured heaven and earth and in which all things perished and were swallowed 
up.205 
 
The consuming figure contrasts with another image of an abyss in which she “perceived 
an Infant being born in the souls who love in secret, the souls hidden from their own eye 
in the deep abyss of which I speak, and to whom nothing is lacking but that they should 
                                               
203 Ibid., 289 (Vision 11). 
204 Ibid., 291. 
205 Ibid., 293 (Vision 12). 
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lose themselves in it.”206 Here, the darkness of the abyss does not swallow the soul but 
rather produces a child—and then swallows it. Hadewijch’s oppositional rhythms—
between the abyss’ fecundity and hunger or between the conflict between lover and love 
itself, sweetness and bitterness—keep her imagery from settling on a set of determinate 
claims about the divine nature but nevertheless reach toward, as she puts it, “the truth of 
Being.”  
Eckhart’s Ground 
  Roughly a century after Hadewijch, Meister Eckhart adopts a similar ground/birth 
metaphor complex (already well-developed by the Beguines) but makes distinctive 
adjustments to it. Whereas the abyss image negates any intelligible ground in the 
Godhead and thereby draws further distinction between the world and God, Eckhart’s 
ground language negates the negation by pointing to a still further uncreated and fecund 
ground shared by both God and the soul.207 For example, in one of his vernacular sermons 
he reflects on an omitted pronoun in the Latin text of Malachi 3:1: “It denotes, firstly, 
God’s ineffability, for God is unnamable and transcends speech in the purity of His 
ground, where God can have no speech or utterance, being ineffable and wordless to all 
creatures.”208 Of course, simply stating that the pronoun, “He,” is ineffable is a violation of 
the rule of total ineffability, so Eckhart proceeds to chip away at pronouns as such: 
                                               
206 Ibid., 289 (Vision 11). 
207 See Bernard McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart: The Man from Whom 
God Hid Nothing (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2001), 37-38 and McGinn, Harvest, 
85.  
208 Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, trans. Maurice O’C Walshe 
(New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2009), 263 (Sermon 45).  
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Secondly it means that the soul is ineffable and wordless: in her own ground she 
is wordless and nameless and without words, for there she is above all names and 
words. That is why the word ‘I’ is suppressed, for there she has neither word nor 
speech. The third reason is that God and the soul are so entirely one that God 
cannot have a single distinctive feature separating Him from the soul and making 
him different, so that He cannot say, ‘I send my angel,’ thus making him out to be 
different from the soul. For if He said, ‘I,’ He would imply something different 
from the soul. Accordingly, the word ‘I’ is suppressed because he [sic] and the 
soul are so entirely one that God cannot have any quality such that we can say 
anything, or nothing, about God that points to difference or otherness.209 
 
Eckhart’s reference to a more fundamental, shared ground raises the question of what 
type of ground can be so shared except one that does not admit of meaningful distinction. 
Eckhart only narrowly avoids collapsing the distinction between God and God’s creation 
(a conflation for which he was disciplined) by emphasizing just how unlike the human 
being the virgin soul would actually be. As Sells puts it, “birth can only occur insofar as 
the soul has become ‘equal to nothing,’ has emptied itself and gone out of itself. In doing 
so it becomes equal to its ground, to naked being, to nothingness.”210 The soul’s ground is 
nothing and so cannot be used as an identifier. The soul’s spark—surely related to the 
Gnostic thought-stream—is therefore not individual because, like the Godhead, it has no 
features with which to refer to it—or, as Blood Meridian’s Tobin puts it, no predicates 
“to mark him out of nothing at all” (BM 131). 
 Determinate features make naming possible.211 From a broader perspective, 
Eckhart’s fundamental identification of the human soul and the divine “in ground” as 
McGinn translates it, is a subtle but important departure from descriptions of union with 
                                               
209 Ibid. 
210 Sells, Unsaying, 163.  
211 See Neville, Ultimates, 187.  
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the divine common in Christian mystical tradition. Eckhart bears traces of later 
formulations like those John of the Cross. For the latter, the soul can unite with God, not 
in a melting away of the particularities of the individual, but rather as a unity of a shared 
will.212 However, Eckhart frequently refers to another ground in which the soul and God 
do not merge or absorb, but are already identical.213 “The Mysticism of the Ground” as 
McGinn terms it, elides scholastic language of cause and substance in favor of the more 
versatile but ambiguous grunt.214 The degree to which Eckhart’s soul is united with God, 
in its ground, it has no component features or attributes that would make it identifiable as 
a discrete thing: no-thing. 
McGinn has argued that the ground image is the central “Sprengmetaphor” of 
Eckhart’s vernacular writings. The term is helpful as it focuses attention on the governing 
spatial logic of a core concept flexible enough to accrue sub-metaphors and survive 
adjustment and reinterpretation by subsequent writers. Similarly to Hadewijch, the 
birthing theme in Eckhart depends on the ground imagery and biblical and medieval 
metaphors for the female body in order for its spiritual and metaphysical claims to 
function as they do.215 In that frame of reference, pregnancy and birth can only occur when 
its fundamental ground is sufficiently clear of determinate obstacles.  McGinn puts the 
                                               
212 This is St. John of the Cross’ nuance on unification. See Bernard McGinn, “Mystical 
Consciousness: A Modest Proposal.” Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality 8, no. 1 
(2008): 58. See also Sells, Unsaying, 167.  
213 It is not clear whether the suggestion of a further ground to the divine (in contrast to its 
bottomlessness) is a metaphysical claim or an apophatic device designed to lure thought 
toward the pre-referential, nor is it clear if this is a distinction Eckhart would recognize. 
214 McGinn, Harvest, 89.  
215 McGinn, Harvest, 90; See Eckhart, Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 29-37. 
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implied violence of this model succinctly: “only through the destruction of the created 
self can one attain identity in the ground.”216 The method of destruction and the means to 
detachment remain a matter of some controversy, however, its general features do 
provide a recognizable shape. Eckhart’s spiritual virtue of abgeschiedenheit—translated 
variously as disinterestedness, detachment, and isolation—is a kind of clearing of the 
soul’s ground of created attributes in order to give birth to Christ in its most fundamental 
aspect. This Eckhart’s contrasts with the economical love that exchanges benefits. He 
uses the example of loving property like a cow, “for her milk and cheese,” that is, as a 
means to secondary ends.217 Through the process of gelassenheit (letting go) of one’s 
attachments (eigenschaft), one can free the soul’s affections and actions from a 
dependence on secondary agendas that obscure the soul’s true ground. By ridding oneself 
of the series of “whys” that structure mundane valuations, one cuts through the web of 
distinctions that obscure the soul’s fundamental identity as nothing. As Eckhart puts it in 
a mini-parable:  
If a man asked life for a thousand years, ‘Why do you live?’ if it could answer it 
would only say, ‘I live because I live.’ That is because life lives from its own 
ground, and gushes forth from its own. Therefore it lives without Why, because it 
lives for itself.218 
 
                                               
216 Mcginn, Harvest, 90.  
217 Eckhart. Meister Eckhart, the Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and 
Defense, Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn trans. (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 
117 (Sermon Fourteen (b), Pf 14, Q 16b). For a similar analysis of means-ends 
relationships, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 121-3 (1156a). 
218 Ibid., 110 (Sermon Thirteen (b), Pf 13, Q 5b, QT 6)  
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Eckhart’s “living without a why” contains what could be missed as a platitude.219 It is a 
lived metaphysic, a recital of the state of the soul as it is in God: without features or 
distinctions leading to other beings like purposes and goals. Its purposelessness is a form 
of freedom. He writes, “[i]f you would be free of any taint of trading, so that God may let 
you enter this temple, then you must do all that you can in all your works, solely to God’s 
glory, and be as free of it as Naught is free, which is neither here nor there.”220 It is 
difficult for the human dispositional not to “trade,” though, and the cost of the freedom 
Eckhart offers is a reprioritization of the basic teleologies that guide daily life by negating 
them and offering them again in renewed form.221 
Eckhart does not leave the soul free of action, however. In order for the soul to be 
free in its own, uncreated ground, it sheds its createdness (nothing in itself, but dependent 
on God’s esse/being), its properties, the attachments and projects that contributes to its 
particular identity as a thing. In other words, it is no-thing. So, paradoxically, the soul is 
what it is—divine—when it is nothing at all. However, Eckhart’s multilayered use of 
negation is further complicated by equivocal usage of nothing, as Sells observes.222 The 
following passage serves as one example: 
                                               
219 Ibid., 74 (Sermon Six Pf 7, Q 76, QT 35); see McGinn’s note on Quint 75, n5. The 
privation here is peculiar, and not exactly privation at all. Also see (Sermon Thirteen (b), 
Pf 13, Q 5b, QT 6, page 110.  
220 Ibid., 67. Sermon Six Pf 6, Q 1, QT 1. 
221 Eckhart elsewhere revives action in a different economy, particularly in his inversion of 
the gospel account of Mary and Martha (Luke 10), in which Martha, being the more 
spiritually mature of the two, can go about her work without the contemplative or 
discursive. See Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, trans. by 
Maurice O’C Walshe. (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2009), Mystical Works, 89 
(Sermon 9, Pf 9, Q 86, QT 28, Evans II, 2).  
222 Sells, Unsaying, 171.  
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The question is asked, what burns in hell. The masters generally say it is self-will. 
But I declare in truth: nothing burns in hell. Here is a simile. Take a burning coal 
and put it on my hand. If I said the coal burnt my hand, I would do it injustice. 
Were I to say truly what burns me, it is negation, for the coal contains something 
that my hand has not. It is this not that burns me. But if my hand contained all that 
the coal has or can effect, it would be all of the nature of fire. Then, if anyone 
were to take all the fire ever burnt, and poured it out on my hand, that could not 
hurt me. In the same way, I say, just because God and all those who stand before 
his face have on account of their true blessedness something which they who are 
separated from God have not, this very not torments the souls in hell more than 
self-will or any fire. I say truly, insofar as not adheres to you, to that extent you 
are imperfect. Therefore, if you want to be perfect, you must be rid of not.223 
 
The nothing Eckhart posits supports a metaphysical claim by the establishment of a 
complex dialectic between nothing and everything. Eckhart’s use of “nothing” is 
ambivalent both in referent and value but highly suggestive in that the unspeakable, 
divine “nothing” is not privative but absolutely dense and without distinguishing features, 
which is, ironically, absolutely distinct from “things,” which are only distinctions and, in 
themselves, nothing. As Denys Turner explains,  
[t]he two ‘nothings’ are radically distinct from one another, as far apart as the 
Creator and the creature, and the essence of that distinction lies in the distinction 
between the esse distinctum (being ‘this and that’) of creatures and the esse 
indistinctium (not being ‘this and that’) of God.224 
 
This conceptual distinction with verbal equivocation allows Eckhart to play in with a 
dialectic between everything and nothing and two different types of nothingness. Here it 
serves to highlight Eckhart’s rapid transitions in the valuation of nothing, particularly 
when linked with the negation of causation and action: 
But I have also said that works and time are nothing in themselves, then, see, he 
who loses them loses nothing. That is true. But I have also said further: Works 
and time have no being and place in themselves; as a work it has been dropped by 
                                               
223 Eckhart, Mystical Works, 109 (Sermon Thirteen (b), Pf 13, Q 5b, QT 6).  
224 Turner, The Darkness of God, 164. 
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the spirit in time. If the spirit is to perform further, this must be another work and 
in a different time. And therefore it can never enter the spirit, as far as it was work 
and ever came into God. And therefore it must perish and be lost.225  
 
Eckhart does not diminish the value of action but relativizes its value to produce 
something outside of itself. Action performed within an imagined economy with the 
divine are, relatively speaking, nothing compared to their status as creatures reliant on the 
ground of such transactions. At the same time, the recognition that it is finally no-thing—
insofar as things have purposes outside of themselves—is, for Eckhart, an aspect of the 
spiritual maturation.  
Boehme’s Ground 
Nearly three centuries after Eckhart’s death, Jacob Boehme absorbed both the 
metaphysically charged ground metaphor and its negation and also coupled it with 
speculation on the dynamic origins of the physical cosmos.226 As has already been noted in 
Chapter 1, Boehme’s apophaticism of the unground is not a lapse into silence but a 
multiplication of verbiage which gestures toward a ground that, being beyond distinction 
and names, cannot be directly referenced. Boehme’s reasoning multiplies more causes, 
stories, and analogies which result in a bold, qualitative theory of natural development in 
which the combinations of fundamental qualities produce nature itself. By tracing these 
fundamental components backward to their sources, Boehme comes at last to the 
fundamental chaos and conflict that moves the divine to create in the first place.  
                                               
225 Eckhart, Mystical Works, 121. 
226 As Sells notes that Eckhart, too, associates the divine seething [ebullitio] with creation. 
See Sells, Unsaying, 149. 
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By tracing the genealogy of causes to their sufficiently reasonable grounds, 
Boehme reaches two of his most striking conclusions: that the ground (grund) of all 
things cannot be yet one more thing among others (no-thing); and that it is itself 
ungrounded (ungrund). Thus, Boehme takes Eckhart’s negation, abgrunt 
(bottomlessness), and intensifies its sense of contrariety by rendering not only a self-
causing overflow (ebullitio), but a traumatic and tragic rending (shrack) of the fabric of 
its original quality.227 The metaphysical contrast between grund and ungrund accepts but 
also undermines the foundation metaphor in favor of the underlying violence that 
produces everything. It is as if Boehme is a geologist who is content to occupy a house 
with a good foundation. Yet he also imagines the stability of the earth’s young crust as a 
temporary cooling of its inexorable violent processes. The immense pressures of tectonic 
plates, keep things—for now—where and how they are. In other words, Boehme 
recognizes cosmological and ontological stability, but in the context of violent processes 
that undergird the temporary peace.  
One added distinction between Boehme’s un-ground and the other mystical 
grounds is its function. Where Eckhart’s ground, for example, refers in a homiletic 
register to a way of adjusting one’s inner life to reflect a subtle truth, Boehme’s is 
explanatory of the natural world. Nature itself bears the marks of a process in which 
Boehme’s Unground is always operative. In the introduction to Six Theosophic Points, 
with which McCarthy demonstrates direct familiarity, Nicolas Berdyaev notes that 
Boehme’s causal process explained above is not linear, but a description of how the inner 
                                               
227 Weeks, Boehme, 177.  
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life of God functions as it continually creates the physical world. 228 God is, at some level, 
always born in the fundamental conflict between the impoverished but absolute freedom 
of the Unground and love, which is manifest in nature, including the nature of evil.229 
Boehme, then, is not pointing away from personal experience but toward common 
experience of a created world with a manifestly evil bent. He reaches a conclusion put 
simply by Berdyaev’s essay: “[w]ithin divinity itself there is an indeterminate will, that 
is, an irrational principle.”230 This is so, by extension, in creation also.  
In McCarthy’s The Crossing, the character of the church “custodian” suggests a 
structure reasoning that mirrors both Boehme’s backward speculation and its conclusion: 
“[c]auses only multiply themselves. They lead to chaos” (TC 142). Indeed, similarly to 
Hadewijch’s whirlpool, Boehme suggests that a fundamental indeterminacy or “turbidity” 
is the ground of the beings that bear its imprint. This is that to which Blood Meridian’s 
epigram refers: “It is not to be thought that the life of darkness is sunk in misery and lost 
as if in sorrowing. There is no sorrowing. For sorrow is a thing that is swallowed up in 
death, and death and dying are the very life of the darkness” (BM 2). For Boehme, 
nature has, as constituent principles of its being—its ground—freedom and conflict, 
darkness and death. This is true even as nature demonstrates stability and calm. At root 
even the most benign processes are impelled by an original, unresolvable war. 
McCarthy’s Ground 
                                               
228 Crews notes that McCarthy has—admittedly jumbled—notes to this effect available in 
the archived materials. See Crews, Books, 157-8. 
229 See Berdyaev’s Introduction to Boehme, Six Theosophic Points, xviii.  
230 Ibid., xxiii. 
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McCarthy’s invocation of grounds metaphors is frequent and on a similarly 
equivocal. In Cities of the Plain, John Grady Cole deploys it in a mode close to 
Eckhart’s:  
I think you can train a rooster to do what you want. But you wont have him. 
There's a way to train a horse where when you get done you've got the horse. On 
his own ground. A good horse will figure things out on his own. You can see 
what's in his heart. He wont do one thing while you're watchin him and another 
when you aint. He's all of a piece. When you've got a horse to that place you cant 
hardly get him to do somethin he knows is wrong. He'll fight you over it. And if 
you mistreat him it just about kills him. A good horse has justice in his heart. I've 
seen it. (COP 53) 
 
One can still “possess” the thing but only on the ground of the thing possessed. In other 
words, you cannot take it back with you to your own economy of want and need. These 
small instances are not always couched within a theory, but they do occur in glimpses 
throughout McCarthy’s novels.  
So far, I have argued that McCarthy’s concern with origins is an important aspect 
of the Gnostic interpretation of his novels and especially Blood Meridian. I have 
suggested that the metaphor of grounds is a variant of this theme and overviewed a strain 
of grounds rhetoric through medieval and early modern European mysticism. To make 
the case that McCarthy’s use of grounds language moves beyond the mere evocation of 
its mystical sense, in this section I argue that the narration of both Blood Meridian and 
The Road signal the double-entendre of ground in its physical and philosophical uses. 
McCarthy’s deployment of ground imagery enables his construction and distortion of 
ground as space (Chapter 3) and his dialectical use of ground as both a logical and 
ontological primitive, particularly in The Crossing (Chapter 4). In this chapter, I argue 
that The Road adopts the metaphor of grounds and develops it using Boehme’s 
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vocabulary of divine substance, ultimately depicting an unfurnished world from which all 
other meanings have been stripped away and into which a child is ultimately born and 
sustained. In Eckhart’s terms: all other finite “whys” are clearly and finally gone and the 
ground exposed. McCarthy’s vacillation between the rhetoric of grounds and its 
negation—groundlessness and abyss—keeps the logical metaphor of dependence 
operative even while simultaneously  undermining it.  
Blood Meridian’s Ground 
Blood Meridian’s rhetoric of grounds vacillates between the moral and the 
ontological. In the passage preceding the previously discussed meditation on the judge’s 
origins, the judge and the kid debate about an episode in which the kid, by some act or 
sentiment of mercy, withdrew his support from an action of the Glanton Gang against 
“the heathen” (BM 312). The event is not explicit in the text. The only plausible 
candidate for the event occurs when the gang prepares to massacre of a peaceful group of 
Tigua. In this scene, Toadvine quietly objects to the attack on the grounds that “those 
sons of bitches aint botherin nobody” (BM 181). In this event, the kid’s role and words 
are obscured by the narration’s indirect report. Ultimately, even as Toadvine mumbles a 
dissent, the narration maintains that “[n]o man stood to tender them a defense,” meaning 
that neither Bathcat, Toadvine, or the kid took a stand against the group (BM 181). 
It is the perversity of mercy that the judge refers his question: “[f]or even if you 
should have stood your ground, he said, yet what ground was it?” (BM 320). Here the 
judge transitions from the ambivalent ground of moral justification—the kid’s 
hypothetical position and footing in the imaginary space of moral and physical 
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courage—to the question of the ontological ground on which one might justify such a 
moral stand. Ontological grounds, according to one of the judge’s earlier speeches, 
overrule moral justifications, a question already raised by the hermit early in the novel—
“can ye make it be?” (BM 20). For the judge, moral questions are not grounded in 
violence, they are settled by violence in an ontological war over what will and will not 
be: “It is the testing of one's will and the will of another within that larger will which 
because it binds them is therefore forced to select” (BM 261). For the judge, the irony is 
that moral objections to violence need an ontological grounding and such grounds, he 
says, are those selected by violence. In the case above, the kid’s vestige of a moral stand 
against his own appetite for mindless violence is presumed by the judge to be motivated 
by a series of reasons, judgments and willing, until the kid finally “stands” on principles 
proven by their force in violent contest with alternatives that each negate the other.  
The judge’s question plants doubt about the plausibility of such moral grounds, 
as he does throughout the text, suggesting that such arguments are untestable by violence 
and are therefore as flimsy as the sketches of the world he destroys (BM 97, 146). For 
Judge Holden the clash of wills in a state of war does not determine the truth or justice 
of discursive quarrels but rather renders them irrelevant. As close as Holden’s view 
seems to Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values or Thrasymachus’ suggestion in The 
Republic that justice is power, they are not identical. He says that “[a] man falling dead 
in a duel is not thought thereby to be proven in error as to his views. His very 
involvement in such a trial gives evidence of a new and broader view” (BM 261). 
Opinion is not proven by force, only commitment, which may or not be survivable in 
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conflict. He continues, “Man's vanity may well approach the infinite in capacity but 
his knowledge remains imperfect and howevermuch he comes to value his 
judgements ultimately he must submit them before a higher court. Here there can be no 
special pleading” (BM 261). But what is the higher court if not the violence that the 
judge has already said does not decide between claimants? The judge does not say. 
Further, emphasizing the ambiguity between sincere claims and idle chatter, the judge 
asks Tobin for a plea on the subject, which he also will not give. “Nihil dicit” (BM 
262), says the judge, a legal term for a judgment made in the absence of a plea by a 
defendant. According to the judge, by remaining silent, Tobin implicitly appeals to 
the judgements of the higher court that is more foundational and decisive than 
language or, perhaps, even violence. Thus, there is no ground other than what 
remains after conflict, and yet even that does not provide final evidence for the 
truth of any single “opinion.”231 That is, according to the judge, who arrives at a 
paradox of a primordial conflict prior to entities that could, in fact, engage in 
conflict.  
As the novel’s rhetorical figure and purveyor of the rhetoric of grounds, it is 
worth engaging the interpretive argument about the status of the judge and his 
argumentation throughout the novel. Positions on the judge could be charted on an x/y 
axis labeled power and credibility. On the x axis, one extreme grants him 
supernatural status, the other deflates or demystifies him as simply one man among 
                                               
231 Dougherty insists that the primacy of violence is why the Judge mocks coinage, since 
the real market economy of the world is force and the exchange of blood. See Dougherty, 
“Gnostic Tragedy,” 167. 
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many. On the y axis, the upper pole takes his claims to be serious arguments while 
on the lower pole he is a liar and a charlatan. So, for example, Dougherty’s gnostic 
reading of the judge probably falls high on the supernature scale and low on 
credibility since the gnostic archon’s intent is ultimately to deceive and disrupt true 
gnosis.  
Alternatively, it is tempting here to read Holden as an amoral mystic who 
intuits a fundamental unity beneath appearances, perhaps charting him lower on x 
(power) and higher on y (credibility) as Douglas does.232 But the judge does not, by 
himself, bearing the full burden of the unsaying this project observes. In other 
words, Blood Meridian’s apophaticism is exemplified but not exhausted by the 
judge. The first is his implicit hypotheses regarding the ground that undergirds 
what he regards as the vanities of explicit discourse. This is Dougherty’s case about 
the judge: all exchange economies—including markets and civil society—are 
inauthentic because they only imitate the great game of war. “War is the ultimate 
game,” says the judge, “because war is at last a forcing of the unity of existence. War 
is god,” (BM 261).233 According to the judge, it is the infinite variability of language 
and the interminability of argument that fools us into believing that there are 
mysteries within or beyond the single will containing war itself. “Books lie” (BM 
122), he says, opting instead for the truth of conflict ultimately indexed by “the 
bones of things” (BM 122). Rather, the judge coerces and negates—through logic or 
                                               
232 See Douglas, Evolution, 2013.  
233 See Dougherty, “Gnostic,” 167. 
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through violence—but he also tends to keep the linguistic process in motion rather 
than arresting it in a final assertion.234 
Likewise, the judge is not simply a stand-in for some transcendent other—a 
temptation brought on by his physical similarity to Melville’s white whale.235 But 
just as his paleness seems to invite readerly projection, his rejection of the 
possibility of finding true ground on which to stand—morally or ontologically—is 
supported by the narration’s observance of his grotesque self-reference.236 Blood 
Meridian reinforces this mundane self-reference at least as much as it teases 
Holden’s preternatural strength and resourcefulness: “The judge raised one pale and 
naked arm and pursued something in the pit of it with his fingers” (BM 191), and 
With his thumb he had been routing small life from the folds of his hairless skin 
and now he held up one hand with the thumb and forefinger pressed together in a 
gesture that appeared to be a benediction until he flung something unseen into 
the fire before him. (BM 97) 
 
Such moments, particularly with their religious satire, suggest neither a mystic nor 
a supernatural demon. However, when set beside novel’s elevation of the judge’s 
physical and intellectual achievements, a definitive interpretation of Judge 
                                               
234 According to Carson, “The novel questions the limits of language, casting its 
inquisition fictionally in the rhetoric of the judge and the conflict between Holden and the 
kid. […] Blood Meridian suggests that language—the meaning-for-us of words and the 
definitions assigned to them—is communally, cooperatively determined, and this 
collective agreement involves agreement in judgments,” Jordon Carson, “Drawing Fire 
from the Text: Narrative and Morality in Blood Meridian,” The Cormac McCarthy 
Journal 12 (2014): 20. 
235 A lot of critics have noted the similarity between Holden and Moby Dick. Foremost is 
Harold Bloom in How to Read and Why (New York: Touchstone Books, 2001), 259. See 
also, Hillier, Morality, Chapter 2.  
236 Holden firmly and without evidence denies the possibility of life on other planets 
(BM 256). 
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Holden’s status remains elusive.  
Rather than settle on a definitive hypothesis of who or what the judge is, I suggest 
that the he and his arguments—his discourses on war, history, and morality—are only 
one movement in the narrative’s apophatic work. Holden casts doubt on grounds, but 
reaffirms them in the concept of violently tested will. The judge’s discursive pressure on 
the concept of grounds amplifies the apophatic effect in much the same way as Boehme’s 
does: by looking backward or beneath the support structures of appearances one finds 
sources, causes, and origins that are equally unpleasant and unintelligible. For both 
Boehme and Judge Holden, a fundamental conflict lurks in the root of things but does not 
itself compress the whole of nature (much less being) into a name or concept any more 
the judge can actually log all of nature into a ledger. Even though the judge claims to 
arrest mystery with knowledge (“the mystery is that there is no mystery”) his doubt-
sowing is one moment in an apophatic rhetoric that collapses while, ironically, 
intensifying an underlying mystery. 
 For both readers and characters in the novel, how one imagines the judge does, in 
part, determine one’s moral response to him. In response to early, supernatural 
interpretations of the judge, like the kind found in Dougherty and Mundik, recent critical 
work especially has been wary of projecting preternatural powers onto a character who 
seems to welcome uncertainty as tactical advantage. These interpreters, as I have 
mentioned, read the judge as a Nietzschean fraud, a charlatan abusing both human beings 
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and language.237 While there is merit for this interpretation in the judge’s sophistic 
speeches and moral shallowness, it does not account well for his uncanny ability to 
appear at will or his strength. His ability to lift and throw a sizable meteorite, to stabilize 
a howitzer with one arm, and capacity for bare-handed skull-crushing (BM 251, 286, 187) 
— all examples that recommend the caution with which Tobin, Toadvine, and others 
approach the judge throughout the book.  
With regard to the rhetoric grounds, interpretation of the judge’s identity does 
affect its function. It is not necessary to determine the final identity of the judge (as 
supernatural or charlatan, or some combination thereof) in order to recognize that his 
deflationary philosophical arguments attempt to undermine language and reduce logical 
grounds to a core of willful violence. If we take seriously his consistent theme, war is not 
only God, but the true ground for human beings is made of the same stuff as the non-
metaphorical ground—dirt: “If war is not holy man is nothing but antic clay” (BM 320). 
While bombastic, there’s no reason to dismiss the claim as empty rhetoric rather than a 
                                               
237 In response to the supernatural readings of the judge, deflationary readings of the judge 
have been more common in recent readings of Blood Meridian: Potts (2015), Hillier 
(2017), and Dorson (2013) portray the judge as a philosophical menace or representative 
of perverse enlightenment rather than as a demon. However, witnessing some of the 
judge’s feats of strength or survival—or the radical evil he represents—elicit a more 
cautious approach from those in the novel. The judge’s aesthetic, as narrated, bears a 
mystique that seems to arrest most characters and keep them warry. The tendency to 
dismiss the judge strikes me as avoiding aspect of the novel that demands some attention: 
what if he’s right? And if so, how does one respond to such a truth? It is this kind of 
“facing-up” that the character demands of the characters—which both they and many 
readers wish to avoid. The question of response is raised effectively with the words of 
Paul Valéry just prior to the fragment used by McCarthy in Blood Meridain’s epigram: 
“You are in love with intelligence, until it frightens you.” See Paul Valéry, The Collected 
Works of Paul Valery Volume 10, trans.  Denise Folbot and Jackson Matthews (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1962), 373. 
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claim to what is ultimately true in the tradition of Boehme, Schelling, Hegel, and even 
Darwin. For the judge, conflict, competition, and violence are the fundamental shapers of 
reality and differentiate humanity from its mere material bases. 
The tenuous identification of human beings with clay occurs in Blood Meridian’s 
narration, too, as it reflects without conclusion about the kid’s ground, claiming that his 
heart is fashioned out of an unknown substance: “His origins are become remote as is his 
destiny and not again in all the world's turning will there be terrains so wild and 
barbarous to try whether the stuff of creation may be shaped to man's will or whether his 
own heart is not another kind of clay (BM 5).”  To paraphrase, without access to some 
terminus—either origins or ends or both— one cannot test the plasticity of nature, “the 
stuff of creation.” Likewise, the “or,” in the above passage is an odd disjunction but leads 
to a speculative distinction rather than a non sequitur: the clay (ground) of the heart may 
be something that is different from the created kind. The narration tells us we cannot 
know without trial on a “wild and barbarous” terrain. What other kind of clay could it be? 
Holden, of course, has a definite answer. He argues that the origin of being is war and 
that it is the measure by which he diagnoses the “flawed place in the fabric of your [the 
kid’s] heart” (BM 312). The ambiguous reference of this specific type of ground again 
modulates among the grounding of morality, grounding of fact, and the ontological 
grounding of its being that anything created must reasonably have and share. Moreover, 
as observed in the above precis on Eckhart, the soul or core or heart is in fact something 
other than the stuff of creation but without the determinate features needed to refer to it. 
To speak of its substance or ground is to speak of no-thing.  
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 Blood Meridian’s narration frequently plays with both the figuration of ground 
and the idea of an internal ground. It suggests that both may be ultimately empty. In a 
case nearly as paradoxical as Boehme’s unground, the narration describes what Blood 
Meridian’s chapter-headings refer to as “Hollow Ground”: 
In the evening they entrained upon a hollow ground that rang so roundly under the 
horses' hooves that they stepped and sidled and rolled their eyes like circus 
animals and that night as they lay in that ground each heard, all heard, the dull 
boom of rock falling somewhere far below them in the awful darkness inside the 
world. (BM 117) 
 
McCarthy’s idiosyncratic “in the ground” construction takes on a different prepositional 
arrangement to small but significant effect. Still led by Glanton and Holden, the gang 
members are here definitely not in one of the few grounds that they actually could be 
inside—a peculiarly hollow one. Nevertheless, the narrator places them—as if each in 
their own imagination—inside the hollow ground as it gradually disintegrates into 
nothing or, at least, the unknown.238 The gang’s status is always precarious—legally and 
morally—but their more basic, material/metaphysical groundlessness is also consistently 
reiterated by the description of their surroundings and encouraged by the judge. 
The Road’s Ground 
We have seen how, in Blood Meridian, attention to the logic of grounds supports 
a series of narrative figures, including the significance of the physical ground in the story. 
The discursive logic of grounds propounded by the dialogue (especially the judge’s) and 
the narration end either in highly ambiguous and unnamable origins (the kid’s ambiguous 
                                               
238 Dana Phillips makes a similar point, “In Blood Meridian, darkness is not a ‘theme,’ a 
dire metaphysical possibility mad characters can urge upon saner men, but a reiterated 
fact” (Phillips, “facts,” 438). 
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“clay,” for example) or in the judge’s hypothesis of ultimate violence. The novel’s 
emphasis on this logical metaphor expands the range of figurative implications for 
grounds as landscape. The Road similarly buttresses its narrator’s range of metaphorical 
possibilities by pressing explicitly on logical grounds. Attention to both elevates other 
thematic elements in Christian apophatic theology, particularly themes examined in Jacob 
Boehme and Meister Eckhart.  
Like Blood Meridian, The Road also shifts between the metaphoric use of 
grounds and the description of qualities drawn from elements of the landscape itself. In 
this novel, fecund, powerful properties are in the process of erasing themselves from the 
world. By contrast, in Blood Meridian it is Judge Holden, by Tobin’s account, who 
masters the near-magical properties of the earth by an uncanny skill with potencies 
hidden in its ground: “He got up when he seen us and went to the willows and come 
back with a pair of wallets and in one was about eight pounds of pure crystal saltpetre 
and in the other about three pounds of fine alder charcoal” (BM 134). Tobin admits 
aspects of his tale are hyperbole. To set the gang wandering not just around a volcanic 
range, but the mouth of hell and turning the whole ordeal into an inverted ritual is a 
good story but also an interpretation of the judge. Tobin imagines hoofprints in the 
volcanic ground as if they were tracks of little demons saying, “[i]t's a notion, no 
more. But someplace in the scheme of things this world must touch the other. And 
somethin put them little hooflet markings in the lava flow for I seen them there 
myself.” (BM 136). Tobin’s story centers on the judge’s proficiency with substances 
that have, historically, been associated with such a point of contact: potassium nitrate, 
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saltpeter, salnitre, or, in the vocabulary of Renaissance alchemy, salitter. The Road 
addresses the same substance by its more obscure name: 
He walked out into the road and stood. The silence. The salitter drying from the 
earth. The mudstained shapes of flooded cities burned to the waterline. At a 
crossroads a ground set with dolmen stones where the spoken bones of oracles lay 
moldering. No sound but the wind. What will you say? (TR 220) 
 
The second of five fragments—“Salitter drying from the earth”—is an observation 
occurring in the ambiguous alternation between the man and the narration. The fragment 
occurs without pause, explanation, or interpretation in a like manner to Tobin’s not-so-
subtle rhetorical associations of saltpeter and brimstone with hell. Instead, the partial 
sentence is simply placed, without hierarchy, beside elements from a non-specific pagan 
tomb (dolmen) and an exhausted method of reading nature as if it bore divine signs 
(spoken bones of oracles). Allen Josephs notes that the term “salitter” is so peculiar to 
Boehme that it constitutes something close to a direct reference—a point of particular 
convenience to the present argument.239 Whatever the degree of direct influence this 
tradition has on McCarthy’s writing, we know it at least appears through Boehme and 
have little reason to think that McCarthy, using the term so frequently, is utilizing a 
loaded metaphysical term without interpretive import. The term is characteristic of 
Boehme’s search for names in a complex cosmology that includes varieties of plant, 
animal, geological, and chemical life as manifestations of divine qualities that find 
expression or at least analogy in corporeal matter. However distant individual bodies are 
from the divine source, it is the chemical qualities that give them specific shape, 
                                               
239 Allen Josephs, “What’s at the End of The Road?” South Atlantic Review 74, no. 3 (July 
2009): 26. 
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structure, and character. Such qualities direct us backward toward even more 
fundamental qualities, to will and desire, darkness and light, that are ultimately sourced in 
Boehme’s the divine abyss. He writes: 
 […]God’s own essence is nigh unto all things, but not essentially in all things; it 
has another principle, and yet inclines itself to all things; as far as the thing has 
anything of the divine property in it, it receives virtue from the divine property, be 
it either a vegetable or animal; for there are herbs and trees, and also creatures to 
be found, in which something of the divine power is couched, with which in the 
magical cure the false magic […].240 
 
Boehme’s use of qualities and characteristics are not symbolic—at least not in a sense 
that would neatly divide the literary from the real. Rather, for Boehme, the world itself is 
symbolic, with some substances especially saturate with their own fundamental qualities. 
According to Principe and Weeks, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw extensive 
speculation on the origin and significance of the substance and Boehme was probably 
familiar with theories to which the substance was central.241 They also suggest that the 
chemical peculiarities of potassium nitrate—its use as a fertilizer, in combustibles like 
gunpowder, and in the dissolution of gold—drew early chemists and alchemists to 
speculate on its status as a fundamental element. Its versatility and potency is probably 
also what prompted Boehme to employ the chemical as his primary symbol for the image 
of the divine substance in nature.242  
                                               
240 Jacob Boehme, The Signature of All Things, trans. William Law (Woodland, CA: 
Ancient Wisdom Publications), 6.21. 
241 Lawrence M. Principe and Andrew Weeks, “Jacob Boehme’s Divine Substance 
Salitter: Its Nature, Origin, and Relationship to Seventeenth Century Scientific Theories,” 
The British Journal for the History of Science 22, no. 1 (1989): 59. 
242 Ibid., 58.  
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 A closer look at the natural aspects of the term exposes further complexity in The 
Road’s sentence fragment and its connection to the rhetoric of grounds: “The salitter 
drying from the earth.” This could be a reference to naturally occurring saltpeter or 
potassium nitrate. However, in their essay on Boehme’s use of the term, Principe and 
Weeks explain that raw saltpeter can appear after bacterial oxidization of nitrous soil, but 
is only evaporated during the refining process. They note that the phenomenon of 
naturally occurring saltpeter “drying” would actually be the fragile salt crystals 
dissolving back into the soil.243 Thus, it is not only the term but the prepositional form of 
the fragment that puzzles. I will examine the significance of spatial relationships to the 
apophatic imagination in Chapter 3, but this passage is an example of just how much 
significance can turn on a slight adjustment to a prepositional phrase. Salitter dries, but 
even though its solid form melts, the substance is precisely what remains after the dew 
has dried from the earth. In other words, its crystalline form dries but not from. Thus, in a 
fragment what would seem, at first glance, to be an evacuation of the salitter, actually 
embeds its generative properties back into the ground, if invisibly so.  
 The evaporation described in The Road’s fragment references the same leeching 
and drying process of refinement Judge Holden uses in Tobin’s account in Blood 
Meridian. When read with this in mind, The Road’s unnamed disaster analogously draws-
off of the inessential properties of the earth leaving only the reified divine substance. In a 
manner not unlike Eckhart’s gelassenheit, the world lets go of its extraneous properties to 
reveal a nature identical—explicitly—"in ground,” to borrow McGinn’s formulation.  
                                               
243 Ibid., 59n.  
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 Themes from Eckhart become especially prominent in The Road when the 
concept of ground is allowed a more expansive role. The Road depicts a gradual merging 
of world’s constituent identities, but in the context of a process of mass extinction. The 
world’s featurelessness merges all properties, especially color, into indistinct gray. The 
fragment on salitter implies that that which remains after distinctions violently disappear 
is inhospitable and indifferent to human life but not entirely absent from reality.244 The 
mystical procedure of shaving off of the extraneous is difficult to survive if applied to the 
world of living, breathing human beings. While this is consistent with McGinn’s reading 
of Eckhart’s ground-logic, it is worth asking if the destruction of the differentiated 
created order in The Road leaves room for the pregnancy/birth wing of Eckhart’s 
metaphorical family.  
Is it possible that The Road’s ground, shorn of determinate qualities, actually 
clears room for another type of fecundity, that is, another potential point of origin?245246 The 
novel indicates that boy is born in the early days of the disaster: “They sat at the window 
                                               
244 Phillips makes a similar point about Blood Meridian. McCarthy seems to be scaling 
value up rather than deflating it altogether. Judge Holden is a good example of this: 
“Nothing in nature,” writes Phillips, ” keeps him from being both a murderer and the life 
of the party.” See Phillips, “Facts,” 449. 
245 The Road’s method of annihilation that reveals what is actually important is an insight 
taken from Professor Ray Hart, spring 2013. Hart observes The Road’s similarity of 
Heidegger’s concept of living-towards, itself derived in part from a reading of Eckhart. 
Our lives are mostly lived in reference to ends, we walk towards the next thing we need 
to do for reasons of survival, pleasure, etc. The Road presents us with a journey to 
nowhere and end to towards-ing. 
246 Matthew Potts has also noted McCarthy’s novels’ affinity with Hannah Arendt’s 
concept of natality See Matthew Potts, Signs of Sacrament, 96-8. For Arendt, the 
fundamental acts of initiation, novelty, and beginning are what ground sociality or, more 
precisely in her thought, politics.  
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and ate in their robes by candlelight a midnight supper and watched distant cities burn. A 
few nights later she gave birth in their bed by the light of a drycell lamp” (TR 59). 
However, The Road’s narrative itself is a forceful foreclosure of the possibility of birth. 
In the aftermath of their stumbling upon the corpse of a roasted infant, the boy’s remark 
that “[i]f we had a little baby it could go with us” (TR 200), is almost cruelly ironic. 
Indeed, the reabsorption of natal possibility into adult sustenance makes an Eckhartian 
reading of The Road appear similarly perverse. Even so, cannibalism is among the most 
uncanny manifestations of the distorted means-ends relationship Eckhart resists. 
Eckhart’s themes further raise the stakes of the book and demonstrate an intense and 
allied version of what McCarthy himself has said (and perhaps understated) about what 
lessons readers ought to derive from The Road, specifically, that readers should: “simply 
care about things and people and be more appreciative,” and that, “[l]ife is pretty damn 
good. Even when it looks bad. We should be grateful. I don’t know who to be grateful to, 
but you should be grateful for what you have.”247 While difficult to integrate the glib 
remark with a complex novel it fits remarkably well with the Eckhartian disposition that 
the simplicity of gratitude, work, and disinterested enjoyment are the byproducts of the 
difficult, painful, and even violent severance of our human agendas.     
 With that in mind, it should be clear that the boy in The Road is not a 
representative of some natal possibility. The mother’s suicide seems driven only in part 
by the inescapability of sexual torture and cannibalism in The Road’s world. In such a 
                                               
247 Michael Conlon, “Writer Cormac McCarthy Confides in Oprah Winfrey,” Reuters, 
June 5, 2007. 
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scheme, the child would be the engine of hope that lures survival onward. But the text 
works aggressively against this interpretation as the child’s mother dismisses the child as 
an insufficient external end for which to live: 
I cant help you. They say that women dream of danger to those in their care and 
men of danger to themselves. But I dont dream at all. You say you cant? Then 
dont do it. That's all. Because I am done with my own whorish heart and I have 
been for a long time. You talk about taking a stand but there is no stand to take. 
My heart was ripped out of me the night he was born so dont ask for sorrow now. 
There is none. Maybe you'll be good at this. I doubt it, but who knows. The one 
thing I can tell you is that you wont survive for yourself. I know because I would 
never have come this far. A person who had no one would be well advised to 
cobble together some passable ghost. Breathe it into being and coax it along with 
words of love. Offer it each phantom crumb and shield it from harm with your 
body. As for me my only hope is for eternal nothingness and I hope it with all my 
heart. (TR 57) 
 
This monologue contains a number of tensions and ambivalences. Some traditional 
construals of family life unravel as the mother’s metaphors parody a normative gender 
and sexual politics. She presents herself as faithless, the man as cuckolded by death. The 
parental role is both a necessity for survival and the destruction of the internal capacity to 
truly receive what motivates it: “My heart was ripped out of me the night he was born.” 
She then asks the child’s father: 
We used to talk about death, she said. We dont any more. Why is that?  
I dont know.  
It's because it's here. There's nothing left to talk about.  
I wouldnt leave you.  
I dont care. It's meaningless. You can think of me as a faithless slut if you like. 
I've taken a new lover. He can give me what you cannot.  
Death is not a lover.  
Oh yes he is (TR 56-7). 
 
Here love operates on opposing vectors, at once bonding and repelling. Love 
ambivalently furnishes a “why” but also removes it. The boy, according to his mother, is 
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the only why remaining to the two parents, but that why no longer has a basis or ground. 
The mother kills herself in response to the loss of that ground and the anticipatory horror 
of an impending state of nature.  
It is never more than a fragile, seemingly arbitrary decision that keeps the man—who is 
at pains to keep two bullets in their gun—from following her, with the boy, into death. 
The unspoken substance behind the decision not to commit murder-suicide—however 
mercifully understood—may be a form of hope, but it is not stated whether that hope 
references a plausible livable future or a why that supposes a justifying end. The 
evacuation of future expectation is confirmed as the man—in either a dream or a 
memory—recalls standing in a ruined library:  
Years later he'd stood in the charred ruins of a library where blackened books lay 
in pools of water. Shelves tipped over. Some rage at the lies arranged in their 
thousands row on row. He picked up one of the books and thumbed through the 
heavy bloated pages. He'd not have thought the value of the smallest thing 
predicated on a world to come. It surprised him. That the space which these things 
occupied was itself an expectation. He let the book fall and took a last look 
around and made his way out into the cold gray light. (TR 187) 
 
The texts, even language itself is end-directed. It is for something else—“a world to 
come.”248 As with the basic function of naming, as I have argued in the previous chapter, 
language offers a form of ordering that, which, although it may correspond to the 
ambiguous orders of the natural world, is not identical with that order. It is, as Judge 
Holden says, “a string in a maze” (BM 256), for projects and plans and intentions. 
Naming is for some other expected interaction or practical end. This is why so many 
objects in The Road become meaningless with regard to their original function, but 
                                               
248 Interestingly, this is also the final sentence fragment of All the Pretty Horses.  
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talismanic for that evacuation.249 While the ecological stability of knowing-for scales up to 
a broader sense of hope, an aggressive interpretation of Eckhart would suggest that an 
economy of exchange remains operative. The Road’s catastrophic purgation unsays all 
texts and eventually all language by eradicating the common archive of grammar that 
supports and reproduces meaning.250 
 While The Road shares some of Eckhart’s rhetorical tools, it does not reach 
Eckhartian conclusions. The world The Road constructs is, from the perspective of the 
man/narrator, a “shrinking down about a raw core of parsible entities” (TR 88), but it 
renders that world secondary to what remains between a parent and a child. The novel’s 
premise is a physical instantiation of aphairesis or removal of everything but that raw 
                                               
249 Similarly to the way The Crossing portrays a useless brass inspection plate of a 
wrecked plane as having been “pried away and carried off […] for amulet” (TC 404). 
250 Traces of a similar assessment of the meaning and value of objects is also Dueña 
Alfonsa’s assessment of rural poverty:  
They had nothing. Every centavo they could scrape together went for funerals. 
The average family owned nothing machine-made except for a kitchen knife. 
Nothing. Not a pin or a plate or a pot or a button. Nothing. Ever. In the towns 
you'd see them trying to sell things which had no value. A bolt fallen from a truck 
picked up in the road or some wornout part of a machine that no one could even 
know the use of. Such things as that. Pathetic things. They believed that someone 
must be looking for these things and would know how to value these things if 
only that person could be found. It was a faith that no disappointment seemed 
capable of shaking. What else had they? For what other thing would they abandon 
it? The industrial world was to them a thing unimaginable and those who 
inhabited it wholly alien to them. And yet they were not stupid. Never stupid. You 
could see it in the children. Their intelligence was frightening. And they had a 
freedom which we envied. There were so few restraints upon them. So few 
expectations. Then at the age of eleven or twelve they would cease being children. 
They lost their childhood overnight and they had no youth. They became very 
serious. As if some terrible truth had been visited upon them. Some terrible 
vision. At a certain point in their lives they were sobered in an instant and I was 
puzzled by this but of course I could not know what it was they saw. What it was 
they knew (APH 232-3, my emphasis).  
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core.  In this sense, its background is more akin to Boehme, who also does conceptually 
what Eckhart and mystics from Plotinus encourages contemplatively: to strip away the 
dross of contingency until one reaches the unspeakable, uncreated non-thing at its origin. 
What remains of the world in The Road is increasingly indeterminate, unintelligible and 
therefore nameless. Although the man struggles against signs of the ground’s violent core 
and squints to discern more fundamental truths on its edges, the narration remains 
ambivalent as to whether that particular apophatic project will yield the revelation it 
raises as a possibility: 
He took one [book] down and opened it and then put it back. Everything damp. 
Rotting. In a drawer he found a candle. No way to light it. He put it in his pocket. 
He walked out in the gray light and stood and he saw for a brief moment the 
absolute truth of the world. The cold relentless circling of the intestate earth. 
Darkness implacable. The blind dogs of the sun in their running. The crushing 
black vacuum of the universe. And somewhere two hunted animals trembling like 
ground-foxes in their cover. Borrowed time and borrowed world and borrowed 
eyes with which to sorrow it. (TR 130) 
 
As so often with McCarthy, the grammar promotes semantic uncertainty. The phrase, 
“The absolute truth of the world” followed, without a colon, by fragments that may or 
may not be subordinated to it. The earth is “intestate,” a corpse with no heirs. The blind 
dogs of the sun are presumably an allusion to phenomenon of a parhelion (the solar 
version of the lunar paraselene), sometimes called sun dogs, which do not occur without 
direct, refracting light. Yet The Road does not depict a gradual shift in worldview that 
would negate the man-narration’s earlier, semi-conscious thoughts while watching the 
boy’s illuminated form stoke their campfire: “Not all dying words are true and this 
blessing is no less real for being shorn of its ground” (TR 31). The physical realities—the 
act of blessing, the warmth of the fire—outstrips the language used to structure and 
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describe them. Even their ground can be negated, or at least dismissed. After this, we are 
told that the man 
woke toward the morning with the fire down to coals and walked out to the road. 
Everything was alight. As if the lost sun were returning at last. The snow orange 
and quivering. A forest fire was making its way along the tinder-box ridges above 
them, flaring and shimmering against the overcast like the northern lights. Cold as 
it was he stood there a long time. The color of it moved something in him long 
forgotten. Make a list. Recite a litany. Remember. (TR 31) 
 
Here again the act takes on more truth or reality than can be expressed otherwise. Potts 
and others have noted the prominence of Christian sacraments in McCarthy. These tend 
to appear in moments where language or cognition begin to fail. Where the traumatized 
boy sits before a fire, the narration takes on the voice of the man who has just washed the 
child of gore: “All of this like some ancient anointing. So be it. Evoke the forms. Where 
you’ve nothing else construct ceremonies out of the air and breathe upon them” (TR 74). 
Ritual, the formalization of behavior around otherwise ambiguous or violent content, 
offers structure in an otherwise dangerous state of flux.251 In contrast to the waning 
stability of conventional semantics in The Road’s setting, the man claims activates 
language’s ritual function, its forms. This turn toward the performance or instantiation of 
ritual also evokes Eckhart’s claim that action (acts of justice in particular) rather than 
contemplation, is the mark of a mature faith on the far-side of the unsaying and 
revaluing.252 
                                               
251 See Seligman, Adam B., Robert Weller, Michael J. Puett, and Bennett Simon. Ritual 
and Its Consequences: An Essay on the Limits of Sincerity. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
252 Eckhart writes this in Sermon 59: “Some teachers hold that the spirit finds its beatitude 
in love. Some make him find it in beholding God. But I say he does not find it in love, or 
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The coping function of ritual and performed roles is present throughout the novel. 
For the child, the roles are fundamentally “we’re the good guys,” “we don’t eat people,” 
in contrast to the “bad guys,” who do (TR 92, 103, etc.). At times, the roles are basic, like 
“we’re beachcombers” (TR 220). In other instances, the man must refer to his “job,” 
which grotesquely includes washing someone else’s brains out of his child’s hair. In this 
futureless world, The Road wavers between narrative, ritual, and narrative about ritual, 
but both require roles to structure them. The Grail, The Road’s working title, appears in 
traces throughout the text and explicitly in the man’s fragmented thought-sentences in 
which the boy is a “[g]olden chalice, good to house a god” (TR 75).253 The unused title is 
evocative both of the Arthurian quest for a grail but also of Joseph of Arimathea bearing 
away the fugitive cup that caught Christ’s blood during his execution. The knight-errant 
model paired with the man and boy’s shambling shopping cart flirts with Cervantes’ 
satirical deflation of romantic chivalry.254 But the man embraces that ludicrousness of the 
aimless quest in the last sensible claim possible: “He knew only that the child was his 
warrant. He said: If he is not the word of God God never spoke” (TR 5). The child, like 
the word of God, is sacred in himself and is a means to no other end but himself—that 
                                               
in gnosis, or in vision.” Rather, writes Eckhart, it is the birth of God in the soul through 
just action that one finds it. See Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works, 307. 
253 See Robert de Boron’s poem, Joseph d'Arimathe, for one of the earlier references to the 
grail lore in the Arthurian legends.  
254 Grace Hellyer makes essay in Styles of Extinction uses Cervantes and Joyce to interpret 
The Road’s flooded library scene. Hellyer notes that Cervantes was especially keen to 
demolish what he thought to be the lies contained in the feudal mythologies. See Grace 
Hellyer “Spring Has Lost Its Scent: Allegory, Ruination, and Suicidal Melancholia in The 
Road,” in Styles of Extinction: Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, eds. Julian Murphet and 
Mark Steven (London ; New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2012).  
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value is no less real having been shorn of his ground, but is only so starkly perceptible 
because of that removal. 
The Road presents a world that is performing Plotinus’ “cutting away” for its 
creatures.255 By gesturing towards objects, events,  transcends language and reference, it 
asks: in a world shorn of its determinate qualities what is the shape of the last important 
object before it too is swallowed by indeterminacy?256 But even these proximate nothings 
are only gestures elicited by the encroaching groundlessness. They, in turn, point our 
attention toward nothings that we have not and cannot have encountered: the abyss, to 
which we now turn. 
McCarthy’s Abyss 
In the above sections, I have explored apophatic uses of two quotidian processes 
of reasoning: origins and grounds. Apophatic thinkers have taken up differing logics of 
origins and grounds as explanatory limit-concepts and artfully pressed their edges, a 
subtle method that gestures at beyond language without the fuss of dramatic, immediate 
experiences of the absolute or union with the divine itself. McCarthy’s fictional adoption 
of ground logic allows the relatively frequent use of the descriptive-logical double-
entendre.  
                                               
255 Aphairesis, sometimes abstraction, but translated in Latin as remotio or “removal.” See 
Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the 
Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 2008), 11.  
256 The search for significance of “what remains” after the unknown disaster is dealt-with 
at length by Shelly Rambo in “Beyond Redemption? Reading Cormac McCarthy’s The 
Road after the End of the World,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 41, no. 2 (2008): 
101-115, especially. 
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In some cases McCarthy also marshals more theatrical negations of the above his 
grounds rhetoric along the lines of Boehme’s un-ground with which we know McCarthy 
to be familiar. This negation is most obvious in McCarthy’s use of abyss imagery. 
Abyss—without bottom—could simply be taken as the negation of ground. The image 
has only a few biblical analogues and a peculiar place within the Christian mystical 
tradition. McGinn notes that Christian interpreters in Late Antiquity generally ignored 
Psalm 42’s Abyssus abyssum invocat (“deep calleth unto deep” in the KJV) and mediated 
on the preceding verses’ reference to the simile of the wild deer searching for water.257 The 
lack of special interest in the preceding passage is perhaps in keeping with early 
Christianity’s ambivalence toward the indeterminate waters out of which the world is 
formed (Gen 1) and may be why the sea explicitly disappears altogether (Rev 21) or is at 
least finally arrested in the Christian eschaton (Rev 4 and 15).258 Since the practical 
bottomlessness of the sea is probably as close as most of us will come—in trust—to a 
manifestation of the truly bottomless, its unpredictability and inhospitality make it a 
ready-to-hand symbol for chaos, fecundity and mystery.259  
McGinn also notes that the twelfth century—in which Christian writers were 
perhaps less pressured by gnostic interpretations of the created world as a chaotic void—
saw increased use of the abyss as a divine attribute. He suggests that the word a-byssos 
(without bottom) offered medieval writers a “verbal ‘black-hole’”260 with which to 
                                               
257 Bernard McGinn, “Lost in the Abyss: The Function of Abyss Language in Medieval 
Mysticism,” Franciscan Studies 72, no. 1 (2014): 435. 
258 McGinn alludes to this relationship in, “Ocean,” 1994.  
259 See the Babylonian Enuma Elish, for example.  
260 McGinn, “Abyss,” 434. 
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indicate a vertiginous but mostly imaginary concept through a straightforward negation 
of the familiar ground or bottom. However, despite assurances that the ultimate source 
and substance of the abyss is divine charity, the concept of abyss negates the cognitive 
security of a limit—a “bottom” or basis for understanding – and thus threatens cherished 
metaphors of rationality.261 Porete and Eckhart were both condemned (Porete fatally) in 
part because the concept softened orthodox conceptual boundaries between the nature or 
ground of the soul and that of God.262 As McGinn notes, Porete and Eckhart took the 
psalmist’s reasoning at its word: if “deep calls out to deep,” then there may be some 
common depth where they can meet in union and, further, without distinction.263 Whether 
or not Porete’s annihilation signals the soul’s apotheosis or Eckhart’s divine spark has 
more ambition to it than meets the eye, it is easy to see how their dissolution of 
ontological distinctions between creator and created could be understood as corrosive to 
otherwise stable grounds of theological reasoning and orthodoxy. 
McCarthy uses the term, abyss, frequently as a simile. However, in contrast to the 
ground metaphors it negates, the power of the word derives from its lack of reference to 
anything readily available to experience. It can only do so as an allusion to other fictional 
abysses.264 For example, Blood Meridian’s narration employs it as a descriptive aid: “[t]he 
sourceless summer lightning marked out of the night dark mountain ranges at the rim of 
                                               
261 McGinn cites Catherine of Sienna (d. 1380) as one of the most prolific users of the 
term, inviting devotees to plunge into the “fiery abyss of divine charity.” Ibid., 438.  
262 See Oliver Davies Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian (London: SPCK, 2011), 200. 
263 McGinn, “Abyss,” 436. 
264 Crews (2017) helpfully points out the OED definition of the word “meontic” can 
provide a contrast to mimetic, and refers to the expression of things that have not been 
experienced and so not available to artistic strategies of imitation (159). 
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the world and the halfwild horses on the plain before them trotted in those bluish strobes 
like horses called forth quivering out of the abyss” (BM 169, my emphasis). This alludes 
to Revelation 9, which describes locust-horse-creatures that emerge from the abyss to 
torment humanity.  
An even more explicitly theological instance of the abyss in Blood Meridian 
comes as a theological assumption in Tobin’s reflection on the paraselene or mock-moon 
and if there every had once been two moons in the sky: 
But certainly the wise high God in his dismay at the proliferation of lunacy on 
this earth must have wetted a thumb and leaned down out of the abyss and 
pinched it hissing into extinction. And could he find some alter means by which 
the birds could mend their paths in the darkness he might have done with this 
one too. (BM 256) 
 
Here the abyss may reference the “without form” and “void” (Hebrew: tohu wa-bohu) or 
chaos above which God hovers prior to creation (Genesis 1:2).  
A more subtle apocalyptic (in the revelatory sense) usage comes in a later scene in 
which, on a narrow, elevated trail Glanton’s fleeing gang slaughters a huge group of 
mule-drivers, shooting and then pushing them from a cliff trail. “He swung [his gun] over 
the pommel and shot the man squarely in the chest. The man sat down heavily and 
Brown shot him again and he pitched off down the rocks into the abyss below” (BM 
203). When used for mining, quicksilver or mercury’s reactive capacity to form cool 
alloys with other metals and so draws out small piece of gold or silver from a slurry 
of water and stone. Following largely from Paracelsus’ alchemical writings, Boehme 
made mercury a primary principle—along with sulfur and salt—in God’s creation of 
the world. Boehme speculates or reveals—it is never entirely clear exactly which—
   
 
157 
that “the Motion and Separation of Nature, by which every thing is figured with its 
own signature [….] which is an Effluence from the Word of the Divine Power and 
Motion, wherein the ground of Heaven is understood.”265 For Boehme, separations of 
form distinguish things in both kind (quidditas) and individuality (haecceity). He 
claims that “In the FIRST Motion, the Magnetical Desire compressed and 
compacted the fiery and the watery Mercury with the other properties; then the 
grossness separated itself from the spiritual nature: the fiery became Metals and 
Stones, and partly Salnitre, that is, Earth […].”266 In other words, the first movement 
out of the abyss of primal desire, anguish and bitterness is its compression out of the 
dark desire of the Father (Salt, the First Principle, characterized by desire), which 
sparks (shrak) in reaction to the love, grace, and “compassion” of the Son (mercury, 
the Second Principle, characterized by form and signature).267 The reaction is both 
light and dark fire. The mercury, a calming, separating agent, parts the 
indistinctiveness of that reaction into actual shapes, operating like a lens or prism 
that filters the indeterminate and gives it form. Sulfur is the active agent in the 
development of nature, the Third Principle, and is characterized by will and growth 
toward determinate ends and beings.268 
 In this passage McCarthy waves the allusion to Boehme, alchemy, and 
Paracelsus aggressively:  
                                               
265 Jacob Boehme, The Key of Jacob Boehme, , Ed. Adam Mclean, Trans. William Law 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1991), 31, [sic]. 
266 Ibid., 41.  
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid., 31. 
   
 
158 
[t]he animals dropping silently as martyrs, turning sedately in the empty air 
and exploding on the rocks below in startling bursts of blood and silver as 
the flasks broke open and the mercury loomed wobbling in the air in great 
sheets and lobes and small trembling satellites and all its forms grouping 
below and racing in the stone arroyos like the imbreachment of some 
ultimate alchemic work decocted from out the secret dark of the earth's heart, 
the fleeing stag of the ancients fugitive on the mountainside and bright and 
quick in the dry path of the storm channels and shaping out the sockets in the 
rock and hurrying from ledge to ledge down the slope shimmering and deft as 
eels. (BM 203-4) 
 
McCarthy’s simile does not depend on the reader knowing the significance of the 
alchemical mercury. Those implications are spelled-out by the narration. It is like an a 
rupture in “some ultimate alchemic work,” so it must not be one, just as “the abyss 
below” is not an actual abyss (except, perhaps, from the imaginative perspective of David 
Brown), but a gulf with a real bottom visible from the narrator’s perspective. Explicitly, 
the narration makes few claims other than these comparisons, but the similes raise a 
series of signposts that point to a shared knowledge of things like “the secret dark of the 
earth’s heart,” which is, for Boehme at least, the truly bottomless “First Principle” and in 
some instances, the most basic form of the Ungrund. The above episode is a pointed 
example that illuminates some shared features found in McCarthy’s subtler rhetoric 
around abysses found elsewhere. 269 
 Blood Meridian generates tension within the scope of its perspective 
geographically. The panoramic perspective of space in valleys described as “gulfs” also 
                                               
269 In an essay on the legal metaphor of the judge, Dorson connects the judge to the 
personification of the law itself, which for Jacques Derrida, is at its core an abyss. The 
judge represents the order which papers over the underlying chaos of the world—a string 
in an empty maze. As Dorson puts it, the law “at once our lodestar and straightjacket, 
coaxing us toward a future telos as inescapable as Judge Holden’s all-encompassing 
embrace.” See Dorson, “Demystifying the Judge,” 116. 
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tends toward the idea of bottomlessness. This is true when the kid observes a distant 
skirmish between Glanton’s gang and General Elias’ men on the “valley floor” but 
observed over the “gulf” between its upper sides  (BM 221). Likewise, when the gang 
camped overlooking the region’s copper mines: “they made a dry and fireless camp. They 
sent down scouts and Glanton walked out on the bluff and sat in the dusk watching the 
darkness deepen in the gulf below to see if any light should show itself down there” 
(BM 118).  Later, the “blue gulf” of the high desert contrasts with the sparse, beautiful, 
and dangerous life within it—aspen, mountain doves, and a lean blonde bear (BM 142).270 
Likewise, the groundless gulf around the gang’s dry camp contrasts to the supposed 
alchemical qualities of the nearby ground (in Boehme, copper is associated with love).271 
In the first example, the affairs of the clashing armies are trivialized by their context and 
the perspective of the kid. The second example shows Glanton with a similar perspective 
searching for sign somewhere in the empty darkness. Both scenes are small, but both 
maintain the descriptive concreteness of the abyss language while drawing attention to 
the ambiguous status of signs themselves in the context of an abyss. 
 McCarthy’s use of the abyss may seem aesthetically overwrought or at least a 
verbal shortcut to existential seriousness. Taken as individual occurrences of the term, 
this may be the case. As Sells argues, the mere negation of categories or terms in itself is 
                                               
270 Glanton, depicted as a murderous, racist psychopath, is also featured in one reminder of 
a subject’s rich inner life:  “They rode up switchbacks through a lonely aspen wood 
where the fallen leaves lay like golden disclets in the damp black trail. The leaves 
shifted in a million spangles clown the pale corridors and Glanton took one and turned 
it like a tiny fan by its stem and held it and let it fall and its perfection was not lost on 
him” (BM 141). 
271 See Jacob Boehme, The Signature of All Things, 4.40. 
   
 
160 
not especially forceful. The aesthetic technique of apophasis deepens linguistic tension so 
that the eventual un-saying is an event in itself rather than another statement. This is why 
instances of abyss language in McCarthy are not isolated but are, rather, contrasted with 
the use of the ground logic we have already discussed. By layering mutually defeating 
concepts, grounds and abysses, McCarthy’s narratives increase the stakes of both terms 
without determining a victor. In the following two chapters, both the dialectical tension 
of mutual negation (Chapter 5) and McCarthy’s use of spatial terms (Chapter 3) will be 
discussed in greater detail. At this juncture, however, it is useful to examine a regular 
theme in McCarthy that plays with the meeting of ground and abyss, which is the figure 
of the edge or shore.  
The Void and the Shore 
We have already seen how the apophatic negation of ground can find momentary 
stability in the concept of abyss. The more abstract concept of nothingness—the negation 
of things or thingness—although difficult to represent, also has contrast terms that can 
keep it in imaginative view. I will reserve a discussion of the dialectical aspects of 
McCarthy’s nothing and nothingness for Chapter 5. However, the negation of ground 
metaphors in the rhetoric of abyss lies between more abstract notions of nothingness and 
that of negative space (chapter 3). Imagery of the void and emptiness in McCarthy’s 
books tend, however, do tend to hover around the narration’s use of both origin and 
nothingness. By using transitional imagery, like a spatial edge or shore, McCarthy keeps 
these otherwise unimaged concepts imaginatively active.  
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 The history of this rhetorical move in mysticism is rich and complex. The 
character of that which was prior to creation, whether primal matter, chaos, or nothing 
shapes and is shaped by the permissible rhetoric around it. As has already been discussed, 
Christian thought and mysticism made slow appropriation of both abyss language and the 
oceanic (Freud). I have already drawn associations in the King James Version of Genesis 
1: “And the earth was without form [tohu wa-bohu], and void; and darkness was upon the 
face of the deep.” The deep is, at least for Christian mysticism, a symbol that sits 
sometimes awkwardly with the conceptual austerity of creation out of nothing (ex nihilo). 
The theological imagination around creation, as has already been discussed, informs the 
overall shape of its mystery.  
McCarthy’s vocabulary, “the deep” or “the void,” tends toward the dramatic, 
particularly in Blood Meridian when linked with the inscrutability of origins we have so 
far discussed.272 But it is also one of the few points of respite given by both narration and 
the described landscape. Take, for example, the narration’s description of the kid’s arrival 
in San Diego, just prior to the kid’s surgery and dreams described above: 
They slept shivering under a wooded boss among owleries and a scent of 
juniper while the stars swarmed in the bottomless night. 
It was evening of the following day when they entered San Diego. The 
expriest turned off to find them a doctor but the kid wandered on through the 
raw mud streets and out past the houses of hide in their rows and across the 
gravel strand to the beach. 
Loose strands of ambercolored kelp lay in a rubbery wrack at the 
tideline. A dead seal. Beyond the inner bay part of a reef in a thin line like 
                                               
272 McCarthy’s oceanic analogies made it into early drafts of The Road before being 
omitted from the final draft. A curious formulation appears a number of times in the 
drafts: “History is what the world is made of. It does not go sucking sluicing back into its 
own origins. It simply washes out into the fog as is gone. The language loses external 
referent" (Wittliff Southwestern Writers Collection, Box 87, Folder 3. Emphasis mine.). 
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something foundered there on which the sea was teething. He squatted in the sand 
and watched the sun on the hammered face of the water. Out there island clouds 
emplaned upon a salmoncolored othersea. Seafowl in silhouette. Down-shore the 
dull surf boomed. There was a horse standing there staring out upon the darkening 
waters and a young colt that cavorted and trotted off and came back. 
He sat watching while the sun dipped hissing in the swells. The horse 
stood darkly against the sky. The surf boomed in the dark and the sea's black 
hide heaved in the cobbled starlight and the long pale combers loped out of the 
night and broke along the beach. 
He rose and turned toward the lights of the town. The tide-pools bright as 
smelterpots among the dark rocks where the phosphorescent seacrabs clambered 
back. Passing through the salt grass he looked back. The horse had not moved. A 
ship's light winked in the swells. The colt stood against the horse with its head 
down and the horse was watching, out there past men's knowing, where the 
stars are drowning and whales ferry their vast souls through the black and 
seamless sea. (BM 316) 
 
This passage is a notable cessation amid the stress and uncertainty of a chapter in which 
Tobin and the kid only narrowly escape the murderous judge in the desert, having been 
rescued by a group of peaceful Dieguenos. It does not completely contrast with the 
escape, which only a few pages prior leaves the two shaken and desperate: “they could 
hear the cries of birds that seemed a charm against the sullen shores of the void out of 
which they had ascended” (BM 315). But this shore is different. Its beauty and tranquility 
are unmatched in the book. Although it is not untouched by death (“a dead seal.”), it 
contains little violence and is the only encounter with the sea in the entire book.  
The sea is an apt figure for unknowing since it is unknown. No metaphor is 
required in its gesture towards the indescribable. But it is telling that the deep’s 
superficial level, the reef that breaks the surface, the dead kelp and seal, what we know of 
it is what it shows: violence and death. Yet the narrator strains imagination to peer 
beneath the “hammered face of the water,” a rearticulation of Melville’s “the fine 
   
 
163 
hammered steel of woe.”273 Beneath the vanity of the surface, the death and violence 
evinced in the shallows, there is more than can be said about the abyssal sea. Even the 
stars—by which the kid has navigated his way out of danger and to San Diego—“drown” 
in an apparent nothingness that can only be viewed and discussed from the shore or 
shallows rather than in its full depth. 
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter has been to explain the logic of grounds with reference to 
its dependence on an organization of conceptual metaphors—origins and terminations—
and exhibit their apophatic function in McCarthy’s novels. I have explained how these 
clusters of metaphor-concepts have been deployed by several writers in the Christian 
mystical tradition who have also pushed these terms to their logical edges. Further, while 
the purpose of this chapter has been not been to draw direct historical lines of influence 
from the Beguine mystics to Boehme and to McCarthy, tracing the network of metaphors 
and concepts demonstrates that some genetic relationships in the techniques used by 
McCarthy are operative throughout these writers. Finally, the dialectic between ground 
and abyss imagery across two of McCarthy’s texts undermines the stability and security 
that the conceptual metaphor of grounds offers. As I will argue in Chapter 5, the 
“unsaying” of epistemological and ontological grounds renders tenuous the rhetorical 
uses of the term in other dialogues. 
  
                                               
273 In the context for this line in the “Try-Works” chapter of Moby Dick is the book of 
Ecclesiastes, “the truest of all books.” Herman Melville, Moby-Dick, Eds. by Hershel 
Parker and Harrison Hayford ( New York: Norton, 2002), 328.  
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Chapter 3: Unsaid Space, Unmapped Landscape  
In Chapter 2, I discussed McCarthy’s use of contrasting physical metaphors that 
reference stability and security. These instances of spatial conceptual metaphors are 
frequently already “dead” insofar as they integrate into mostly non-metaphorical 
discursive frames and only stand out when undermined.  
Similarly, we generally do not pay special attention to the metaphorical space 
constructed by semantic supporters like prepositions. They become more noticeable, 
however, when strained or combined with new rhetorical roles. This was the case when 
the concept of an epistemological foundation, “ground,” was applied to the problem of 
ontological dependence. The conceptual metaphor enlivened neighboring and negating 
words like ‘abyss’ (without-bottom), ‘void,’ and ‘edge’ which in turn gave more 
imaginative flesh to abstractions like “nothing.” In the same line of reasoning, the 
mystics I examined took the ground metaphor as a primary symbol not only for 
epistemological ontological dependence, but as a rhetorical means to emphasize the 
transcendence of an object that is both ground and is groundless. In other words, being 
must also have a basis either as origin or sustainer, but that origin and sustainer must 
somehow arrest the regress of dependence.  
McCarthy’s prose, I argued, frequently vacillates between describing the ground 
as landscape, as conceptual metaphor for rational thought, and as a metaphor for the basis 
of being. Yet both the narrative depiction of physical ground and the conceptual 
metaphor of grounds collapse or negate themselves, leaving only voids and abysses on 
the edge of which both characters, narrators, and readers are left to stand. I concluded that 
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the ground was an apophatic entendre with the unique capacity to simultaniously 
reference a historic mystical tradition, describe a dangerous landscape, and exploit a 
current conceptual metaphor, all while unsaying each at different points in McCarthy’s 
novels.  
 This chapter continues the discussion of the negation of spatial organization of 
language, specifically the rhetorical contortion of space that does not simply negate but 
reconfigures intelligible imaginary space and its inhabitants. In McCarthy, this form of 
negation occurs at the syntactical and stylistic level, for example, in descriptions of 
natural spaces with polysyndeton(s) that thin the organizational tissue between imagined 
objects. Likewise, contortions and negations occur at the narrative level as well, 
especially in the negation of body and sense examined in the Chapter 4.  
 The apophatic element in this chapter is a member of a class of indexical signs 
coordinated in order to disrupt determinate reference while referring elsewhere.274 Many of 
the disruptions described are commonplace in fiction (parataxis, for instance, is a familiar 
device). However, much like the rhetoric around grounds in Chapter 2, the goal of this 
chapter is to demonstrate that concrete signs are coordinated in such a way that they have 
a discernable momentum toward receding points of reference. Unlike the ground and 
abyss rhetoric of the Neoplatonic and Beguine traditions, however, this chapter does not 
rely as heavily on an openly metaphysical discourse. Rather, the mode here will be 
                                               
274 Robert Neville refers to such signs under the broader term of symbol. While for Neville 
the referencing power of all symbols eventually break under the pressure of their object 
(ultimate reality), I suggest that the figures observed in this chapter function to break 
them “early,” in this sense that they collapse linguistically and without the aid of an 
explicit metaphysical argument. See Neville, Ultimates, Chapter 8, IV.  
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primarily an analysis of signs with reference to analogues in the mystical discourse 
already discussed.  
I continue to examine spatial metaphors and spatial relationships as apophatic 
tools in McCarthy’s novels, paying special attention to points of tension between 
landscape and domesticity and, in Chapter 4, between the order of the human body and 
violence done to it. These tensions are of particular importance as they address 
perceptible orders of nature (cosmology) and the extent that they can be known 
(epistemology). Finally, I suggest that the narrative collapse of both the natural order 
itself and knowledge of it again raise questions of its existence as such (ontology). I argue 
that McCarthy’s themes, images, and figures move in and out of these philosophical 
frames in order to address questions, anxieties, and experiences that defy the normal 
language and otherwise reliable signs like maps.  Finally, I argue that the failure or 
disintegration of maps within the novels does not terminate in flattened-out nihilism or a 
mere surrender to labyrinthine imagery. Rather, the eventual failure of commonplace 
maps and the landscape (in The Crossing and most extremely in The Road) clears space 
for the emergence of more opaque, natural maps. As the maps imagined in nature are 
likewise negated, their epistemological unreliability once again raises questions of 
ontological dependence. 
Kant’s is the standard argument linking the processes of reasoning with the 
concept of space. In general consonance with the tradition discussed in Chapter 1, Kant’s 
understanding of reason is, at root, the differentiation and establishing of relationships 
   
 
167 
between objects.275 It is not necessary to rehearse Kant’s entire argument in order to 
suggest merely that space is an important aspect of effective cognition. This is the case 
with the physical objects as well as with the coherence (hanging together) of ideas. The 
extent to which this is universally applicable across all language and all thought is 
doubtful. However, as a rhetorical observation that bears on a limited number of 
language-users, Kant’s point is relatively mundane. At least in English, there are areas of 
linguistic sense structured by idiomatic metaphors that gain functionality by consistently 
applied—and often arbitrary—spatial and temporal relationships. As George Lakoff has 
argued, even abstract linguistic constructions are frequently organized by semi-conscious 
imagery. On the sentence-level, these relationships are governed by explicit positions in 
physical space (e.g. feeling well is feeling “up” and feeling bad is “down”) or an implicit 
prepositional relationship required by the physical metaphor (e.g. “they were in a good 
mood” or even “I understand”).276 
Despite their arbitrariness, such conceptual spaces are not unsystematic. They 
facilitate rapid communication by constructing a shared sense of coherence. Their 
pragmatic usefulness usually does not require explanation or full elaboration of their 
basis in fact. There is, for example, probably no demonstrable natural correlation between 
                                               
275 For Kant, “Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of thins 
in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one 
speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique 
space.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 158 (A25).  
276 See Lakoff, Metaphors, 1980. See also Mark Tovey, “Spatial Metaphors as Linguistic 
Primitives: A Comparison of UP-DOWN Metaphors in Three Languages,” Totem: The 
University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology 2, no. 1 (1995). 
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being unemotional and being “cold,” but the relationship is only one instance of web of 
imaginative relationships based on an colloquial link between affect and temperature.277 
While this may seem a banal point, the factual results of arbitrarily constructed metaphors 
are highly ambiguous. Their communicative power provides ready-to-hand terms for 
metaphysical and religious systems (see Chapter 2 of this study) but can as easily oil the 
semi-conscious gears of ideological bias and prejudice. For example, metaphors and 
terms that reproduce the expectations of what a normal human body is able to do and 
linking those functions with the ability to reason logically or morally.278  
 The significance of spatially oriented logical relationships is not always obvious. 
While not all concepts are connected through overt spatial and temporal relationships, 
they do, in many languages, take prepositions and tenses that organize them into 
meaningful forms and sequences. Thus, for example, the litigator’s quibble over verbal 
minutia makes sense when the stakes of these semi-conscious verbal short-cuts are raised 
in the contestation of a contract. Likewise, interpretations of revelatory texts can have 
such intense moral or spiritual consequences that the ambiguity of single words may bear 
significant interpretive pressure.  
Space and Mysticism 
 Michael Sells and others have argued that apophatic mystical literature sometimes 
destabilizes language at these important logical and linguistic joints. A helpful example 
                                               
277 John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 82.  
278 See Amy Vidali, “Seeing What We Know: Disability and Theories of Metaphor,” 
Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies 4, no. 1 (January 2010): 33–54. 
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of this is Sells’ analysis of John Scotus Eriugena’s Periphyseon (On the Division of 
Nature), which focuses on small but pivotal adjustments of space for apophatic ends of 
the kind I wish to highlight in McCarthy. This is specifically the case in the text’s 
dialogue between the ‘nutriter’ and the ‘alumnus’ on the meaning of creatio ex nihilo, a 
doctrine that sets the conceptual boundaries between God and creatures. Eriugena is 
explicit that the boundaries of the discourse can be referenced back to God’s 
incomprehensibility. As Dierdre Carabine explains: “Given the primary understanding 
that the ousia of any thing is unknowable, it stands to reason that the essence of all things 
is unknowable since that very essence is God.”279 The discourse limitation itself does not 
demonstrate incomprehensibility but is a premise of the method that will demonstrate the 
collapse of knowable categories. Sells’ contribution here is his analysis of the importance 
of moving through a discourse that not only demonstrates transcendence of 
comprehension within individual experience (a dominant motif in Christian mystical 
texts) but of incomprehensibility itself. 
Eriugena’s character, “the nutriter,” takes pains to limit the interpretative field 
around creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing). The nutriter’s worry is that the phrase 
insufficiently aligns with the negative assertion that the divine does not suffer accidents. 
Eriugena’s characters then look to loosen the imaginative hold of the implied spatial and 
temporal “from” in favor of a conceptual model that leans on the more metaphysically 
satisfactory preposition, “in.” God does not create out of some other material called 
                                               
279 Deirdre Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
42. 
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nothing and the spatial implications of from should not encumber the imagination with a 
time prior to some point when it occurred to the divine mind. “The statement that effects 
subsist in their causes,” writes Sells, “is the first step in making explicit the alteration of 
the meaning of in from spatial to causal.”280 Eriugena attempts to parochialize the 
prepositional baggage of creation ex nihilo in favor of prepositions like in and sub. Sells 
writes that “the tension between under (sub) and in (in) is the linguistic hinge for the 
expanding and collapsing of the hierarchical levels. The word’s [logos] diffusion is the 
subsistence of all things. We have here a classic paradox of emanation and return.”281 
Sells’ notes the sense of tension the paradox produces. It neither wholly promotes 
understanding, nor wholly confuses it, but affirms two plausible claims that cannot 
mutually harmonize. Eriugena does not cleanse a theological concept of its dissonant 
spatial relations in favor of a more rarified concept. Rather, Sells notes how the nutritor, 
“at the microlevel of preposition,” first exposes that buried spatial metaphor, then 
reconfigures the possible spatial and temporal interpretations of ex nihilo from a familiar 
spatial relationship (once there was nothing and then, out of it, God created) into a 
paradoxical one.282 Eriugena’s rhythmic disruption and repositioning of key conceptual 
relationships neither spin nor completely unravel the creation narrative embedded in 
creation ex nihilo, but maintain only a measure of understanding of each division of 
nature. 
                                               
280 Sells, Unsaying, 46.  
281 Ibid., 47. 
282 Ibid. 
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 Eriugena condemns as monstrous and idolatrous what Sells terms the “semantic 
delimitation” of verbal formulations that might imaginatively arrest the extension of 
thought toward the excess of God beyond all other relational categories.283 Sells argues 
that 
Mere assertions, such as the assertion that the terms are not to be taken temporally 
or spatially, fall apart in the face of the inherent linguistic structures built around a 
substantialist understanding of the divine, structures that lock the referent of 
theological language into spatial and temporal categories, all protestations 
notwithstanding.284 
 
In other words, the metaphysical imagination embedded in language is difficult to shed. It 
is not enough to merely change linguistic frames, as if the transition from literal to 
figurative were as easy as shifting gears in a car. As Sells notes, “its [the beyond being’s] 
appearance as grammatical subject (‘it’ circumscribes) locks it into categories it allegedly 
transcends.”285 Sells notes that even the guiding principles—that the divine is in principle 
beyond articulation—must also be both negated as an articulation in order to be 
thoroughly enacted. In other words, it is not enough to claim ineffability without 
demonstrating the limitations of even the most specialized technical abstractions.  
 What is especially unique about Eriugena’s style of linguistic destabilization is its 
influence on the shape and texture of his metaphysical and doctrinal conclusions. Sells 
suggests that the structure of the divine in On the Division of Nature is “one of 
apparational, nested layers of being whose ground is not supreme being but a point that 
                                               
283 Ibid., 49. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid., 57, my emphasis.  
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recedes infinitely just beyond every approach, a point he calls ‘nothing.’”286 This spatially 
paradoxical mysticism of a receding mise en abyme (cast into the abyss) as Carmel 
Bendon Davis refers to the model, only offers momentary glimpses of spatial coherence 
before, according to Sells, collapsing into yet another reconfigured relationship.287 The 
subject of the verbal relationship, the “nothing” that is God’s quiddity or “whatness,” 
Sells argues, is not merely a rhetorical shorthand for the claim that God is beyond 
categories. Rather, Eriugena suggests that it is at the root of the world. Thus, the 
possibility of “nothing” as an object of reference should be a moment of both dread and 
repulsion—but also a momentary glimpse of an image before it recedes from view 
again.288 
 The primary mechanics of Eriugena’s Periphyseon are logical and therefore 
intelligible, but its literary upshot is its construction of a type of symbol. Eriugena’s 
conventional (for Neoplatonists, anyway) spatial relations of emanation and return 
gesture toward a referential object rather than fully articulating one. In other words, the 
Great Chain of Being refers in a direction beyond referential capacity, which would be 
confined to subjects with predicates. Eriugena thus arranges ex nihilo as an indexical sign 
that blocks any interpretation that would take the concept as 1) a representational report 
on 2) actual relationships among sequence, space, and substances.289 As Peirce argues, 
                                               
286 Ibid., 59.  
287 Carmel Bendon Davis, Mysticism and Space: Space and Spatiality in the Works of 
Richard Rolle, The Cloud of Unknowing Author, and Julian of Norwich (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 6.  
288 Sells, Unsaying, 62.  
289 See Duclow, Ignorance, 36-7 on the emanation of (as opposed to interaction between) 
substances.  
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neither representations and indices assert anything on their own.290 Rather, the details of 
this text and its theological implications are certainly (and vociferously) arguable within 
the confines of Christian religious practices and the metaphysical claims that underwrite 
them. The relevant point for the present argument, however, is that spatial and temporal 
relationships, especially in prepositional phrases, are both potential liabilities in apophatic 
theological discourse. In order to emphasize the transcendence of the supposed (or 
revealed) object of reference, prepositional relationships can be reordered into paradoxes 
that resist foreclosure in mundane spatial awareness. By articulating and dissolving 
discourse in the process of clarifying a principal overlap between his philosophy of 
nature and theological first principles, Eriugena gestures at a non-articulate aperture at 
the source of both streams of thought. In other words, the fundamental principle is that 
nature’s terminal origin, God, is ineffable.   
 The significance of Eriugena’s dialogue is flagged by its genre. Eriugena’s stated 
goals set the parameters of his apophatic method. Even though he is engaged in a project 
of dialectical reasoning, his commitment to the ontological transcendence of God remains 
the guiding principle of the text. This is in part a social understanding that makes the 
apophatic exercise intelligible. He writes that,  
there is no one of those who devoutly believe and understand the truth who would 
not persistently and without any hesitation declare that the creative Cause of the 
whole universe is beyond nature and beyond being and beyond life and wisdom 
and power and beyond all things which are said and understood and perceived by 
any sense.291 
                                               
290 See Peirce, “Of Reasoning in General,” in Collected Papers Vol. II, 17.  
291 Quoted Rik Van Nieuwenhove, An Introduction to Medieval Theology (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 65. The quotation is from Eriugena’s Periphyseon 
(6z1D-622A). 
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What remains an open question is the degree to which destabilizing and reconfiguring 
rhetoric can effectively produce indexical signs for transcendence without articulating 
such a corresponding theological frame of reference to guide it. In other words, can a text 
become a symbol without a pre-established view of transcendence that draws the text 
toward it? If Sells is correct and the un-saying of language amounts to a type of 
experience, it is an index of or toward something—even if that something is the fact of a 
specific failed linguistic formulation. To the extent that an utterance could become a 
convincing index of the transcendent probably depends on its content and the intensity 
and plausibility of its destructive force. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is an apt target 
precisely because it hovers over the all-important relationship between the divine and 
nature. 
 There are, of course, less theologically volatile versions of the same problem. 
This stress on specific spatial relationships is not inherent to language itself. Rather, 
prepositional ambiguity tends to be more vexed in the interpretation of a textual medium. 
Prepositional forms are generally imprecise given the array of relationships that are 
actually possible. Steven Pinker has argued that prepositional inexactitude tends to be 
irrelevant to speakers with shared knowledge of a situation or set of objects. Arbitrary 
prepositions are benignly ambiguous because usually a speaker’s proximity to relevant 
points of reference is enough to convey specific information or correct 
miscommunications.292 Eriugena’s case, on the other hand, demonstrates the extent to 
                                               
292 Steven Pinker, The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature 
(London: Penguin Books, 2010), 184.  
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which the significance of prepositional ambiguity can be intensified when access to an 
important subject is mediated by a text, particularly when the text is removed from its 
original contexts. Eriugena exploits the pressure on the precise spatial and temporal 
relationship between God and creation by showing various conceptual results of the God-
world distinction’s collapse and reopening. This sort of play is possible because the 
spatial relationship conveyed by the preposition is, in principle, already symbolic for 
Eriugena. 
 This chapter demonstrates forms of functional spatial ambiguity in McCarthy’s 
use of physical form, its deformation and reformation, in a mode analogous to 
Eriugena’s. This includes the forms of landscape, the human body, and the ecological 
dependencies that produce and sustain those forms. The below analysis observes 
anomalies at the sentence level and interprets the figuration and narration of physical 
spaces with an eye toward their collapse and reconfiguration, specifically illustrated 
through ecology, cartography and, in Chapter 4, human pain. As in Eriugena, the 
distortive and paradoxical articulation of spatial concepts present their own limitation as 
indicators of what transcends their referential power.  
Because I have already discussed the significance of the logic of grounds 
metaphors in the previous chapter, McCarthy’s use of “ground” as both a logical 
metaphor and a descriptor of space serves as an example of why spatial relationships 
warrant special attention, particularly in light of Euriugena’s reformulations of creatio ex 
nihilo as an inscrutable ontological origin. A sentence-level analysis of McCarthy’s 
prepositional construction of ground and floor descriptions reveals odd stylistic behavior. 
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This is especially the case in McCarthy’s use of the preposition “in” interchangeably with 
“on.” The use of the simple construction “in the floor” (Blood Meridian alone 3, 45, 71 
twice, 122, 147, 230, 234 four times, 245 twice, 283 three times, 295) makes frequent 
occurrence in the same text as other occurrences of the more conventional “on the floor” 
(BM 62, 107, 319, 346). The less conspicuous “in the ground” occurs in some frequency 
in Blood Meridian even when not describing holes or other embedded phenomena that 
break the ground’s initial surface plain (BM 38, 39, 70, 301) and where “on the ground” 
functions without an obvious effect on the phrase’s meaning. No Country for Old Men 
uses “in” three times as much as “on” in similar contexts.293 These shifts are subtle; but are 
they suggestive of anything in particular? The prepositional shift is a peculiarity of 
dialect reported in West Tennessee, rural South Carolina and Georgia, but it is one that 
McCarthy’s narrators use only selectively.294 The ambiguous depiction of spatial 
relationships in a previously charged context could, as in the case of Eriugena, at least 
raise questions that might otherwise be arrested by more conventionally “precise”—if 
still arbitrary—selections of spatial orientation. The selection of preposition could 
correspond with narrative theme. For example, the odd use of “in” is almost completely 
missing in The Crossing, where logical and metaphysical ground language is common. 
Yet it returns with even greater frequency in The Road where, as we have seen, while its 
                                               
293 Jay Ellis notes this oddity in Child of God and interprets it as referencing domestic 
inner space. See Ellis, Home, 91.  
294 I have only found one native to these regions who will corroborate that this 
prepositional shift occurs.  
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explicit grounds rhetoric itself is slightly muffled, its logic and implications are more 
persistently engaged by the overall theme of the book.295  
This example of mild spatial distortion serves only to emphasize the importance 
and suggestiveness of altering spatial relationships on the sentence level. In McCarthy’s 
novels, this odd use of prepositions does not trip up the reader so much as slightly slow 
one down. Again, Pinker has argued that prepositional semantics tend to be ambiguous in 
writing, where contextually selected points of reference are absent. Otherwise they 
usually perform adequately. So, where conventional prepositions tend to be relatively 
invisible, meaningful but unconventional positioning words draw attention, however 
briefly, to the specifics of that relationship and its conditions. In this case, the “in” 
reconfigures both the ground and the floor permeable planes that an occupant interrupts 
and occupies. Since McCarthy frequently primes attention to spatial relationships in 
coordination with the explicit descriptive narration of space and physical bodies, what 
may appear to be the minutia of both his prose-style and narrative setting is yet another 
site of textual disfiguring and refiguring of conceptual and imaginative space. In other 
words, even the usage of prepositions expands and contracts referential possibility within 
McCarthy’s texts. 
Space, Ecology and Anthropomorphism 
 
McCarthy’s description and employment of place and landscape have stimulated a 
steady stream of secondary literature in several interpretive currents: ecological, 
                                               
295 The lone exception to this in The Crossing may be a passage that includes the phrase 
“ocular ground” located “in” a set of binoculars (TC 231). 
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mythological, and figurative. The ecological stream of interpretation focuses on the 
relative position of humanity within the natural order. The same critics tend to interpret 
this as an anti-anthropomorphic strain in McCarthy’s prose, reasoning that human 
interests can be bracketed or at least that the narrators can drain the stories of sentimental 
projection.296 
 The mythological stream reads the landscape as a cipher for a particularly 
American imaginative projection. These works analyze McCarthy’s work with view to its 
uniquely “American” ideological attachment to landscape. Manifest destiny, the idea of 
the rugged individualist, and “the cowboy” as a symbolic cache for masculinity are all 
themes drawn from the novels either as subjects of McCarthy’s implicit criticism or as 
ideological fragments unconsciously embedded in the narratives.297 Criticisms of this sort 
                                               
296 This stream is represented by critics like Andrew Keller Estes, Cormac McCarthy and 
the Writing of American Spaces (New York, NY: Rodopi, 2013); Georg Guillemin, The 
Pastoral Vision of Cormac McCarthy, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 
2004); George Monbiot, “Civilisation Ends With a Shutdown of Human Concern. Are 
We There Already?” The Guardian, October 29th, 2007; Dana Phillips “Ugly Facts,” 
(1996); Sara L. Spurgeon, “The Sacred Hunter and the Eucharist of the Wilderness: 
Mythic Reconstructions in Blood Meridian,” in Cormac McCarthy: New Directions, ed. 
James D. Lilley (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002); Dianne Luce is 
among the most subtle descriptive interpreter of McCarthy noting multiple interpretations 
of nature on the part of McCarthy’s characters and narrators in Reading the World, 
Reading the World: Cormac McCarthy’s Tennessee Period, (Columbia, SC: University 
of South Carolina Press, 2009).  
297 See for example, work by John Beck, “Filibusterers and Fundamentalists: Blood 
Meridian and the New Right,” Polemics: Essays in American Literary and Cultural 
Criticism 1, (2004): 13-26; 
 John Cant, Cormac McCarthy and the Myth of American Exceptionalism, (New York: 
Routledge, 2008); David Holloway, The Late Modernism of Cormac McCarthy, 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002);  Robert Jarrett, Cormac McCarthy (New York : 
London: Twayne Publishers, 1997); Megan Riley McGilchrist, The Western Landscape 
in Cormac McCarthy and Wallace Stegner: Myths of the Frontier, (New York: 
Routledge, 2010); Nell Sullivan “Boys Will Be Boys and Girls Will Be Gone,” in A 
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tend to focus on how characters internalize the permanent and changing aspects of 
landscape, and its imagined freedoms, opportunities, or failures.298 These critical 
interpreters place a premium on how the novels educate the reader either as sites of 
criticism or ideological reproduction.   
 A third stream of criticism interprets space in McCarthy as a figure or symbol of 
moral or spiritual significance. These interpretations are less insistent on landscape’s 
specific critical significance (landscape as a symbol of western masculinity, for example) 
and are more likely to seek out symbolic functions of landscape within the narratives. 
Gerhard Hoffmann, for example, claims that, in relation to the fragility of McCarthy’s 
human characters “it is space, nature and landscape that mark off the absolute.”299 
Similarly, Jay Ellis has made a book-length interpretation of “spatial constraint” in 
McCarthy, examining how McCarthy’s domestic spaces constrain, secure, or falsely 
reassure characters. Ellis’ book tracks the subtle interaction between domestic space, 
landscape, and character development throughout McCarthy’s oeuvre. It culminates with 
the thesis that McCarthy’s texts reference cosmological arcs of psychology, history, and 
philosophy. Ellis detects a similar momentum to McCarthy’s use of space as does this 
                                               
Cormac McCarthy Companion: The Border Trilogy, eds. Edwin T. Arnold and Dianne C. 
Luce, (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), among others. 
298 See Adam David Morton, “The Warp of the World: Geographies of Space and Time in 
the Border Trilogy by Cormac McCarthy,” Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 33, no. 5 (October 2015): 831–49, on the distinction in McCarthy between absolute 
and constructed spaces.   
299 Gerhard Hoffmann, writes that “In McCarthy’s Southern fiction it is space, nature and 
the landscape that mark the absolute” in “Strangeness, Gaps, and the Mystery of Life: 
Cormac McCarthy’s Southern Novels,” Amerikastudien / American Studies 42, no. 2 
(January 1997): 238. 
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project, though Ellis explains it differently and with an upward trajectory toward higher 
“arcs.” 
 This section engages each of these rich discussions in an effort to demonstrate 
these stories’ connection to a specific strain of religious discourse is yet one more way in 
which space and landscape matters. However, the contention here is not that landscape 
acts as a mere negation of mythology or anthropomorphic projection—although it at 
times does—rather I wish to draw attention to how the presentation, arrangement, 
limitation, and collapse of space in McCarthy’s novels unravels their spatial coherence 
and reconstructs it. 
Criticism of McCarthy that cuts along ecological lines tends to focus on the 
novels’ narration of landscape, particularly on matters of scale. Largeness in measure, in 
size, duration, and distance, are said to relativize local concerns and priorities. An 
example of this is a simile in The Orchard Keeper referencing pre-history as an analogue 
to rural Appalachia: 
In the relative cool of the timber stands, possum grapes and muscadine flourish 
with a cynical fecundity, and the floor of the forest—littered with old mossbacked 
logs, peopled with toadstools strange and solemn among the ferns and creepers 
and leaning to show their delicate livercolored gills—has about it a primordial 
quality, some steamy carboniferous swamp where ancient saurians lurk in feigned 
sleep. (OK 11) 
 
As this critical line of reasoning goes, the “quality” produces as comparison of lived-time 
with cosmic or geological time dims the relative value of human concerns. According to 
this body of literature, vastness—both in space and as time figured by space—puts the 
small and short-by-duration in perspective (whose, it is not clear). This also expands the 
range and priorities of the texts’ evaluation to a cosmic scope. With an expansive 
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cosmological perspective, the text (and, presumably, the reader) is able to reevaluate 
human concerns, plans, and projects in light of larger and older things.  
 While it is probably fallacious to assume that size indicates relative value, 
McCarthy’s taste for contrasts make the case for relativization somewhat more 
convincing. Take, for example, the narration of Blood Meridian’s mass of entities in the 
following description: 
Spectre horsemen, pale with dust, anonymous in the crenellated heat. Above all 
else they appeared wholly at venture, primal, provisional, devoid of order. 
Like beings provoked out of the absolute rock and set nameless and at no 
remove from their own loomings to wander ravenous and doomed and mute as 
gorgons shambling the brutal wastes of Gondwanaland in a time before 
nomenclature was and each was all. (BM 180) 
 
The picture is of a chaotic mess of nameless ghosts whose identity is in flux and whose 
origin is the ambiguous “absolute rock” of a different geological age. This is a tempting 
target for those who detect traces of metaphysical speculation and mysticism in this 
novel. Yet, at the end of the long third sentence, one recalls that it is simile. The 
horsemen are like that. They are like things that, by definition, no possible reader could 
imagine any more thoroughly than the physical image of clay-pasted riders. Even the 
reference to “Gondwalaland,” as Rick Wallach notes, is a term coined in 1912 and one of 
several anachronistic moments in relation to the time-frame of the story.300 This technique 
draws attention to things like origins, the absolute, and vast time-scales without 
committing to specific propositions about them. Because they—and we—cannot possibly 
                                               
300 Rick Wallach, “Cormac McCarthy’s Metaphors of Antiquity and Deep Time,” in 
Cormac McCarthy: Uncharted Territories/Territoires Inconnus, Christine Chollier, ed., 
(Reims: Presses universitaires de Reims, 2003), (n12). 
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scale-up to the appearance constructed by the simile, the “real” human beings on the 
initial side of the simile recede in relative importance to the prehistorical reverie they 
induce.    
 Despite their dramatic representation, McCarthy’s more ornate “claims” about the 
nature of the universe tend to evaporate when examined closely. As will become more 
obvious by the end of this chapter, many of McCarthy’s negations of order occur in 
similes. McCarthy’s narration manipulates this sense of or lack of order by the style of 
the descriptions themselves. The use of parataxis, or side-by-side arrangement of 
sentence elements, has a similar effect. It suspends sentence-level valuation by omitting 
words or clauses that would signal priority. For example, McCarthy’s narration lightens 
the following sentence’s prepositional load and leans heavily on conjunctions 
(polysyndeton, or “many connectors”) instead. The resulting devices are both species of 
parataxis: 
Already you could see through the dust on the ponies' hides the painted 
chevrons and the hands and rising sums and birds and fish of every device like 
the shade of old work through sizing on a canvas and now too you could hear 
above the pounding of the unshod hooves the piping of the quena, flutes made 
from human bones, and some among the company had begun to saw back on their 
mounts and some to mill in confusion when up from the offside of those ponies 
there rose a fabled horde of mounted lancers and archers bearing shields bedight 
with bits of broken mirrorglass that cast a thousand unpieced suns against the 
eyes of their enemies. (BM 54) 
 
The variety of parataxis produced by this description in Blood Meridian’s Comanche 
raid, drops the array of imagery all at once despite the occasional subordination of 
prepositions. The breathlessness of the single sentence thus fits the intensity of the scene. 
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 A less violent example of polysyndetonic parataxis occurs in the description of 
John Grady’s dream during his first sleep in prison after his arrest at la Purísima: 
That night he dreamt of horses in a field on a high plain where the spring rains 
had brought up the grass and the wild-flowers out of the ground and the flowers 
ran all blue and yellow far as the eye could see and in the dream he was among 
the horses running and in the dream he himself could run with the horses and they 
coursed the young mares and fillies over the plain where their rich bay and their 
rich chestnut colors shone in the sun and the young colts ran with their dams and 
trampled down the flowers in a haze of pollen that hung in the sun like powdered 
gold and they ran he and the horses out along the high mesas where the ground 
resounded under their running hooves and they flowed and changed and ran and 
their manes and tails blew off of them like spume and there was nothing else at all 
in that high world and they moved all of them in a resonance that was like a music 
among them and they were none of them afraid horse nor colt nor mare and they 
ran in that resonance which is the world itself and which cannot be spoken but 
only praised. (APH 161-2) 
 
The long chain of conjunctions make the sentence impossible to speak aloud without 
pause for breath and thereby adding implicit punctuation. It can only be read. It 
references natural objects, but in this case it is an unconscious representation of nature—
not unlike the decorative “picturebook” horses in the Grady household (APH 16). 
Prepositions texture the space without providing any sequence of cause or time. 
Likewise, at the peak of its intensity, the narration claims that the harmonious vibration 
of the horses and the world itself are not ineffable, but subject to a certain liturgical genre 
that stands elevated compared to day-to-day reference. It is hard to know how John 
Grady might know this other than as an article of faith. However, the narration 
demonstrates the strain associated with the description of such an article.  
 The dream starkly contrasts with an instance of asyndetonic (no-connection) 
parataxis in the same novel, this time set in a home: 
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He entered his grandfather's office and went to the desk and turned on the lamp 
and sat down in the old oak swivelchair. On the desk was a small brass calendar 
mounted on swivels that changed dates when you tipped it over in its stand. It still 
said September 13th. An ashtray. A glass paperweight. A blotter that said Palmer 
Feed and Supply. His mother's highschool graduation picture in a small silver 
frame.  
The room smelled of old cigarsmoke. He leaned and turned off the little 
brass lamp and sat in the dark. Through the front window he could see the starlit 
prairie falling away to the north. The black crosses of the old telegraph poles 
yoked across the constellations passing east to west. His grandfather said the 
Comanche would cut the wires and splice them back with horsehair. He leaned 
back and crossed his boots on the desktop. Dry lightning to the north, forty miles 
distant. The clock struck eleven in the front room across the hall. (APH 10-1) 
 
Few of the period breaks represent whole sentences. Rather, the few verbs and lack of 
connectives among subjects quiet the scene, differentiating the items without elevating 
any. It is the window that draws John Grady’s attention (presumably the free indirect 
report of his thought) from the domestic space of the office toward the outdoors, which 
immediately seem to draw a higher prose register: “the starlit prairie falling away to the 
north. The black crosses of the old telegraph poles yoked across the constellations 
passing east to west.” These he interprets through family lore, stories that draw him 
further into his own fragmented sense of American mythology and romance.301  
 The contrast between the quiet, highly differentiated indoor place and 
undifferentiated outdoor space evoking a wild past is a consistent through All the Pretty 
Horses. The outdoors, especially the icons of horses and stars, turn attention to an 
overwhelming sense of incalculable measure. This attention toward sublime scales of 
                                               
301 See Ellis, Home, 203, on reading McCarthy’s westerns as a form of medieval romance. 
Also Jay Ellis and Natalka Palczynski, "Horses, Houses, and the Gravy to Win: Chivalric 
and Domestic Roles in The Border Trilogy," in Sacred Violence Volume 2, eds. Wade H. 
Hall and Rick Wallach (El Paso, TX: Texas Western Press, 2002). 
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space is not always accompanied with dread. The feeling of ecstasy in response to 
immensity is evinced by John Grady and Rawlin’s first moments of what they perceive as 
the freedom of the road toward Mexico: 
they heard somewhere in that tenantless night a bell that tolled and ceased where 
no bell was and they rode out on the round dais of the earth which alone was dark 
and no light to it and which carried their figures and bore them up into the 
swarming stars so that they rode not under but among them and they rode at once 
jaunty and circumspect, like thieves newly loosed in that dark electric, like young 
thieves in a glowing orchard, loosely jacketed against the cold and ten thousand 
worlds for the choosing. (APH 30) 
 
The ten thousand worlds “swarming” overhead are possibilities, naïve and not a little 
sinister considering their choice is for another land which, as they must be reminded, is 
another “country” (APH 136; COP 241).  
Stylistic variations of this kind are subtle. They support the narration’s molding of  
subject matter by creating contrasts—between inside and outside, between small and 
large, for example. These contrast the direct attention to scale—for example, between 
two small riders and the stars. While contrasts in scale like the one in the above passage 
are not always ominous, McCarthy’s more heavy-handed stylistic variations function 
almost like film-scoring, playing with the text’s emotional register prior to some action in 
the narrative. 
 It its more explicit modes, however, McCarthy’s narration sometimes insists on 
ignoring hierarchical categories altogether. This is true in Blood Meridian’s passage in 
which the narration states overtly that the landscape refuses categorization: 
In the neuter austerity of that terrain all phenomena were bequeathed a strange 
equality and no one thing nor spider nor stone nor blade of grass could put forth 
claim to precedence. The very clarity of these articles belied their familiarity, for 
the eye predicates the whole on some feature or part and here was nothing more 
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luminous than another and nothing more enshadowed and in the optical 
democracy of such landscapes all preference is made whimsical and a man and 
a rock become endowed with unguessed kinships. (BM 258-9) 
 
This last example, well-known among secondary interpreters, has made the term “optical 
democracy” shorthand for the egalitarian parataxical style in McCarthy.302 The 
asssumption is that if a description offers no particular order, it indicates a perception or 
belief that nature lacks a fundamental order. 303 However, the passage itself is not 
parataxical and the narrator’s use of the perfect tense and “such landscapes” suggest that 
a landscape neutering human preferences is neither a singularity nor a claim about nature 
as such, but rather points out one feature of a type of landscape that momentarily 
“relativizes” categories to a single plane of importance. This is a particular rather than a 
universal claim that, ironically, carefully describes one class of landscape that defies 
classification.  
 In the above passage, McCarthy’s narration directly refers to specific 
arrangements of landscapes that supposedly defy referential tools: category, class, 
                                               
302 See, for example, Gary Adelman, Sorrow’s Rigging: The Novels of Cormac McCarthy, 
Don DeLillo, and Robert Stone, (Montreal ; Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2012);  
; Estes, Writing of American Spaces, 2013; Guillemin, Pastoral Vision, 2004; Holloway, 
Modernity, 2000; McGilchrist, The Western Landscape, 2009; Phillips, “Ugly Facts,” 
1996, to name a few.  
303 I take this as an alternative to Megan McGilchrist’s or David Holloway’s interpretation 
of Blood Meridian’s “optical democracy” as if it were in isomorphic relationship with 
McCarthy’s own worldview: “McCarthy’s dark gaze in which all things appear equally 
without substantive meaning” (208). Rather, the logic of the narration’s claim is only that 
some not all landscapes have this effect. Megan Riley McGilchrist, The Western 
Landscape in Cormac McCarthy and Wallace Stegner: Myths of the Frontier (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), and David Holloway, The Late Modernism of Cormac McCarthy 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002). 
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priority. By contrast, the narration is actually prone to use the same prose rhetoric 
(parataxis) but as sentence fragments to describe human “place”—to use the distinction 
between space and place used by Ashley Bourne—than to describe outdoor space which 
is more or less determinate depending on the scale of the narration’s perspective.304 
Human categories, actions, perception, and consciousness are more likely to be both 
differentiated and then “relativized” in stylistic terms than is land, which remains—at 
least in terms of style—a sturdy point of reference. This stabilization of reference points 
is especially true in McCarthy’s vocabulary around stars, which serve as absolute fixtures 
unless the interpreting characters are drunk, insane (BM 58, 336; CG 133, 190; S 332, 
354, 457; TC 82, ) or if they are unfamiliar with the land’s relationship to the heavens. In 
the latter case, the stars seem to “swarm” or are “strewn” (APH 30; TC 374; S 159).305  
Thus, it is not clear that the relativizing function extends to nature as a whole so much as 
human constructions of natural space and material or human interpretations of its larger 
orders.  
 That said, perception of landscape itself is also subject to human projection and 
sometimes stands unchallenged by both style and direct reference. The narration of All 
the Pretty Horses that describes Rawlins and John Grady’s arrival at la Purísima contains 
a similar run-on style, but with heightened prepositional precision: “The grasslands lay in 
                                               
304 Ashley Bourne, “‘Plenty of Signs and Wonders to Make a Landscape’: Space, Place, 
and Identity in Cormac McCarthy’s Border Trilogy,” Western American Literature 44, 
no. 2 (2009): 108–25.  
305 According to Ellis, the incomprehensible orders of nature McCarthy depicts are not a 
nod to nihilism, but a kind of faith that, “the world in its turnings” are somehow 
ordered—however provisionally (190). 
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a deep violet haze and to the west thin flights of waterfowl were moving north before the 
sunset in the deep red galleries under the cloudbanks like schoolfish in a burning sea and 
on the foreland plain they saw vaqueros driving cattle before them through a gauze of 
golden dust” (APH 93, emphasis mine). Likewise, Blood Meridian’s narration frequently 
uses polysyndetons when it shifts to huge, run-on subordinating clauses (hypotaxis, 
arrangement under) which place nouns and verbs in precise orders that indicate cause, 
sequence, and order of importance.306 In a more ecstatic and erotic mode, the narration still 
employs the polysyndeton but opts for prepositions that signal interiority, gesturing 
toward the orders found within: 
                                               
306 A good example of an extreme case is the remainder of Blood Meridian’s Comanche 
raid already mentioned above. In its entirety it is remarkably few sentences. After the 
initial chaos and chaos and shock of the first sentence, it then treats elements of that 
chaos with greater prepositional precision. It is still a snapshot in time just before the 
action begins again with the Sargent’s “Oh my God,” but it is arranged in space more 
clearly: 
A legion of horribles, hundreds in number, half naked or clad in costumes 
attic or biblical or wardrobed out of a fevered dream with the skins of animals 
and silk finery and pieces of uniform still tracked with the blood of prior 
owners, coats of slain dragoons, frogged and braided cavalry jackets, one in a 
stovepipe hat and one with an umbrella and one in white stockings and a 
bloodstained weddingveil and some in headgear of cranefeathers or rawhide 
helmets that bore the horns of bull or buffalo and one in a pigeontailed coat 
worn backwards and otherwise naked and one in the armor of a Spanish 
conquistador, the breastplate and pauldrons deeply dented w i t h  old blows of 
mace or sabre done in another country by men whose very bones were dust 
and many with their braids spliced up with the hair of other beasts until they 
trailed upon the ground and their horses' ears and tails worked with bits of 
brightly colored cloth and one whose horse's whole head was painted 
crimson red and all the horsemen's faces gaudy and grotesque with daubings 
like a company of mounted clowns, death hilarious, all howling in a 
barbarous tongue and riding upon them like a horde from a hell more horrible 
yet than brimstone land of christian reckoning, screeching and yammering 
and clothed in smoke like those vaporous beings in regions beyond right 
knowing where the eye wanders and the lip jerks and drools. 
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While inside the vaulting of the ribs between his knees the darkly meated heart 
pumped of who's will and the blood pulsed and the bowels shifted in their 
massive blue convolutions of who's will and the stout thighbones and knee and 
cannon and the tendons like flaxen hawsers that drew and flexed and drew and 
flexed at their articulations and of who's will all sheathed and muffled in the flesh 
and the hooves that stove wells in the morning groundmist and the head turning 
side to side and the great slavering keyboard of his teeth and the hot globes of his 
eyes where the world burned. (APH 128)307 
 
McCarthy’s narration maintains a tension between passages that drain an obvious sense 
of human perception and those that impose aggressive interpretations on their subject. If 
these texts have moments of de-anthropomorphizing scales of reference, they also re-
anthropomorphize with simile and projected meaning. Despite the intriguing 
interpretation of Phillips, for whom McCarthy’s narration seems uncannily non-human, 
these descriptions remain shaped in human form for human intelligibility.308 This passage 
does little to mask that this is John Grady’s feeling in response to the immensity of the 
animal between his legs. The analogous nouns of vaulting, hawsers, sheath, keyboard are 
all human artifacts that help explain the vast operations of the horse’s anatomy.  
 These differences in style verge on a binary that can be interpreted in several 
ways. Nancy Kreml argues that stylistic transitions between high and low levels of 
subordination is pedagogical according to specific stages in the narrative, in some cases 
leaving interpretation to the reader, in others constraining interpretation along specific 
lines. Kreml understands these a rhythmic transitions between lack of imposed order in 
                                               
307 What can be said about “who’s will”? I’m not sure what it means and seems odd 
considering McCarthy’s stated distaste for apostrophes. 
308 Phillips argues that “Blood Meridian is not so much inhuman as non-human. It is 
thoroughly dispassionate. The book’s odd power derives from its treating everything and 
everybody with absolute equanimity; its voice seems profoundly alien, but not alienated” 
(Phillips, Ugly Facts, 450-1). 
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parataxic passages, which demonstrate no causes, few explicit relationships, and treats 
entities either as isolated facts or facts in an arbitrary pile. 309 Kreml contrasts this with an 
“opaque” style that explicitly orders and interprets those relationships and ultimately 
teaches the reader how to respond to them.310 In Kreml’s study of All the Pretty Horses, 
this device is deployed to teach the reader to associate causation with moral consequence. 
The lack of explicit causation in the narration, then, is likewise linked with the denial of 
responsibility on the part of the characters. Similarly, Christine Chollier notes, The 
Crossing’s narration of emotional content compared with its “explicit lack of emotional 
expression” is a relativizing instrument for human deeds against a larger “cosmic” 
backdrop. The narrative style is for Chollier “anti-anthropological” to the extent that the 
description does not satisfy the immediate emotional expectations of the reader.311 
                                               
309 See Constance Hale, “There’s Parataxis, and Then There’s Hypotaxis,” The Chronicle 
of Higher Education, August 7th, 2013. 
https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/linguafranca/2013/08/07/parataxis-and-hypotaxis/ 
310 In the two developments of this idea, Kreml uses different vocabulary, in the earlier 
transparent/opaque and in the later marked/unmarked. See Nancy Kreml “Stylistic 
Variation and Cognitive Constraint in All the Pretty Horses” in Sacred Violence: A 
Reader’s Companion to Cormac McCarthy, eds. Wade Hall and Rick Wallach (El Paso, 
TX: Texas Western Press, 1995) and “Implicatures of Styleswitching in the Narrative 
Voice of Cormac McCarthy’s All the Pretty Horses” in Codes and Consequences: 
Choosing Linguistic Varieties, ed. Carol Myers-Scotton (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998). Denis Donoghue also makes a similar case with his notion of McCarthy’s 
“high” register which is supposed to speak where the inner lives of characters cannot or 
would not (Denis Donoghue “Dream Work,” New York Review of Books, June 24th 1993). 
Style, Ellis notes is possibly a surrogate for conveying a quality of feeling that would 
otherwise we inarticulate (Ellis, No Place for Home, 2). 
311 Christine Collier, “‘A Thing Wholly Alien’: Focalization, Dispossession and Nescience 
in The Crossing” in Cormac McCarthy: Uncharted Territories/Territoires Inconnus. 
Christine Collier, ed. (Reims: Presses universitaires de Reims, 2003), 142. 
   
 
191 
 Both Chollier and Kreml recognize that McCarthy’s narration constrains readerly 
interpretation toward specific pedagogical ends. The overall sense of relativization is 
enough for Edwin Arnold, for example, to claim that The Crossing “requires—of Billy 
and the reader—a willingness to contemplate at no remove the mystical and the sacred.”312 
Yet Kreml and Chollier expose precisely how the collapse and reconstruction of 
categories and meaning actually occurs at the sentence-level. According to Chollier, the 
narration ignores the emotional needs of the reader and subordinates them to the vast and 
complex values produced by nature. For Kreml, the collapse and reconstruction of order 
on the sentence-level draws attention to the structures of causation toward which the 
characters need to face—and face up to—in order to take responsibility for their 
decisions and actions. Thus, when it comes to McCarthy’s space and landscape, the sense 
of relativizing indifference should not be interpreted in isolation from the narrative, but as 
one device in a complex artifice that includes the performative pedagogy of McCarthy’s 
texts. Chollier and Kreml highlight different and alternative plausible interpretations of 
McCarthy’s stylistic shifts than my own. However, their formal analysis of the prose’s 
rhythmic construction and reconstruction of causal and spatial order supports the 
apophatic interpretation I wish to make here.  
 Ironically the narration seems as eager to anthropomorphize and scale-up human 
concerns as it is to deflate them. Steven Fry, detecting no less than Arnold the vague odor 
of mysticism in McCarthy, also claims that, in the “optical democracy” of The Crossing 
“[t]here is a mystical union in the very physicality of the land,” but also that “in learning 
                                               
312 Arnold, “McCarthy and the Sacred,” 216.  
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to see the landscape as the outer image of his own being, [John Grady] ultimately finds 
himself.” 313 For Frye, the landscape is a “living consciousness” allowing the interpreting 
narration to explore the inner-topos of the character.314 Likewise, Rick Wallach’s “Cormac 
McCarthy’s Metaphors of Antiquity and Deep Time” is skeptical of some eco-critical 
approaches to McCarthy, noting that the narration is as apt to re-anthropomorphize as 
much as relativize the orders of human characters and readers.315 Examples of this are 
Blood Meridian’s description of, “the mountains on the sudden skyline stark and black 
and livid like a land of some other order out there whose true geology was not stone 
but fear” (BM 49, my emphasis). Likewise, Outer Dark, with a subtle free-indirect 
narration of Culla’s internal feelings, describes his perception of the natural 
landscape’s ill-intent as an extension of his own physical and moral vulnerability: “the 
trees beginning to close him in, malign and baleful shapes that reared like enormous 
androids provoked at the alien insubstantiality of this flesh colliding among them” (OD 
17). Both are similes, analogues produced by human imagination and concerns.  
 McCarthy’s contrasts so far suggest that the actual orders of nature and the even 
more ambiguous systems of metaphysics can be experienced only in glimpses and 
mediated through anthropomorphic terms. Wallach suggests that there is a tension in 
McCarthy’s work between the narration’s insistence on the world’s “incoordinate” spaces 
                                               
313 Steven Frye, “Wilderness Typology, American Scripture, and the Interpreter’s Eye,” in 
Cormac McCarthy: Uncharted Territories/Territoires Inconnus. Christine Collier, ed. 
(Reims: Presses universitaires de Reims, 2003), 121. 
314 Ibid., 116.  
315 See Rick Wallach, “Cormac McCarthy’s Metaphors of Antiquity and Deep Time” in 
Cormac McCarthy: Uncharted Territories/Territoires Inconnus. Christine Collier, ed. 
(Reims: Presses universitaires de Reims, 2003).  
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as a fact about the world and the mere disorientation of the human perspective with 
regard to the world’s facts (APH 257, BM 154).316 For example, when the drunk Suttree is 
wholly disoriented by the artifice of raw liquor, human bodies become in his perspective 
“twisted gymnasts hung by wires in a quaking haze” (S 81). His navigational priority is  
“[t]o select a landmark. Some known in this garden of sorrow” (S 81). This is consonant 
with Suttree’s description of the environment, which includes toward long, unpleasant 
catalogues of river pollution. Within this passage’s chaos of blended categories, however, 
his attention seizes on ancient natural features within another human artifice used to 
manipulate landscape:  
A wave of nausea washed through him and he paused to rest on an old retaining 
wall. Looking under his hand he saw dimly the prints of trilobites, lime cameos of 
vanished bivalves and delicate seaferns. In these serried clefts stone armatures on 
which once hung the flesh of living fish. He lurched on. (S 82) 
 
Suttree interprets the retaining wall—an important element in changing land into 
landscape—like a text with indiscernible glyphs. These are signs, but signs that take 
conventional meanings. Rather, the fossils are indices of huge swaths of time, whole eco-
systems otherwise unimaginable without their small, faint clues. The extinct sea imagery 
                                               
316 Blood Meridian’s use of the phrase is unsurprisingly ambiguous: “The scouts would be 
already gone, riding out in the dark before the sun rose, and they would not return until 
night, reckoning out the camp in that incoordinate waste by palest starlight or in 
blackness absolute where the company sat among the rocks without fire or bread or 
camaraderie any more than banded apes” (BM 154). The scouts “reckon” out of the camp 
by the stars or else in “blackness absolute.” The first seems right and notes some real, 
orderly points of reference in the natural world, even if “pale.” The second is wandering, 
aimless. This is distinct from All the Pretty Horses, which could be read as John Grady’s 
perspective as he realizes the extent of his alienation from his country of attempted 
adoption: “as he rode he saw small villages distant on the plain that glowed a faint yellow 
in that incoordinate dark and he knew that the life there was unimaginable to him” (APH 
257). In both cases, points of reference may be singular, and so not co-ordinate.  
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renders a contrast off of which to interpret the intimate meaning of individual life. This is 
likely the type mystical moment that both Arnold and Wallach observe: the character’s 
epiphanic recognition of continuity between their own small being and the vast time-
scales that support them. This sense of natural solidarity, however, is not precisely the 
type of mystical conflation of identity sought in the current project. Rather, the contrasts 
of scale raise the question of how well our anthropocentric tools, especially our language, 
equip us to reference nature, much less anything that transcends it. There is not a clean 
answer in these descriptive texts, only a greater sense of what such reference might entail.  
 By now it should be clear that McCarthy’s narration vis-à-vis land and landscape 
and space and place, does not easily function as a univocal set of statements or 
ideological commitments. Rather, the texts are designed to take apart and reconfigure 
themselves as much as the expectations and habits of readers. For example, according to 
Jay Ellis, the “argument” of Blood Meridian is that the orders imposed on the world by 
human beings do not scale up to the cosmic order the judge reports to perceive (BM 157-
8). This is in keeping with several commentators cited above. However, I do not think 
this means that the novel is univocally in harmony with the judge’s arguments. Rather, 
the rhetoric of the text raises the issue of what an expansive sense of natural order might 
mean for a morality that is scaled to human-needs. Ellis’ example is of the kid’s climb up 
a bluff to observe his own gang’s battle against the pursuing Mexican army. From the 
point of view of this distant and somewhat disinterested observer, the war below is only 
of secondary importance once seen from the perspective of the landscape’s higher 
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vistas.317 However, the narration claims that “all that land lay cold and blue and without 
definition” (BM 213, my emphasis).318 There is a view of nature that sees beyond the petty 
conflicts that constitute human history, but it is without definition or, in other words, 
unintelligible without the imposition of categories that dissolve when set in that very 
perspective. Ellis remarks: 
[McCarthy] consistently points out—whether in his narrator’s references to the 
sun, to stars, the moon, and their cold indifference to human activity, or through 
the judge’s slippery philosophical discourse—that indeed there is an order to the 
universe. The truth of that order, is however, inaccessible to human beings.319 
 
If Ellis is correct, in order to de-anthropocentrize our images of nature, McCarthy uses an 
anthropomorphic image—the “indifference” of things that enjoy no concerns or 
intentions toward anything—to draw attention to and weaken the distortive effects of 
human projection. After all, our understanding of nature occurs through the constructed 
experience of being anthropos. Our sense of nature’s order is mediated through all kinds 
of analogies and metaphor—the juridical “laws” of nature being the most obvious. Our 
understanding of that order is, as Ellis points out, not unlike the judge’s string in a maze. 
It keeps us from getting lost, but is not exhaustive. By repurposing the anthropomorphic 
habit, McCarthy acknowledges that nature’s order transcends our understanding, yet, as 
Ellis points out, always retains reference to the particulars of human experience. This, 
does not keep us from imagining that order, however. To do so, we 
anthropomorphize whatever we see. We demand human relationship in a universe 
that refuses such silliness. The sun is ‘blood’ red, it lies ‘to the west in a holocaust 
(BM 105), even though there is no such thing as a whole burning within human 
                                               
317 Reminiscent of Thomas Cole (1801-1848) or John Martin’s (1789-1854) The Deluge 
318 See Ellis, Home, 159. 
319 Ibid., 190. 
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history; rather there are horrible burnings that are nearly total to particular groups 
of people: Jews, Native Americans, Armenians.320  
 
In Ellis’ terms, in order to control or even understand nature, it is necessary for us to turn 
it into a particular “place” of some kind, whether by domestic habits, through the 
sheltered conditions of scientific experiment, or through the articulation of intelligible 
categories and idioms that constitute the meaning of language. Engagement with space, 
for human beings, is always on some spectrum of domesticity.  
 Both Witek and Ellis have noted that such ecological relativization tends to circle 
back to the specifically American political relevance of the novels, but through the sense 
of space as either wild, domesticated, or in transition from one to another. Both argue that 
McCarthy’s male characters are especially resistant to domestic space, even while, as 
Susan Hawkins notes that they sense they need to learn it.321 Witek is especially forthright 
in arguing that resistance to domesticity amounts to a criticism by McCarthy of social life 
as a “shared delusion.”322 Witek’s title, “Reeds and Hides” comes from one of the judge’s 
passages in Blood Meridian: 
For whoever makes a shelter of reeds and hides has joined his spirit to the 
common destiny of creatures and he will subside back into the mud with scarcely 
a cry. But who builds in stone seeks to alter the structure of the universe and so it 
was with these masons however primitive their works may seem to us. (BM 152) 
 
                                               
320 Ibid., 190. 
321 Susan Hawkins, “Cold War Cowboys and the Culture of Nostalgia,” in Cormac 
McCarthy: Uncharted Territories/Territoires Inconnus. Christine Collier, ed. (Reims: 
Presses universitaires de Reims, 2003). 
322 Terri Witek, “Reeds and Hides: Cormac McCarthy’s Domestic Spaces,” in Cormac 
McCarthy, ed., Harold Bloom (New York, NY: Chelsea House Publication, 2009), 27. 
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This sentiment would later be gently echoed by Ben Telfair in The Stonemason 
(published a year after Witek’s essay). The unhewn stone of the mason is set in place and 
held by gravity alone, the “[t]hat is to say, by the warp of the world” (TS 9). This, claims 
Ben, is true for both the stone and the wall itself. He says that an unexperienced 
contractor might want to plumb the wall and that the plumb would only be 
Pointing to a blackness unknown and unknowable both in truth and in principle 
where God and matter are locked in a collaboration that is silent nowhere in the 
universe and it is this that guides him as he places his stone one over two and two 
over one as did his fathers before him and his stones to follow and let the rain 
carve them if it can. (TS 67) 
 
Woodward and Ellis also not that McCarthy worked as a stonemason and even built a 
wing of his own home in fitted stone.323 For the mason it is the gravity and “warp of the 
world” that holds the stones in the wall. Creating harmony between the literal and 
figurative ground is a spiritual discipline for Ben. Yet stone, one of the more lasting 
patterns of order fashionable by human beings, is still impermanent and thereby another 
long sign of our own origin and destiny in dust. The memento mori notwithstanding, 
McCarthy nevertheless constantly returns to the brute fact of our dependence on 
domesticity in contrast to naïve, endless frontierism for which his characters sometimes 
long. But in the case of the mason, even domesticity is firmly held in place not by force, 
but by the contours of physical being itself. 
 Such domesticity is a craft, and for most characters, a skill hard-won amid the 
conceits of western masculinity. Billy’s reference to John Grady’s role as the “all-
american cowboy,” as noted by Ellis, combined with the subtle fun McCarthy pokes at 
                                               
323 Ellis, Home, 60.   
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John Grady’s machismo act in the San Antonio theater gesture toward the latter’s earnest 
attempt to play a role that is both anachronistic and unsustainable (CP 3, APH 21).324 
Likewise, John Grady’s attempt at domesticity through his renovation of an abandoned 
house is more pathetic than realistic—the morally upstanding version of other homes and 
domestic spaces the text presents only to negate. Witek’s second selection from the judge 
puts it,  
The way of the world is to bloom and to flower and die but in the affairs of men 
there is no waning and the noon of his expression signals the onset of night. His 
spirit is exhausted at the peak of its achievement. His meridian is at once his 
darkening and the evening of his day. He loves games? Let him play for stakes. 
This you see here, these ruins wondered at by tribes of savages, do you not 
think that this will be again? Aye. And again. With other people, with other 
sons. (BM 153) 
 
The judge sees the pattern, and, as Witek argues, “the patterns themselves, McCarthy's 
work argues, are the only dwelling place we have: they are quite literally the one home 
truth permitted.”325 Witek’s argument may too evenly interpret the judge as the argument 
of the entire book. John Grady’s little home, not made in stone but with a somewhat 
deluded sense of high-stakes love, fits the above description but with the added pathos of 
being one of the patterns that either fades with time or is violently destroyed. 
 As Ellis shows, the dialectic between natural and domestic spaces is a constant 
theme in McCarthy and is often the fundamental reference of both gender performance 
and ideology. This is the case both in the complex urban landscape of Knoxville and for 
the antinomian Glanton Gang, who coalesce around the most basic of human 
                                               
324 Ibid., 34. 
325 Witek, “Reeds,” 154. 
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domestications: fire. Likewise, for Ellis, one of the many significant “meridians” in 
Blood Meridian comes from the grid placed on the whole continental space by the 
domestications of charts and maps. In other words, the first step for turning a land into 
landscape – that is, a topos and not wild space – is to make a map. 
Mapped and Unmapped Space 
 
 McCarthy’s depiction of maps represents the argument of this dissertation in 
miniature. The failure of maps occurs in advancing stages of relevance from 
epistemological insufficiency of maps to their function as ontological symbols. By failing 
in rhythmic patterns, map signs—peculiar amalgams of icons, symbols, and indexes—
morph into pure indexes, though evocative of its conventional cousins.326 Throughout 
McCarthy’s later novels, tension builds between the notations of space on maps and their 
decay. The process of disfiguration and refiguration of maps reaches an ambiguous 
termination in The Road.   
 Prior to its notation on maps, McCarthy’s depiction of landscape is intertwined 
with the depiction of ordered, domestic space—at its most basic, shelter and fire. The 
domestic, as opposed to the wild, is contrived by artifice in varying degrees from its most 
extreme in urban space to a minimum of a boundary markers or fencing. The boundaries 
between domestic and landscaped space are thin and fragile by degrees. Sometimes the 
                                               
326 Maps may have more or less representational content, but generally abstract isomorphic 
content from the area or thing mapped. Likewise, for any map to be useful there are likely 
some kind of operative conventions. Contour-lines in a topographical map, for example, 
are a convention for indicating relative elevation. Thus, while indexes in maps are 
sometimes less obvious internally to the map, the entire purpose of a map is to indicate 
relevant features out of complex and confusing field and relate them to others.  
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thinly boundaried natural space is invaded by the state, as is the case of the government 
tank on Arthur Ownby’s land in The Orchard Keeper or the impending eminent domain 
declaration over Cities of the Plains’ Cross Fours Ranch. Likewise, the domestication of 
space by urban sprawl in Suttree produces a grotesque runoff at its edges. By contrast, 
there is also simply land, which has no natural boundaries and is expressed most 
extremely in “space” itself, where the stars are among the few regular orders, however 
indifferent to human affairs. 
 The success and failure of tools used on and in reference to both land and 
landscape are a good measure for the relative faith the narratives put in both the order of 
the world and the reliability of both conventional language and isomorphic representation 
of the physical world. Pushed further, the failure of maps functions as a critique of 
narratives themselves. Stories are maps (The Crossing says this almost explicitly as we 
will see in Chapter 6) insofar as they ignore certain irrelevant aspects of reality in order to 
construct a relevantly isomorphic approximation of specific events. This may be one 
reason for the frequent appearance of maps in the narratives. They too are a generalized 
and abstracted form of a human relationship with space. They form a contrast with, and 
often include indices of, the “incoordinate” blanks that beggar its coordination parallels 
and meridians (APH 257). The novels press the failure of cosmological reference—the 
ability of maps to reference the “order” of landscape—further. The cosmological failure 
suggests that the natural world’s assurance of continued existence has ontological 
significance. Simply raised, the question is if the natural order breaks down, is being 
itself also in jeopardy?  
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 Each of the novels tend to be quick to point out the limits of maps. As Sutree 
narrates a polluted Knoxville landscape with the question: “are there dragons in the wings 
of the world?” Similarly, Blood Meridian’s narration describes Glanton Gang bizarrely 
merging in terms of a substantive union that includes the same reference to the marginalia 
of Medieval and Renaissance European maps: 
They rode like men invested with a purpose whose origins were antecedent to 
them, like blood legatees of an order both imperative and remote. For although 
each man among them was discrete unto himself, conjoined they made a thing 
that had not been before and in that communal soul were wastes hardly 
reckonable more than those whited regions on old maps where monsters do live 
and where there is nothing other of the known world save conjectural winds. 
(BM 158) 
 
The passage is a long simile, as many of the narration’s more outlandish images are. 
They are claims that are not claims, but dead-end descriptions of things unknown 
compared to other things unknown. At this stage, however, they remain suggestive while 
remaining propositionally neutral.327  
 Other instances of map margins occur early in All the Pretty Horses as John 
Grady Cole and Lacey Rawlins pause before crossing the Rio Grande to get their 
bearings on an  
oilcompany roadmap that Rawlins had picked up at the cafe and he looked at it 
and he looked south toward the gap in the low hills. There were roads and rivers 
and towns on the American side of the map as far south as the Rio Grande and 
beyond that all was white.  
It dont show nothin down there, does it? said Rawlins. 
No. 
You reckon it aint never been mapped? 
                                               
327 This same sentiment on maps nearly made it into The Road. In a later draft is the 
following sentence: "The whited spaces on the old maps have all been colored in. Not so 
long ago. A few lifetimes. Now they are creeping back" (Texas State University, San 
Marcos, Wittliff Southwestern Writers Collection, Cormac McCarthy Box 91, Folder 1). 
   
 
202 
There's maps. That just aint one of em. I got one in my saddlebag. 
Rawlins came back with the map and sat on the ground and traced their route  
with his finger. He looked up. 
What? said John Grady. 
There aint shit down there. (APH 34) 
 
As has been observed by other critics, the boys’ act of simply wandering down from 
Texas to Mexico to claim a sense of personal meaning is arrogant enough. The colonial 
obtuseness of Rawlins more obviously spells out how the two boys are, unconsciously, 
projecting their own whiteness onto the perceived blank space of Mexico. Since the 
American’s comportment toward Mexico is a primary plot problem in the novel, it is not 
difficult to read the passage as a parody of maps—what’s in them, and what’s inevitably 
left out. John Grady seems dimly aware of this and internalize the mistake more 
thoroughly later in the novel: “He rode at night that its hooves might benefit from the 
damp or from what damp there was and as he rode he saw small villages distant on the 
plain that glowed a faint yellow in that incoordinate dark and he knew that the life there 
was unimaginable to him” (APH 257, emphasis mine).  
 The Crossing deals with the problems of maps more explicitly. As Billy and Boyd 
examine a dirt map made for them by an unnamed “loco” man in Mexico. A group of 
three strangers caution the boys about placing faith in maps at all. The central stranger 
extends the caution to maps in general, “He said that anyway it was not so much a 
question of a correct map but of any map at all. He said that in that country were fires and 
earthquakes and floods and that one needed to know the country itself and not simply the 
landmarks therein” (TC 185). Landscape contains more detail, contingency, and 
changeability than can be adequately mapped. The man’s criticism extends even beyond 
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the provisional nature of most maps. When the rightmost stranger suggests that the good-
will behind the map itself would at least boost the boys’ morale on their journey,  
[t]he man who was standing weighed these words and then erased them in the air 
before him with a slow fanning motion of his forefinger,” and declares this to be 
the worst possible scenario. He said that in any case a bad map was worse than no 
map at all for it engendered in the traveler a false confidence and might easily 
cause him to set aside those instincts which would otherwise guide him if he 
would but place himself in their care. He said that to follow a false map was to 
invite disaster. He gestured at the sketching in the dirt. As if to invite them to 
behold its futility. The second man on the bench nodded his agreement in this and 
said that the map in question was a folly and that the dogs in the street would piss 
upon it. But man on the right only smiled and said that for that matter the dogs 
would piss upon their graves as well and how was this an argument? (TC 185) 
 
The increasing existential momentum of the discussion—the suggestion that the only 
“coordinates” that really matter are those discovered in death—is mostly teasing. The 
discussion dead-ends as the last of the strangers laughs-off the game and simply gives the 
boys the verbal directions for which they had asked. Again, without rejecting maps in 
practice, the dialogue plants doubts about the stability of both their internal and external 
references. 
 The Crossing’s narration also represents disintegrating domestic spaces being 
absorbed back into the landscape as faded or decomposing maps:  
 The sparse trunks of the painted alameda trees stood pale as bone in the light 
from the windows. Some windows of glass but mostly oiled butcherpaper tacked 
up in frames and behind them neither movement nor shadow but only those 
sallow squares like parchments or old barren maps long weathered of any trace of 
their terrains or routes upon them. (TC 240)  
 
And even earlier in the novel: 
The house smelled of damp and old straw and waterstains had wrought upon the 
swagged and crumbling plasterwork great freeform sepia maps as of old antique 
kingdoms, ancient worlds. In the corner of the parlor a dead animal, dry hide and 
bones. A dog perhaps. (TC 161) 
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In both cases, the maps have been absorbed entirely by the margins of the unknown. 
There are beasts in those margins as well, but not monsters, only dead, domestic ones. 
 Finally, The Road maintains a map amid the annihilation of natural and social 
orders. Human beings are among the last remaining organisms in a dying landscape and 
depend entirely on the vestiges of both. But unlike the doubt cast on maps in previous 
novels, the failure of maps in The Road is not entirely the fault of the map. Rather, the 
problem is diminishing points of reference in the world. The meaning of navigational 
indicators like town-names and colors fade as both the landscape and the society that 
supported them wither away. The “tattered oilcompany roadmap” returns, but now 
numbered in crayon to mark their sequence. The man attempts to keep the map ordered 
enough so that it “answered” to quaries about location (TR 42). Yet the answers grow 
more faint. 
He found a telephone directory in a filling station and he wrote the name of the 
town on their map with a pencil. They sat on the curb in front of the building and 
ate crackers and looked for the town but they couldn’t find it. He sorted through 
the sections and looked again. Finally he showed the boy. They were some fifty 
miles west of where he'd thought. He drew stick figures on the map. This is us, he 
said. The boy traced the route to the sea with his finger. How long will it take us 
to get there? he said.  
Two weeks. Three. 
Is it blue? 
The sea? I dont know. It used to be. (TR 94) 
 
The names of things, as argued in the first chapter, are a basic unit of reference but one 
that requires constant social maintenance in order to function. Where no such 
maintenance is possible, so go the points of reference in every other convention. 
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Indicators like the two stick figures begin to replace other referents, much like the piece 
of string in another scene:  
They ate the last of their provisions and he sat studying the map. He measured the 
road with a piece of string and looked at it and measured again. Still a long way to 
the coast. He didnt know what they'd find when they got there. He shuffled the 
sections together and put them back in the plastic bag and sat staring into the 
coals. (TR 104) 
 
Here is both another decomposing map and a reference Judge Holden’s string from Blood 
Meridian. The other half of the Judge’s quote can be found almost in full in The 
Crossing, where the enigmatic Quijada declares to Billy, 
 the names of the cerros and the sierras and the deserts exist only on maps. We 
name them that we do not lose our way. Yet it was because the way was lost to us 
already that we have made those names. The world cannot be lost. We are the 
ones. And it is because these names and these coordinates are our own naming 
that they cannot save us. They cannot find for us the way again. (TC 387) 
 
The symbolic conventions of human society are pragmatic, that is, they help solve the 
problem of our social and spatial orientation. In both Blood Meridian and The Crossing, 
the world and the conventional order charted on the map once provisionally corresponded 
with the other. In The Road, that correspondence is almost wholly severed and 
maintained only by a string, held against map fragments, which increasingly fail to 
reference real space. 
  When the man and the boy finally do reach the coast, the narration describes the 
boy standing on the gray shore holding the exhausted map: “…the ocean vast and cold 
and shifting heavily like a slowly heaving vat of slag and then the gray squall line of ash. 
He looked at the boy. He could see the disappointment in his face. I'm sorry it's not blue, 
he said. That's okay, said the boy” (TR 215). Like most maps, this one must represent 
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water in the conventional “blue,” a tormenting source of color in a world that now exists 
only in gray. Here the map itself seems to have been a passable guide to what remains of 
the world—they successfully navigate to the coast, after all—but the map is a false hope 
if that hope was for meaning. Meaning, in The Road, is annulled by a terminal point of 
reference that is just as anemic as the road thereto.  
The arbitrary shape of a road with what appears to be a preordained end is not 
singular theme in McCarthy. The “shape of the road” is one brought up elsewhere in the 
course of his novels—the primadonna, for example—and it is characterized by its 
irreducible uniqueness and its end as a form of death (TC 230).328 This raises the question 
of whether a road is itself significant or merely a shape made by vain repetition or a way 
toward something meaningful? Elsewhere, in the closing pages of Outer Dark for 
example, Culla reaches the end of his own road to find a hellish swamp and “wondered 
why a road should come to such a place” (OD 242). He turns around watches a blind man 
tap his way toward the bog and does not tell him.329 The Road’s road similarly resists the 
assignation of meaning by an end since there do not appear to be any ends possible.  
                                               
328 Ellis notes that this seems to be the case with Sherriff Bell’s non-factual reference to 
the gas-chamber in NCFOM. The eliding of a factual detail raises the question: what does 
it matter which way they kill you? See Ellis, Home, 294.  
329 This contrasts with the theme of hunting or tracking. Almost all of McCarthy’s books 
involve some form of tracking or being tracked. In in Outer Dark, the absence of a road 
can sometimes mean that Cullah cannot be tracked since “could see no tracks in the 
packed sand he trod and he left none,” despite his immediately coming upon a blind man 
with hounds (OD 117). In other instances, his fresh tracks lead the tinker to his child (OD 
19). Suttree seems to evade similarly dubious hounds by catching a bus, abandoning his 
scent altogether (S 471). 
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 This is admittedly a grim assessment of the relative stability of value and 
meaning. The Road dials-up the potential failure of all spaces—domestic and natural—to 
provide a context for meaning-making. In so doing, the novel raises the question of on 
what, if anything, do meaning and value depend? The novel’s answer is mostly negation: 
not the state, not civil-society, or family. But like McCarthy’s other later novels, The 
Road takes its negated and disfigured maps and reconfigures them, not as coordinate 
maps of corresponding meaning, but as far more ambiguous, natural maps. 
 An example of such a natural map can be found in The Crossing, when Billy finds 
a chart in the coals of his campfire in which he watches “red crazings in the woodcoals 
where they broke along their unguessed gridlines. As if in the trying of the wood were 
elicited hidden geometries and their orders which could only stand fully revealed, such is 
the way of the world, in darkness and ashes” (TC 130). The narration suggests that true 
orders can only be revealed by their destruction. This idea corresponds with the final 
pages of McCarthy’s third border novel, Cities of the Plain. In this novel Billy, now in 
his seventies and practically homeless, wakes in the night while in the care of a family in 
Portales, New Mexico. Here his own body is a site of another kind of map. Here a woman 
named Betty,  
patted his hand. Gnarled, ropescarred, speckled from the sun and the years of it. 
The ropy veins that bound them to his heart. There was map enough for men to 
read. There God's plenty of signs and wonders to make a landscape. To make a 
world. (COP 291) 
 
Billy, now a drifting unemployed movie-extra, is little more than thin representation of 
the cowboy he once was. But according to this fragment of narration—which is possibly 
a moment of insight on the part of Betty—the body has become map—“enough” to read. 
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This is clearly not the “reading” of conventional signs, but rather of “wonders.” Not 
supernatural miracles—which are by definition not among the quotidian orders of 
nature—but wonders that constituent of landscape itself. The passage suggest that 
transcendent orders may be what landscapes and bodies, ultimately, are. This may be a 
defensible hedge around meaning, but it is not one that survives McCarthy’s negations 
elsewhere.  
 Finally, the process of un-mapping is clearest in The Road because, in it, natural 
maps arise in the wake of negated, conventional maps. But they also die. As Janet 
Williams suggests, the intensifying range of negation moves the rhetoric from a critique 
of knowledge toward questions of ontological dependence. This is the case in The Road’s 
epilogue’s well-known description of brook trout, which, in the context of the novel, are 
extinct.  
You could see them standing in the amber current where the white edges of their 
fins wimpled softly in the flow. They smelled of moss in your hand. Polished and 
muscular and torsional. On their backs were vermiculate patterns that were maps 
of the world in its becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing which could not be put 
back. Not be made right again. In the deep glens where they lived all things were 
older than man and they hummed of mystery. (TR 286-7) 
 
This passage has received a lot of critical attention. Ecological critics have justly 
understood the natural map as a figure for the long, fragile map of evolution. This is a 
frame that offers rich and compelling readings of the entire novel. I would, however, like 
to highlight a simpler point. Which is that none of the maps we’ve seen, including this 
one, function all that well. That is, they tend to be more misleading than they are effective 
guides to the landscape. The recurring oilcompany map is, perhaps, the only one that 
works, but mostly as either a satire or remnant. Otherwise, maps in McCarthy’s worlds 
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are in degrees of decay, increasingly flawed, written in dirt, fire, or in flesh. What 
meaning they provide is generally only perceptible in contrast with their own destruction: 
boots trod out the dirt maps, fire turns to ash, the flesh and the fish and the landscape 
itself all die. 
The collapse and reconstruction of maps and their meaning gesture increasingly 
toward unmappable landscapes. Likewise, the negation of landscape raises the rhetorical 
stakes even further. Landscapes, though transcendent of human maps, are more 
fundamental orders on which our existence and values depend. But they are also 
vulnerable. The result in the novels is that negated maps become mazes or mysteries 
rather than isomorphs of landscape. Yet, in reverse, ambiguous patterns in nature begin to 
look a little like maps before they, too, collapse. The question is whether or not the action 
of collapse is meaningful as a performed index or simple negation. If an index, then 
McCarthy can be said to be fashioning more than a desiccated representation destroyed 
by overwhelming natural, moral, and political forces. Rather, the ruined index becomes 
the possible sign of something beyond those powerful but finite orders that are 
themselves the subject of the maps. In other words, one live question McCarthy presents 
is whether or not apophatic negation is a sign of meaninglessness or transcendence.  
The latter is at least plausible given the evidence elsewhere in McCarthy’s novels 
where maps construct an index out of failed icons (isomorphs) and symbols 
(conventions). This is perhaps most obvious in Suttree where the picaresque Gene 
Harrogate attempts to map the Knoxville sewer system with plans to rob a bank by 
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undermining its vault with explosives. Unable to chart the correspondence of sewer to the 
outer world, Harrogate finds a hole out of which   
“he peered out with a cautious eye. A spray of pine needles stirred against the 
depthless blue. A lizard scuttled, a bird. He listened. Beyond the drone of insects 
and the sound of the wind he thought he heard distant traffic but he was not sure. 
He made his way back down to the floor of the vault and squatted there tapping 
his fingers against his knee, the shaft of light terminating in the top of his head 
without apparent pain or power of inspiration. 
He unfolded from his pocket the damp and thumblacked map of the city whereon 
he'd traced with grocer's crayon deadreckoned reaches, corrected tangents, notes 
on distance. He held the light above his head and fastened down a mark with his 
finger. 
Shit if I know where I'm at, he said to the silence. 
Am at, said a soft stone echo. 
He folded his chart and rose. He studied the pale thin probe from the outer world 
and he finally climbed up and stopped the hole with his rolled map. (S 261) 
 
The world answers only in an echo of what Gene puts into it. He then tries to employ the 
otherwise defunct map as an index, marking an external hole with the scrolled paper. 
However, unsure of where to look,  
He never found it from the outside. After wandering about for days he came back 
and took the map down again. He'd brought some oily rags filched from a can at 
the gas station on Henley Street and he lit these in the chamber and went out. All 
day he looked along the edge of the city and down by the river and anywhere he 
could see or hope to see a pine tree. He began to suspect some dimensional 
displacement in these descents to the underworld, some disparity unaccountable 
between the above and the below. He destroyed his charts and began again. (S 
261-2) 
 
The “above and the below” has already been referenced in an early discussion of the 
labyrinthine tunnels by Suttree himself, who, when asked to speculate on their content 
replies internally with the private thought, “[b]lind slime. As above, so it is below” and 
then out loud, “nothing that I know of, he said. They’re just some caves” (S 23). The 
sarcastic reference is to an Arabic Hermetic document that itself is compact reference the 
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Lord’s Prayer (“on Earth has it is in Heaven”).330 Gene’s attempt to find some 
correspondence between the above and the below does not fail because of “dimensional 
displacement,” but because the above is too rich, complex, and confusing to be fully 
represented on the map-turned-index.331 
 McCarthy transforms literary maps from a representational, navigational tool of 
the ordered cosmos into abstract indexes that reference space beyond their capacity to 
denote. This occurs by first rendering representational maps epistemologically suspect 
and transforming them into natural metaphors of maps. The narration’s metaphorical 
natural maps, although they are scaled much more abstractly, are also nonetheless finite 
and subject to death. Only in destruction or deformations to these maps push their 
references beyond actual landscape, nature, and cosmology toward something else, 
beyond convention, names, and reference.332 The closest we come to a fully realized map 
of anything is the ambiguous patterns the bodies of old men and extinct species of fish. 
These also die, but it is possible that death may not be the final negation it seems to be. 
Conclusion 
 
                                               
330 “As above so below”  is a reference to the Hermetic Emerald Tablet. See Peter 
Forshaw, “Alchemical Exegesis: Fractious Distillations of the Essence of Hermes,” in 
Chymists and Chymistry: Studies in the History of Alchemy and Early Modern Chemistry, 
ed. Lawrence Principe (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2007),  31.  
331 This is an old and often repeated point by Alfred Korzybski. The quote in full context is 
more useful: “The map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar 
structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness,” Alfred Korzybski, Science 
and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics 
(Brooklyn, N.Y: Inst. of General Semantics, 2005), 38. 
332 Ellis notes how McCarthy’s cosmology seems to arc upwards toward these higher, 
increasingly abstract values. See Ellis, No Place for Home, Chapter 8.  
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 In this chapter I have argued that the constitutive role of space and landscape in 
McCarthy’s novels has broader cosmological and ontological reference at both narrative 
and stylistic levels. More precisely, the novels disrupt and reconfigure spatial reference 
on both small and large scales. I claim that while the perspective and style in some novels 
and passages tend to contrast small human projects with large size and time-scales, the 
text also uses deeply anthropomorphic imagery to convey the vast as well as the small. 
The comparison on the level of scale may relativize human achievements and values, but 
such contrast also has a humanly significant goal. Specifically, the text destabilizes the 
discursive norms of coherent spatial relationships. The navigation of such spatial 
relationships, I have also argued, are figured in McCarthy’s use of map imagery. The 
construction, destruction, and then the refiguration of maps—the means of navigating 
ambiguous space—collapse. They are conventional and representational signs that leave 
in their wake the ruined shapes that suggest or indicate that which they cannot contain. In 
the next chapter, I extend this analysis to McCarthy’s depictions of the human body in 
states of injury, pain, and decomposition.  
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Chapter 4: Undone Bodies: Violence, Pain, and Decomposition 
In this chapter I extend Chapter 3’s argument about McCarthy’s deformation and 
reformation of space to another family of related physical and spatially significant 
phenomena: violence, pain, and death. The “negation” of bodies in these novels is not 
mere deletion. Pain, injury, death and decomposition, like the apophatic sentence, 
manifest as changes in coherence and structure while preserving degrees of sense and 
orienting them elsewhere.  
On the subject of death and decomposition, the scale of McCarthy’s reference 
continues to continues to vacillate. In the previous chapter, I discussed different 
interpretations of the scale of McCarthy’s prose vis-à-vis human concerns. Some have 
argued that McCarthy’s texts tend to de-anthropomorphize nature by pointing to the 
relative insignificance of human concerns compared to the vastness of the cosmos or the 
complexity of ecosystems over time. On the contrary, against the suggestion that 
McCarthy’s narrative voice imaginatively withdraws to a location outside of human 
history, Rick Wallach argues that McCarthy’s construal of “deep time” is designed to 
contextualize and situate human meaning, not belittle it. Wallach suggests argues that 
McCarthy’s emphasis on the vastness of both space and time are existentially relevant to 
the human reader. Ubiquitous existential categories like death do more than relativize the 
significance of things that die. This is especially apparent in the narrator’s study of the 
decomposition of The Orchard Keeper’s Mildred Rattner, described with the others in the 
book’s closing graveyard scene: 
the dead sheathed in the earth’s crust and turning the slow diurnal of the earth’s 
wheel, at peace with eclipse, asteroid, the dusty novae, their bones brindled with 
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mold and the celled marrow going to frail stone, turning, their fingers laced with 
roots, at one with one with Tut and Agamemnon, with the seed and the unborn. 
(OK 245) 
 
Mildred’s corpse is not merely a reminder of death, nor does death render all things 
“same.” True, within the sweep of history from ancient rulers to the unborn, all 
beings/humans appear as equals in a cosmos dispassionately observing their 
decomposition. Wallach, however, notes that the passage’s democracy of death also 
reframes the corpse by emphasizing another phase of natural processes. 
Her remains, like those of the other inhabitants of the graveyard, are already mold 
and mineralizing, a stark reminder that there is an ironic aspect of preservation 
even in decay. This is a key recognition on behalf of a narrative voice that 
contextualizes its subjects and thereby reconstitutes them moment to moment, by 
evoking the very processes of their undoing.333 
 
The narration, according to Wallach, repurposes the corpse’s association with death as a 
double negation. Death is final for the dead, of course, but an ecological view of 
decomposition renders the negation necessary for life as such. The scale of the narration’s 
perspective expands to include the existential finality of death and locates the individual 
body within a larger system. 
  McCarthy’s novels have been criticized for a taste for the same “mindless 
violence” with which Blood Meridian’s kid is afflicted. McCarthy’s stated positions on 
literature’s concern with life and death and life’s concern with bloodshed also suggests 
that violence as a component feature rather than as an aberration of the cosmos.334 
Violence and death may be engines of order from a perspective scaled to the level of eco-
                                               
333 Wallach, “Metaphors of Antiquity and Deep Time,” 107. 
334 Woodward, Venomous Fiction, 1992.  
   
 
215 
systems, plate tectonics, or stellar formation and McCarthy’s narration has been 
understood as expressing such a “new and wider view,” to use Judge Holden’s 
language.335  
 McCarthy’s well-known exploration of violence and death drowns out the texts’ 
 subtle silence around the subject of pain. The absence of “access” to McCarthy’s 
character’s inner world has been the subject of considerable critical exploration. While 
this lack of internal data is somewhat exaggerated in secondary interpretations, it is true 
that amid considerable violence and disfiguration of bodily integrity, the actual pain of 
the characters is comparatively muted. This proliferation of violence paired with the 
wordlessness of pain in McCarthy acknowledges the limitation of language when it 
comes to pain and the necessity of engaging the subject nonetheless. While the manner in 
which the language around pain is not specifically “unsaid” as has been this project’s 
interpretive focus throughout, McCarthy’s strategies for dealing with the limitations of 
language are similar. The flow of rhetoric from violence, injury, and death has a similar 
                                               
335 The question of McCarthy’s scale of reference is a point of tension critics. Phillips in 
‘Ugly Facts,” for example, uses a cosmic scale of reference to read Blood Meridian. 
Nature is described as inherently sinister in some of McCarthy’s southern novels. 
Likewise, Blood Meridian, from its epigraphs onward, simply takes human aggression as 
a premise rather than an argument (Owens, Cormac McCarthy’s Western Novels, 61; also 
Tom Nolan, Los Angeles Times Book Review, June 9th, 1985). The sense of lurking 
predation is present but softened throughout the border books. Finally, with regard to The 
Road, Rune Graulund takes the empty biosphere as a place of “unrelenting indifference 
and meaninglessness,” but notes that the novel’s narrative attention is necessarily 
anthropocentric; “Fulcrums and Borderlands. A Desert Reading of Cormac McCarthy’s 
The Road,” Orbis Litterarum 65, no. 1 (February 2010): 57. Laura Gruber Godfrey 
makes a similar argument in “‘The World He’d Lost’: Geography and ‘Green’ Memory 
in Cormac McCarthy’s The Road,” Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 52, no. 2 
(February 28, 2011): 163–75. 
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structure to the paradoxical negations and reconstruction of maps in the above section. 
The logical frame of negation still applies to the subject of bodies insofar as violence 
negates the fragile order of the body. Pain, on the other hand, does not admit of obvious 
negations or assertions but represents, perhaps, one possible moral consequence of this 
type of study. That is, that that which exceeds the limits to language—transcends it—may 
not be good for us.  
Bodies, Violence, and Pain 
 
 So far, I have attended to and argued for a sense of linguistic limitation on the 
“upper” side of referential possibility. The assumption has largely been that something 
transcends and is therefore beyond the complexities scaled to human articulation. Such 
assumptions may be warranted, but likely depend more on metaphysical habit than they 
are necessary for a rigorous interpretation of an apophatic text. McCarthy offers a 
corrective to this by limiting the referential capacity of language on the “lower” side as 
well. Put another way: there are limitations on language’s adequacy at the level of our 
most intimate experiences, especially violence against our own bodies and the 
qualitatively infinite range of extreme pain.   
 McCarthy’s novels are violent and the descriptions around that violence range 
from the precise to the merely suggestive. Critics have drawn attention to the odd 
position of admiring the beauty of formal prose depictions of horrific content.336 It is not 
                                               
336 As Peter Josyph, for example, if we need to “check our ethos at the door to fully enjoy 
McCarthy?” in Adventures in Reading Cormac McCarthy (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow 
Press, 2010) 74. Similarly, Denis Donoghue describes trying to teach such texts more 
broadly: “it was difficult to speak of language, form, style, and tone without appearing 
decadent, ethically irresponsible,” especially given McCarthy’s “refusal to adjudicate” 
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necessary to rehearse all of the beautiful and troubling imagery from Outer Dark, Blood 
Meridian or Child of God to highlight a few general and relevant patterns, though. First, 
while violent actions are accessible to the reader by rich description, the narrators tend to 
elide most of the living aftermath of violence. The actual feeling of pain and injury 
cannot be fully articulated by either the experiencer or the narration. By contrast, the 
experience of fatal injury can only be described from the external observer. An example 
of this tension is that careful description of potential violence in the dialogue of The Road 
when the man threatens a road agent with a gun: “Because the bullet travels faster than 
sound. It will be in your brain before you can hear it. To hear it you will need a frontal 
lobe and things with names like colliculus and temporal gyrus and you wont have them 
anymore. They’ll just be soup” (TR 64). This is a fairly straightforward hypothetical 
negation. The collapse of names here would come as a result of their being irrelevant to 
an indistinct mass of tissue. Bullets delete the nameable distinctions discernable by form 
and function.  
 On the other hand, there are instances in McCarthy in which the bodily 
consequences of death and decay are also richly described. In The Orchard Keeper, the 
long-dead body of Kenneth Ratner is partially exposed in a pit of toxic insecticide: “[t]he 
thing seemed to leap at him, the green face leering and coming up through the lucent 
rotting water with eyeless sockets and green fleshless grin, the hair dark and ebbing like 
seaweed"(OK 54). Likewise, the trash-laden Tennessee River in Suttree’s Knoxville is 
                                               
the action within the narrative, see “Reading Blood Meridian.” The Sewanee Review 105, 
no. 3 (Summer 1997): 401, 409.  
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awash with “foetal” corpses (S 4, 306) and suicide victims, “window dummy” are pulled 
from the water from their faces like fish on large grappling hooks (S 9). Similarly to 
Wallach’s interpretation, Ellis observes how the narration of Child of God describes the 
decaying bodies of Lester Ballard’s victims in terms of food, with a “a pale gray cheesy 
mold” (CG 196) and “enormous hams” (CG 197), both items Ballard has been unable to 
afford earlier in the novel (CG 124).337 These last pages of Child of God seem to revel in 
the narrated rot, emphasizing the transition from living thing into food for plants.338 Sepich 
also takes the discovered use of bone phosphorous as fertilizer to be the motive of Blood 
Meridian’s “bonepickers” in both the final chapters and the epilogue.339 The ecological 
cycles that depend on death are at once a beautiful, complex dance and a nightmare of 
what waits for us mortal bodies.  
This ambivalence is a consistent aspect of the novels’ rhetorical artifice. The 
decomposition of bodies is, in a very blunt way, its own type of un-articulating, 
especially if being “articulate” in McCarthy is to have a basic, discernable form (e.g. BM 
218, 227). The experience of seeing the orders of which we are made elicits complex 
responses from disgust to horror and, for some, the loss of consciousness. It may be 
tempting to say that decomposition, much like violence in its gratuitousness, 
                                               
337 Ellis, Home, 100. Likewise, Giles observes that the total absorption of the body seems 
to be Ballard’s aim: “Lester, in fact, wants to merge his body with theirs until what is left 
is a pure physicality from which all boundaries have been removed” (Giles, “Violence,” 
36).  
338 Blood Meridian also makes references to corpses as resembling food, as in 
“luminescent melons cooling on some mesa of the moon” (BM 182). 
339 John Sepich, Notes on Blood Meridian: Revised and Expanded Edition, (Austin, Tex: 
University of Texas Press, 2008), 67. 
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communicates very little and points to flattened nothingness, pain, and waste rather than 
transcendence or higher orders of life and complexity. However, the disgust and 
fascination generated by rotting corpse is distinct from the violence that may have turned 
a living body into a dead one or the fear of pain an un-done body represents. That 
McCarthy’s corpses are sometimes renamed as or associated with food indicates the 
transition from body into nourishment from other organisms.340 They—even the bones and 
the mummies—are not quite as “dead” as they might otherwise seem. 
Again, compared with decay, far less articulate in the novels is pain. This is 
consistent with McCarthy’s well-known tendency to withhold the inner-lives of 
characters, which is the only location for pain. Compared to violent action and 
decomposition, McCarthy’s non-narration of pain is conspicuous. Pain is, of course, a 
corollary of the novels’ violence that does not end in death, but the question of whether 
or not pain is already beyond stable reference is an open and active one. There are a few 
possible exceptions to the narrative’s relative silence around pain. Ellis notes that 
McCarthy also often keeps violence off-stage, suggesting something even more ominous 
once the aggressor has “shot the wooden barlatch home behind him” (BM 347) or “shut 
the door and pushed the boltshackle home in the pad” (ATPH 166).341 The torture and 
possible rape of Rawlins in All the Pretty Horses ends with this latter bolting. In its 
                                               
340 Mundik points out that a cyclical, pan-carnivorous nature is precisely the figure elicited 
in Cities of the Plains’ description of a dead calf, the upturned ribcage of which was “like 
some great carnivorous plant brooding in the barren dawn,” (Mundik, Bloody and 
Barbarous God, 202).  
341 Jay Ellis, “The Rape of Rawlins: A Note on ‘All the Pretty Horses.’” The Cormac 
McCarthy Journal 1, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 68.  
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aftermath, Rawlins “bent slowly forward and to one side and lay holding himself.” He 
neither articulates his pain nor the violence done to him, but intimates to John Grady that 
he will likewise succumb to confession if he is “taken into the shower room” (APH 166). 
Similar suggestions of violence—particularly rape—surround various episodes in Blood 
Meridian’s Judge Holden. The judge is seen “picking his teeth, as though he had just 
eaten” lines before a young boy is found dead on a pile of other, older bones (BM 123). 
After the Glanton Gang arrives near Tucson, a young girl goes missing. 
Parts of her clothes were found torn and bloodied under the north wall, over 
which she could only have been thrown. In the desert were drag marks. A shoe. 
The father of the child knelt clutching a bloodstained rag to his chest and none 
could persuade him to rise and none to leave. (BM 250) 
 
In yet another episode, the Judge murders an abducted Apache child after “dandling it 
on one knee while the men saddled their horses” (BM 170). The narration’s object 
pronoun “it” renders the corpse as neutral as the amoral prose itself.  
For all of the violence of these books, pain is relatively inarticulate. The difficulty 
of applying language to the lonely quality of pain is only compounded in a text tasked 
with describing someone else’s. So they are passed over by McCarthy’s narration, either 
as off-stage events or observed by external perspectives. In Outer Dark, Rinthy’s labor 
pain goes mostly unexpressed in words. Likewise, nowhere are the circumstances of her 
pregnancy openly discussed, although they are presumably violent. Aside from one “it 
hurts bad now,” (OD 13) her labor pains are narrated entirely from the perspective of 
Culla: “Periodically she would seize the thin iron headrail behind her, coming tautly 
bowed and slowly up with her breath loud in the room and then subsiding back among 
the covers like a wounded bird.” Again, the signs of pain are available to Culla, but little 
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else: “It wasn’t until midafternoon that she began. He stood before the bed in which she 
lay bowsprung and panting and her eyes mad,” then later,  “[t]he spasms in which she 
writhed put him more in mind of death. But it wasn’t death with which she labored far 
into the fading day” and “[w]hen he went in again she had crawled or fallen from the bed 
and lay in the floor clutching the bedstead. He did think she had died, lying there looking 
up with eyes that held nothing at all. Then her body convulsed and she screamed” (OD 
13-14). Similarly, when a family takes Rinthy later in the novel, when a teenaged boy 
accidently “stove a hole in his kneecap,” he swears once (“God damn it to hell”) and 
afterward looks “pilloried and stoic” (OD 70). Later, an old man who the narrator depicts 
being stabbed in a doorway can only mutter repetitions of his final prior word: “Minister? 
he said. Minister?” (OD 129). Closest of all to articulate pain might be when Culla is shot 
at long-range with a shotgun and “[t]he pellets went up his back like wasps” (OD 93), a 
close relative to the same injury felt by Llewellen Moss in No Country for Old Men, 
whose wounds “stung like a hornet” (NC 34). In The Crossing, when Boyd (a letter-
position away from being “body”) is shot, he tells Billy, “It hurts, Billy” (TC 270). A few 
pages later, when Billy tries to coach Boyd through is conscious surgery he says, “I know 
it hurts,” to which Boyd responds, “no you dont” (TR 308). The communication of pain 
can thus be bluntly factual, “that” pain is occurring, but it can only be spoken by analogy 
with other common types of pain, or it can be expressed by groans.  
The narration of injury in Blood Meridian is similarly vague. As the kid and 
Sproule wander the desert in the aftermath of a massacre, the badly injured Sproule says 
of his gangrenous arm only that it “stinks” (BM 64). Later, David Brown, whose pain 
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(caused by an arrow lodged in his leg) is studiously avoided by the entire gang, finds a 
surgeon in the kid: “Brown seized the ground on either side of him and his head flew 
back and his wet teeth shone in the firelight. The kid took a new grip and bore down 
again. The veins in the man's neck stood like ropes and he cursed the boy's soul” (BM 
167). When The Road’s man is shot with a makeshift arrow, he “felt a sharp hot pain in 
his leg” but can only swear: “Oh you bastard, he said. You bastard” (TR 263). Later, he 
acknowledges with a simple affirmative that his self-suturing/removal “hurts” (TR 266 
and 272). In Cities of the Plain, John Grady’s fatal gash across his belly “Hurts, bud. Like 
a sumbitch” (CP 260).342 But these verbal acts are mostly nugatory. Swearing, especially 
in response to pain, is probably governed by a different branch of cognition than the 
grammatical memory.343 The broader point I wish to make by these examples is that the 
experience of pain—and probably in all literary efforts to engage it—is difficult to 
articulate. In McCarthy it is expressed in ways similar to other sentient creatures in the 
texts -- cries, yelps, and screams: “Out of the mad horse's throat came a sound that 
brought the men to the door” (BM 121). 
Although replete with opportunities for pain, its inarticulate nature is not 
peculiar to McCarthy. William Cavanaugh, drawing on the conceptual work of Elaine 
Scarry, makes this point in his Torture and the Eucharist: 
                                               
342 The wound, speculates Eduardo sarcastically, is revelatory: “Perhaps he will see the 
truth at last in his own intestines. As do the old brujos of the campo” (COP 252). 
343 Pinker notes that patients with severe aphasia due to tissue-loss also sometimes retain 
taboo compound swearing formulas like “goddamn” or “fuck off.” This may suggest that 
“such formulas are at the opposite continuum from propositional speech in which 
combinations of words express combinations of ideas according to grammatical rules.” 
See Pinker, Stuff of Thought, 334. 
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in language a person learns to name the world, to become part of a larger world, 
to gain a larger self. For a person in pain, the process is reversed. The immediacy 
of pain, its monopoly of attention and its incommunicability, reduces the world of 
the sufferer down again to the limits of the body itself. In older people, bodily 
frailty often brings the world down to within a few feet of their physical bodies. 
Their world becomes a ceaseless preoccupation with sitting comfortably, the 
room temperature, their aches and pains. In torture this phenomenon takes an 
extreme form. The immediacy of the pain shrinks the world down to the contours 
of the body itself; the enormity of the agony is the sufferer’s only reality. Pain is 
often called “blinding” because it eliminates all but itself from the field of 
vision.344 
 
The context of Cavanaugh’s analysis of torture’s relationship to language and complex 
sensation is the political “disappearing” of persons by agents of the Pinochet regime.345 
The kidnapping and occasional, inexplicable release of a tortured person was a method of 
destroying and repackaging language to spread fear and distrust among the population. 
One might have been released for denouncing a neighbor or simply injected back into the 
populace to describe potential tortures available to punish dissidents. Survivors of torture 
were thus forced to choose between participating in the regime of state terror and 
recovering in silence. 
 At this juncture, one could argue for a strong distinction between the mystic’s 
artful unsaying toward a transcendent object and the violent repression of complex, 
differentiated feeling through torture and fear. There surely is a difference. However, the 
                                               
344 William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of 
Christ, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 37. 
345 Crews notes that McCarthy’s archives include a letter noting that he had read Scarry in 
1986, the year after Blood Meridian was published. Crews also notes that Rick Wallach 
had noted the literary affinity between McCarthy and Scarry before McCarthy’s letter 
was made public in the Wittliff Collections (Crews, Books Are Made Out of Books, 296-
8). See Rick Wallach, “From Beowulf to Blood Meridian: Cormac McCarthy’s 
Demystification of the Martial Code,” in Cormac McCarthy: New Directions, ed. James 
D. Lilley (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 211. 
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potential goals of unsaying are vast and the resemblance between apophatic techniques 
should at least suggest both their diversity and their wide scope of moral application. 
Absolute pain requires a determinate context as much as the thought or feeling that some 
order or thing transcends the mundane world. In McCarthy the difference is blurry, but 
that is not alien to the traditions that posit a transcendent order to justify, explain, or 
simply cope with pain. In other words, language’s limit conditions, pain’s silencing of 
language, and the transcendent’s surpassing of it are at least related. This is particularly 
so when qualitative consciousness itself contains no strict limiting conditions for its own 
potential pain and yet cannot be engaged without determinate symbols or social 
frameworks. As Elaine Scarry writes,  
 The point here is not just that pain can be apprehended in the image of the weapon 
(or wound) but that it almost cannot be apprehended without it: few people would 
have difficulty understanding Michael Walzer’s troubled statement, ‘I cannot 
conceptualize infinite pain without thinking of whips and scorpions, hot irons and 
other people’; and the fact that the very word ‘pain’ his its etymological home in 
‘poena’ or ‘punishment reminds us that even the elementary act of naming this 
most interior of events entails an immediate mental somersault out of the body 
into the external social circumstances that can be pictured as having caused the 
hurt.346  
 
While pain has no obvious qualitative limit, it requires determinate conditions that must 
somehow occur within the world of possible representation. This may be why, in contrast 
to the frequent and extreme forms of violence in McCarthy, the novels sustain only thin 
articulations of physical pain.  
                                               
346 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 81. 
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Instances of emotional pain are, however, where explicit intrusions on first-order 
experience occur. This type of pain reaches into the imagination to find the wounds and 
weapons that might take a solid reference. This is true most frequently in the minds of 
McCarthy’s men—Culla Holme, Llewelyn Moss, The Road’s “man,” Billy Parham, and 
John Grady, with the latter three searching for determinate imagery to give analogous 
form to underarticulated or unnamed pain. This is the case in the following passage in 
which John Grady grieves his final meeting with Alejandra while traveling back to 
Mexico: 
He slept that night in a field far from any town. He built no fire. He lay listening 
to the horse crop the grass at his stakerope and he listened to the wind in the 
emptiness and watched stars trace the arc of the hemisphere and die in the 
darkness at the edge of the world and as he lay there the agony in his heart was 
like a stake. He imagined the pain of the world to be like some formless parasitic 
being seeking out the warmth of human souls wherein to incubate and he thought 
he knew what made one liable to its visitations. What he had not known was that 
it was mindless and so had no way to know the limits of those souls and what he 
feared was that there might be no limits. (APH 256)  
 
John Grady’s insight is itself a tool in the torturer’s catalogue of agonies. In principle, 
there is no limit to pain, only merciful cessation. This is the engine of fear that powers the 
genres of body-horror, but also the grotesque in literature more generally. In 
Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, for example, the compounding nature of pain is, to the 
person in pain, infinite in scope.347 One can always suffer just a little more and likely will 
if one enters the ever-accelerating engine of cyclical, violent retribution. That type of 
escalating exchange indeed yields sows pain and harvests the malevolent and deformed.
                                               
347 I owe this connection between limitless pain and vengeance in Shakespeare to 
Professor Neal Leavitt, Boston University. 
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 This figure of a mal-formed and inarticulate monster incarnates out of pain. It 
arises earlier in the novel in the comparatively trivial but all-consuming dull pain of a 
hangover:  
The browsing horses jerked their heads up. It was no sound they'd ever heard 
before. In the gray twilight those retchings seemed to echo like the calls of some 
rude provisional species loosed upon that waste. Something imperfect and 
malformed lodged in the heart of being. A thing smirking deep in the eyes of 
grace itself like a gorgon in an autumn pool. (APH 71) 
 
The Road elaborates the description of this, second poorly limited creature lodged, if not 
in the heart of being, but in the core of the world’s development (or decay), repressed 
deeply in some hidden memory of how it came to be: 
In the dream from which he'd wakened he had wandered in a cave where the child 
led him by the hand. Their light playing over the wet flowstone walls. Like 
pilgrims in a fable swallowed up and lost among the inward parts of some granitic 
beast. Deep stone flues where the water dripped and sang. Tolling in the silence 
the minutes of the earth and the hours and the days of it and the years without 
cease. Until they stood in a great stone room where lay a black and ancient lake. 
And on the far shore a creature that raised its dripping mouth from the rimstone 
pool and stared into the light with eyes dead white and sightless as the eggs of 
spiders. It swung its head low over the water as if to take the scent of what it 
could not see. Crouching there pale and naked and translucent, its alabaster bones 
cast up in shadow on the rocks behind it. Its bowels, its beating heart. The brain 
that pulsed in a dull glass bell. It swung its head from side to side and then gave 
out a low moan and turned and lurched away and loped soundlessly into the dark. 
(TR 1-2) 
 
The monster’s translucence shows how thinly limited it is, while raising the question of 
what kind of mind or brain (an inherently limiting organ) operates within it. As a retold 
dream, the narration has to cross several boundaries of mind in order to talk about it at 
all. The potential horror of the dream is that there may be no story behind the pain, no 
form of mind behind its meaning—no story to tell at all, only a low moan and silence.   
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 The collapse of explanation into grotesque despair is short-lived, however. 
Shortly after John Grady’s kidnapping of the Captain is resolved and his horses 
recovered, he kills a deer while camping near the Texas border. As he reflects on the 
nature of predation, death, and nutrition mentioned as mentioned earlier. His thought 
shifts from death to pain: 
The sky was dark and a cold wind ran through the bajada and in the dying light a 
cold blue cast had turned the doe's eyes to but one thing more of things she lay 
among in that darkening landscape. Grass and blood. Blood and stone. Stone and 
the dark medallions that the first flat drops of rain caused upon them. He 
remembered Alejandra and the sadness he'd first seen in the slope of her shoulders 
which he'd presumed to understand and of which he knew nothing and he felt a 
loneliness he'd not known since he was a child and he felt wholly alien to the 
world although he loved it still. He thought that in the beauty of the world were 
hid a secret. He thought the world's heart beat at some terrible cost and that the 
world's pain and its beauty moved in a relationship of diverging equity and that in 
this headlong deficit the blood of multitudes might ultimately be exacted for the 
vision of a single flower. (APH 282)  
 
Pain, being unlimited, is rendered here as a type of currency, but one with an asymptotic 
inflation rate. This passage has been characterized by some as signaling that the story is a 
gnostic tragedy and that there is a secret source of evil and pain in the cosmos. It may be 
an extreme form of what we might find in Boehme: The determinacy, complexity, and 
harmony of beauty has as its conceptual cost the inclusion of evil in the fundamental 
structure of the world. The insight sticks as, in a later scene, John Grady is said to share 
with a stranger “a knowing deep in the bone that beauty and loss are one” (COP 71). Of 
course, John Grady’s imaginative projection of a source of pain into the world is one way 
of meaningfully narrating pain. Yet it is one cosmology among many possible. It is an 
orderly exchange, but it may not be true. 
   
 
228 
 Such forms are contested, however. The Book of Job, for instance, crescendos 
with a firm rebuke of the transactional cosmologies of Job’s friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and 
Zophar. The final third of Job performs the transcendence of the arbitrary divine fiat that 
brooks no exchange of human righteousness for divine protection from pain. Likewise, 
John Grady’s thought also contains the germ of its own absurdity since the notion of an 
economic exchange of pain for beauty is not coherent or, at least, not sustainable. Billy 
Parham’s interpretation of his dream encounter with his sister in Cities of the Plain 
recognizes the shortcomings of such form-giving stories about pain: 
In the night he dreamt of his sister dead seventy years and buried near Fort 
Summer. He saw her so clearly. Nothing had changed, nothing faded. She was 
walking slowly along the dirt road past the house. […] When she passed the 
house he knew that she would never enter there again nor would he see her ever 
again and in his sleep he called out to her but she did not turn or answer him but 
only passed on down that empty road in infinite sadness and infinite loss. (COP 
265-6) 
 
There is no accounting possible for infinite pain and infinite loss. Billy recognizes this as 
the text perhaps hyperbolically negates his beliefs to that point: “He woke and lay in the 
dark and the cold and he thought of her and he thought of his brother dead in Mexico. In 
everything that he’d ever thought about the world and about his life in it he’d been 
wrong” (CP 266). Billy does not have an affirmative case for some fact about the world 
that would replace his earlier hypotheses. Rather, the dream upends some other idea or 
ideas that had hitherto structured his life. While cosmologies of despair, too, have proven 
unsustainable, cosmologies of moral exchange, of fate, or dualistic struggle, cannot 
account for what is, in principle, limitless. However, like Scarry’s hot pokers and social 
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punishments, one cannot refer to the limitless without recourse to the determinate 
language pain transcends.  
 Screams and inarticulate groans are signs of limitlessness, even when they do not 
assert information about it. Michel de Certeau observes in The Mystic Fable, 
Scattered through the entire mystic corpus “there are” (Es gibt) these resonances 
of a body touched, “moans” and sounds of love, cries breaking the text they 
induce, enunciative lapses in a syntagmatic organization of statements. [….] 
[V]oice without language, or rather utterance flowing from the wounded body, 
but opaque when it no longer has the space offered to the amorous saying by the 
voice of another.348 
 
de Certeau links the ambiguity of the amorous and wounded groan with Boehme’s roiling 
abyss prior to his theogony. The groan of pain is precipitated by the “the noise of 
violence deprived of word and object, the ‘war’ that already articulates, however, the 
desire to tear or be torn with the act of living.”349 While it does not follow that bodily 
wounds and groans of pain are themselves signs of indeterminate limitlessness, their 
ubiquity make them effective literary signs in stories about pain and loss. Their inherent 
ambiguity as signs is appropriate given the ambiguity of their supposed referents, but 
they are no less significant for that fact. McCarthy’s novels participate in this classically 
mystical equivocation around pain and ecstasy, injury and insight. Yet it is worth noting 
that the novels and narrators also abandon the reader to adjudicate aspects of the moral 
ambiguity they leave in their wake. 
                                               
348 Michel de Certeau, The Mystic Fable Volume Two,  ed. Luce Giard, trans. Michael B. 
Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 142.  
349 Ibid., 143. 
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The goal of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the blunt disfiguration of 
bodies through violence and death also refigures those same bodies by including them in 
broader orders of life and death. Likewise, the relative silence of pain and its potential 
infinity is stark compared to the violence inflicted within McCarthy’s texts. The narration 
engages the potential infinity of pain through imagery of inarticulate monstrousness, 
physical deformity, and by the literary representation of the sheer expressiveness of 
groans. I have argued that these figures constitute not direct references but indexical signs 
that reference toward the outer edges of language’s capacity.350 Such references to the 
potential limitlessness of inarticulate experience, I suggest, are narratively proximate to 
similar limit-concepts like God or justice. In the next chapter, I argue that in McCarthy’s 
dialogues such transcendent objects and the limits of language and thought are openly 
debated among McCarthy’s characters who employ vocabulary established in the 
subsequent chapters. The end result of this is not information or assertion but the 
enactment of transcendence through negated language.   
  
                                               
350 By limit, I mean just a bare minimum of pragmatic determinacy not some kind of 
linguistic lock on essential properties of an object. 
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Chapter 5: Dialectics 
In the preceding chapters I have argued for the presence of three themes of 
apophatic discourse in McCarthy: pressure on naming, the negation of ontological 
grounding, and the disfigurement and refiguring of space and the body. With those 
established, I conclude by applying them to the longer dialogues in the novels, focusing 
on passages in which the “sages” or teachers make arguments about the nature of 
transcendent entities. I argue that these passages’ meandering claims gain momentum 
when read as sites of apophatic dialectic rather than as representative of McCarthy’s own 
first-order philosophical claims. In other words, rather than dramatizing a proposed 
ideological position, these dialogues make arguments (sometimes in contradiction to each 
other) that expose personal, occupational, ideological, emotional biases in the characters 
to whom they speak. Examples of the dialectical genre already examined are John 
Grady’s interviews with Alfonsa, the brief dialogue between Ely and the man in The 
Road, the campfire debates between Outer Dark’s trinity, and Blood Meridian’s many 
debates among members of the Glanton gang with half-sane anchorites. All of these 
conversations revealingly deploy at least one element of three categories discussed in the 
foregoing chapters. My goal is to offer evidence that an apophatic reading of these 
passages is not only possible, but warranted by those attributes of the texts we have 
investigated so far. The actual payoff—the apophatic collapse into indexical signs of 
transcendence—is, however, only as strong as the text itself. In other words, the result of 
this chapter is not decoded dialogues, but an exposure of their philosophical and religious 
function.  
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The bulk of the examples below are taken from The Crossing. Since the teaching 
characters rarely recur in The Crossing (in contrast with the repeated debates with the 
judge, Anton Chigurh, Outer Dark’s trinity, or Ed Tom Bell), Billy’s episodic lessons 
have clear individual voices, even as together they form the polyvocal warp of the novel. 
The Crossing’s overall narrative voice puts a particular philosophical gloss on its 
descriptions and interpretations, but its dialogues presents figures who proffer various 
positions, conclusions, and advice that differ from the narrator’s. They also present 
cosmologic and ethical arguments distinct and divergent from each other. In Billy’s 
encounters with Arnulfo the brujo (sorcerer), the custodian and heretic, the four map-
critics, the primadonna, the blind man and his wife, Quijada, and the Gitano with the 
airplane, all either interpolate or reference even more stories as history, parables, 
“carantoñas,” corrido, or legend. Even his long episode with the wolf could be read as an 
encounter with one more teacher with another opaque lesson that can only be partially 
imagined—which both the narration and Billy attempt to do. 
Each of the “sages,” as Phillip Snyder has called them, attempt to make their case 
with the three apophatic categories we have examined in the course of this dissertation: 
Names and language, origins and grounds, space and bodies.351 In the hands of The 
Crossing’s sages, these categories are tools for engaging overlapping questions of God, 
                                               
351 The category of philosophical and prophetic “sages” is from Phillip A. Snyder and 
Delys W. Snyner “Modernism, Postmodernism, and Language: McCarthy’s Style” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Cormac McCarthy, Ed. Steven Frye (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013. 
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justice, fate, and the truth-value of story itself. The stories that The Crossing’s sages tell 
frequently feature unnamed individuals. They discuss an origin or matrix (matríz) in 
close proximity with the serving and eating of eggs. They involve the destruction of 
buildings, bodies, or body-parts. Space does not permit a full exegesis of each teacher’s 
lesson. The following examinations are especially salient examples of the of this 
dissertation’s primary analytic categories and their appearance, distortion, and negation 
within McCarthy’s dialogues.  
The interwoven concepts of origin and ground appears early in The Crossing. 
When Billy and his family begin running wolf-traps, they find scented bait among the 
belongings of an old trapper, Mr. Echols, labeled “No. 7 Matrix.” The caretaker of 
Echols’ supplies, Mr. Sanders, suggests that Billy visit a Mr. Arnulfo for more of the 
scent. There, Billy and Arnulfo, the “brujo” (shaman), as his caretaker calls him, discuss 
wolves more broadly. 
He said that the matrix was not so easily defined. Each hunter must have his own 
formula. He said that things were rightly named its attributes which could in no 
way be counted back into its substance. He said that in his opinion only 
shewolves in their season were a proper source. The boy said that the wolf of 
which he spoke was in fact herself a shewolf and he asked if that fact should 
figure in his strategies against her but the old man only said that there were no 
more wolves. (TC 45) 
 
The matrix is undefinable. The syntax of the subsequent sentences likewise strains 
interpretation: “things were rightly named its attributes which could in no way be counted 
back into its substance.” That is, its correctly-named characteristics will still not reference 
what it truly is. Its source is yet another matrix defined as the shewolf’s body in general, 
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but Arnulfo doubts the existence of the specific instance of an actual wolf. He states 
outright in Spanish that the wolf itself is also unknowable.352  
“El lobo es una cosa incognoscible, he said. Lo que se tiene en la trampa no es 
mas que dientes y forro. El lobo propio no se puede conocer. Lobo o to que sabe 
el lobo. Tan como preguntar to que saben las piedras. Los arboles. El mundo” 
[The wolf is a thing unknowable, he said. What you have in the trap is nothing but 
teeth and hide. The own wolf cannot be known. The wolf or whatever the wolf 
knows. As well as asking what the stones know. The trees. The world]. (TC 45)  
 
The epistemic negation is plain in Arnulfo’s monologue. To illustrate his point, he does 
not provide evidence, but rather an analogy. He says,  
You want to catch this wolf, the old man said. Maybe you want the skin so you 
can get some money. Maybe you can buy some boots or something like that. You 
can do that. But where is the wolf? The wolf is like the copo de nieve. 
Snowflake.  
Snowflake. You catch the snowflake but when you look in your hand you dont 
have it no more. Maybe you see this dechado [instance, sample]. But before you 
can see it it is gone. If you want to see it you have to see it on its own ground. If 
you catch it you lose it. And where it goes there is no coming back from. Not 
even God can bring it back. (TC 46) 
 
This final comment about God is perhaps hyperbole, intensifying the non-replicability of 
the instance. The preceding sentences are of equal importance for the discourses’ 
apophatic rhetoric. But they suggest a referent that, while it cannot be known or owned or 
held, it can somehow be seen “on its own ground.” Billy does not ask what ground it is, 
but where. Arnulfu continues, 
Escúchame, joven, [listen to me, young man] the old man wheezed. If you could 
breathe a breath so strong you could blow out the wolf. Like you blow out the 
copo. Like you blow out the fire from the candela. The wolf is made the way the 
world is made. You cannot touch the world. You cannot hold it in your hand for it 
is made of breath only. (TC 46) 
                                               
352 Although sometimes translated by the narration in paraphrase, the mixture of Spanish 
and English either presumes a bilingual reader, or else plays with the fragmented 
dialogue monolingual reading produces. 
   
 
235 
 
Arnulfo sets the propositional conditions of the wolf’s knowability by negating its very 
possibility, then expands those conditions to the world. He states this bluntly and, as 
Sells’ aesthetics would judge it, not especially intensely. It is a statement without 
evidence. Arnulfo’s proposition of unknowability, moreover, is at least partially negated 
by Billy’s experience with the particular instance of a captured wolf. The wolf’s 
contradictory features, its supposed immanence and transcendence, are both plausibly 
true. Therefore one feature of the wolf must either be misleading or indicative of 
something that cannot be articulated without collapse into paradox. It is the progression 
of the narrative, framed by these hypotheses that develop the cognitive and aesthetic 
intensity of the contradiction through the course of the novel. The wolf can be held for 
only a moment before it dies in captivity. According to Arnulfo, it, like the world, cannot 
be owned. Billy will find that it can be, but only as a corpse.  
Arnulfo’s epistemological limit conditions may play a role in Billy’s decision to 
place the wolf “back” in Mexico—on her own ground. But that quest is not explicable to 
anyone, nor does the novel explain his moment of decision. Rather, Billy repeatedly 
obfuscates his reasons or omits the wolf from the journey completely, as in his later 
account to Boyd. At no point are Billy’s reasons self-serving or economic, as Arnulfo 
suggests they might be. This is emphasized when the narrator notes that the rifle he trades 
for the wolf’s corpse “was worth a dozen mutilated wolfhides” (TC 124). When Billy is 
later asked what he received in exchange for the rifle, he responds:  
I dont think I could say.  
You mean you wont say. 
No Sir. I mean I aint sure I could put a name to it. (TC 170) 
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The narration has no such difficulty in describing the transaction. The trade is clear and 
explicit. Yet Billy himself cannot say.  
 Arnulfo then introduces the concept of the wolf’s ground while simultaneously 
confessing his own ignorance about it. “Escúchame, joven, he said. Yo no sé nada. Esto 
es la verdad. [I don’t know anything. that is the truth].” The “brujo,” the shaman or 
sorcerer, then offers a prophecy. He claims to know nothing, but he has suggested that the 
wolf may be seen, though not possessed, on its own ground. That ground is not the 
accidents (features) of the matrix, but some point of contact, where the acts of God and 
humanity overlap. 
The matríz will not help you, the old man said. He said that the boy should find 
that place where acts of God and those of man are of a piece. Where they cannot 
be distinguished. 
Y qué clase de lugar es éste? [what kind of place is this?] the boy said.  
Lugares donde el fierro ya está en la tierra, [Places where the iron is already on 
the ground] the old man said. Lugares donde ha quemado el fuego. [Places where 
the fire has burned.] 
Y cómo se encuentra? [how can I find it?] 
The old man said that it was not a question of finding such a place but rather of 
knowing it when it presented itself. He said that it was at such places that God sits 
and conspires in the destruction of that which he has been at such pains to create. 
Y por eso soy hereje, he said. Por eso y nada más. [that is why I’m a heretic. This 
and nothing else]. (TC 47) 
 
Is such a place the same “ground” such as in the sense I examined Chapter 2? The 
allusion is a strong one. Jacob Boehme’s Threefold Life of Man uses the image of burning 
fire to demonstrate the relationship between God and the human soul when in a state of 
interpenetration.  
Behold a bright flaming piece of iron, which of itself is dark and black, and the 
fire so penetrates and shines through the iron, that it gives light. Now, the iron 
does not cease to be; it is iron still: and the source [or property] of the fire retains 
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its own propriety: it does not take the iron into it, but it penetrates [and shines] 
through the iron; and it is iron then as well as before, free in itself: and so also is 
the source [or property] of the fire: in such a manner is the soul set in the Deity: 
the Deity penetrates through the soul, and dwells in the soul, yet the soul does not 
comprehend the Deity, but the Deity comprehends the soul, but does not alter it 
[from being a soul], but only gives it the divine source [or property] of the 
Majesty.353 
 
The fire of God illuminates the elemental aspect of the human being, comprehending 
while not being comprehended. As with much of Boehme’s writing, the speculative, 
alchemical underpinnings of the illustrations are not straightforwardly metaphorical, 
either. There is no easy distinction between its meaning and the objects used to reference 
it because the qualities used to describe events like creation are embodied in other objects 
that bear those same qualities: the bitter, the sour, or the salty, for instance.354 In that final 
case, the splitting of the atom does offer a hyperbolic instance of promethean hubris, but 
                                               
353 Boehme, Jacob. The Threefold Life of Man, eds. Eric Bowers and C.J Parker, trans. 
John Sparrow (Online Publisher: Kraus House, 2016), 6.88. 
354 There are a few candidates for such a “place” in The Crossing—Boyd’s lake of fire in 
which people burn, “These people were burnin. The lake was on fire and they was burnin 
up” (TC 35); a campfire described by the narration in terms of an iron forge,  
They camped that night in an old burn among the bones of trees and among the 
shapes of boulders that had broken open in the earthquake half a century before 
and slid down the mountain on the face of their cleavings and grinding stone on 
stone had struck the fire with which they'd burnt the woods alive (TC 188);  
and Billy’s campfire just before he meets the troop of gitanos,  
He camped on the plain and made a small fire that seethed in the wind like a 
forgefire and swallowed up his meager hoard of sticks and limbs. He watched it 
burn and watched it burn. The rags of flame that fled downcountry broke and 
vanished like a shout in the darkness (TC 371).  
Given the possible elemental shift referenced, the burning of heavy metals, may also 
foreshadow of Billy’s witness to an atomic test explosion that closes the novel.  
The fire in the bajada no more than a glow, hid in the ground like some secret 
glimpse of the earth's burning core broke through into the darkness. He seemed to 
himself a person with no prior life. As if he had died in some way years ago and 
was ever after some other being who had no history, who had no ponderable life 
to come (TC 382). 
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it leaves open the question of wolf and its grounds. Such grounds, as I have already 
argued in Chapter 2, suggest a link between the ontological ground of being to the infinite 
ground of its origin. Given the possible reference to Boehme at this point in The 
Crossing, a reference which itself refers to the divine light in the soul itself, it seems 
possible that that the wolf is itself such a place where the divine and natural – if not the 
divine and human—overlap. The narration of Billy’s perception of the wolf indicates in 
this direction: 
Her eyes burned out there like gatelamps to another world. A world burning on 
the shore of an unknowable void. A world construed out of blood and blood's 
alcahest and blood in its core and in its integument because it was that nothing 
save blood had power to resonate against that void which threatened hourly to 
devour it. (TC 73) 
 
Billy recognizes, somehow, that the living wolf is made of both blood (iron) and its 
negation (alkahest is the hypothetical universal solvent posited by Paracelsus).355 While 
not an exact match to Arnulfo’s “place,” it does suggest the possibility of a being utterly 
overcome by its contradiction. A scene in Child of God in which Ballard is taught to re-
forge a ruined steel axehead suggests a similar danger: “some people poke around at 
something else and leave the tool they’re heatin to perdition but the proper thing is to 
fetch her out the moment she turns the color of grace. Now we want a high red” (CG 72). 
Overheating the steel decarbonizes the alloy, leaving brilliant but ultimately brittle iron 
slag. Again, Arnulfo only gestures in such a direction and, as with many of Billy’s 
                                               
355 The alkahest was one fabled target of material revelation sought by alchemists 
throughout the seventeenth century. See Brian Vickers, “The ‘New Historiography’ and 
the Limits of Alchemy,” Annals of Science 65, no. 1 (January 2008): 127–56. 
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teachers, leaves it unexplained. Arnulfo is not being cagey. He does not appear to know 
more than he is able to say. 
 Such ignorant messengers are also a theme among the The Crossing’s sages. With 
the wolf captured, Billy dreams en route to Mexico that, 
a messenger had come in off the plains from the south with something writ upon a 
ledgerscrap but he could not read it. He looked at the messenger but that face was 
obscured in shadow and featureless and he knew that the messenger was 
messenger alone and could tell him nothing of the news he bore. (TC 82-3) 
 
Even in his subconscious, Billy cannot answer the question of why he is delivering the 
wolf back to Mexico, erasing the errand from most of his retellings. The refrain of the 
theme suggests that significance, if not a narrative meaning, is somehow present without 
being known or articulate. 
In the next extended dialogue, Billy does not argue directly with the sage, but 
listens to the story of an argument from one of the participants. On his first return journey 
from Mexico, Billy encounters a self-appointed custodian of church that has been ruined 
by an earthquake. The man, a former Mormon and former priest claims to have “[come] 
because of the devastation [….] seeking evidence for the hand of God in the world” (TC 
142), when Billy asks what kind of clue the man sought, he replies,   
I dont know. Something. Something unforeseen. Something out of place. 
Something untrue or out of round. A track in the dirt. A fallen bauble. Not some 
cause. I can tell you that. Not some cause. Causes only multiply themselves. They 
lead to chaos. What I wanted was to know his mind. I could not believe He would 
destroy his own church without reason. (TC 142) 
 
The method of parsing causes backward into their origin will not do, according to this 
teacher. As we have already discussed in Chapter 2, the origin, according to some like 
Boehme, must be a kind of chaos, or at least far too murky to provide intelligible 
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information that would count as knowledge. Wanting a reason, though, the custodian 
looks for indexes instead. Yet the category of sign he seeks is unlikely to produce 
evidence of purpose. There was no evidence of some corresponding sin to pair with the 
destruction, “something suitably unspeakable” that might have provoked divine action. 
Rather, what remained was, “Nothing. A doll. A dish. A bone” (TC 142). 
 The custodian then says that he came tracing the steps of another man, a story, 
that reforms his philosophical project from a quest for signs to a quest for meaning: 
“What was here to be found was not a thing. Things separate from their stories have no 
meaning. They are only shapes. Of a certain size and color. A certain weight. When their 
meaning has become lost to us they no longer have even a name” (TC 142). In other 
words, what differentiates things and gives them meaning is their value for human beings 
within shared social narrative.356 The custodian seeks an expanded narrative frame. The 
question is whether the fragmented signs of destruction can find a place in a story about 
God, which in turn could make sense of both the event and its author.  
The custodian tells of a man who survives both his parents (killed by American 
filibusters at Caborca), then survives his son who dies in the earthquake at Bavispe. He 
says that such a man feels elected by providence to live, yet bitterly. The unnamed man 
becomes a heretic, “in the darkened chancel within him had the ground also shifted, also 
cracked. There also was a ruin” (TC 147). Abandoning his wife, the man takes a pension-
bearing career has a “bearer of messages.” In what seems a reference to Billy’s dream, he 
                                               
356 See Robert Mugerauer, Responding to Loss: Heideggerian Reflections on Literature, 
Architecture, and Film (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), for an extended 
comparison on McCarthy and Heraclitus. 
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“carried a satchel of leather and canvas secured with a lock. He had no way to know what 
the messages said nor had he any curiosity concerning them” (TC 147). He sees the world 
as undifferentiated, indifferent, and forgetful. The custodian says that the pensioner did 
not cease to believe or “come to have some modern view of God,” but rather “came to 
believe terrible things about him” (TC 148). In his dreams the pensioner could see God,  
bent at his work [….] [s]eated in the light of his own presence. Weaving the 
world. In his hands it flowed out of nothing and in his hands it vanished into 
nothing once again. Endlessly. Endlessly. So. Here was a God to study. A God 
who seemed a slave to his own selfordinated duties. A God with a fathomless 
capacity to bend all to an inscrutable purpose. Not chaos itself lay outside of that 
matrix. And somewhere in that tapestry that was the world in its making and in its 
unmaking was a thread that was he and he woke weeping. (TC 149)357 
 
In this iteration of God, chaos and evil have a place in the plan and intention of the divine 
weaver. All is included in the warp and woof of reality, including the pensioner’s own 
suffering.  
Eventually the pensioner returns to Caborca and sleeps beneath the wrecked dome 
of La Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Caborca, which hung in the air, 
supported by nothing but its thin connection with the church’s ruined structure. There the 
pensioner rails against this weaver God, says the custodian,  
It seemed that what he wished, this man, was to strike some colindancia with his 
Maker. Assess boundaries and metes. See that lines were drawn and respected. 
                                               
357 The reference to the cosmic loom combined with the custodian’s cautious, “now we can 
speak of madness. Now it is safe to do so” (TC 154), is a clear reference to Pip in Moby 
Dick, who “saw God’s foot upon the treadle of the loom, and spoke it; and therefore his 
shipmates called him mad.” Pip’s vision comes from looking to long into the abyss. The 
notion that such a vision breaks reason for a higher sense has a more ironic tone in 
Melville’s version: “So man’s insanity is heaven’s sense; and wandering from all mortal 
reason, man comes at last to that celestial thought, which, to reason, is absurd and frantic; 
and weal or woe, feels then uncompromised, indifferent as his God” (Melville, Moby 
Dick, 322).  
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Who could think such a reckoning possible? The boundaries of the world are 
those of God's devising. With God there can be no reckoning. With what would 
one bargain? (TC 151) 
 
The pensioner’s heretical project is similar to the complaint of Job, but intensified by the 
recognition of both God’s assured injustice and inescapability.358  
When a liberal priest is summoned to mollify the pensioner, the two enter into a 
long debate. The priest points to the principles of grace observable in nature. Of the 
priest, the custodian says: “He carried within himself a great reverence for the world, this 
priest. He heard the voice of the Deity in the murmur of the wind in the trees” (TC 152). 
The pensioner listens but refuses the priest’s God. The custodian’s own critique of the 
priest is that he is not existentially serious.359  
He'd nothing at hazard. He stood on no such ground as the crazed old man. Under 
no such shadow. Rather he chose to stand outside the critical edifice of his own 
church and by this choice he sacrificed his words of their power to witness. The 
old man by whatever instinct stood on ground at once blessed and fraughtful. By 
his arrogance he had engaged the living thing. On that perilous ground he had 
made of himself the only witness there can ever be and if some saw in his eyes the 
rapture of madness what else would one look for in one who had enjoined the 
God of the universe on ground of that God's own choosing? For that is always the 
nature of such ground, perilous and transitory. And it is indeed so that you must 
make your case there or nowhere (TC 152). 
 
By taking a moral stand against God, the pensioner claims the right to determine limits—
“assess boundaries”—to God. In this, according to the custodian, the pensioner ventures 
into dangerous ground. By contrast, the priest, “believed in a boundless God without 
center or circumference. By this very formlessness he'd sought to make God manageable. 
                                               
358 The Book of Job is explicitly mentioned as a piece of great literature by the flailing 
professor, White, in The Sunset Limited (15). 
359 Later the custodian indicates that he is the story’s priest.  
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This was his colindancia,” and likewise, the limitlessness being its own articulation of the 
divine nature, it is also the priest’s heresy (TC 152-3). The priest’s vague God cannot be 
argued with because it is too defuse. It is the pensioner who realizes that, “what we seek 
is the worthy adversary” with which to argue and assess limits (TC 153). Such a point of 
friction is a necessary to reach the existentially perilous ground on which the pensioner 
stands. The custodian continues: 
For we strike out to fall flailing through demons of wire and crepe and we long 
for something of substance to oppose us. Something to contain us or to stay our 
hand. Otherwise there were no boundaries to our own being and we too must 
extend our claims until we lose all definition. Until we must be swallowed up at 
last by the very void to which we wished to stand opposed. (TC 153) 
 
The pensioner eventually concludes that God has elected him as a witness to God’s own 
existence, but that God “could create everything save that which would say him no” (TC 
154). This “terrible tragedy” in the center of the divine life is also what Boehme claims 
causes God to create in the first place. The internal bitterness of being unrelated to 
anything is what explodes in creative fire, producing the differentiations of trinity and, 
eventually, the world.360  
The significance of the custodian’s story-debate for my current argument is that it 
continues to intensify and eventually leads to the terminal edge or “void” specified above. 
The dialectical reasoning within the narrative eventually unsays most of what comes 
before, but the quality of the subsequent silence is different for having said something, 
                                               
360 See, for example, Jacob Boehme, The Three Principles of the Divine Essence, eds. Eric 
Bowers and C.J. Parker, Trans. John Sparrow (Online Publisher: Kraus House, 2016), 
1.3-7 (1-2). 
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even if that something is insufficient.361 The pensioner’s image of “God” becomes yet 
another rhetorical ratchet as the narrator raises the stakes of what is told about God, but 
allows the custodian to reach the opposite conclusion with the appropriated vocabulary: 
that “God need no witness.”  
The truth is rather that if there were no God then there could be no witness for 
there could be no identity to the world but only each man's opinion of it. The 
priest saw that there is no man who is elect because there is no man who is not. 
To God every man is a heretic. The heretic's first act is to name his brother. So 
that he may step free of him. Every word we speak is a vanity. Every breath taken 
that does not bless is an affront. (TC 158) 
 
The custodian/priest gains these fragmented insights only by validating the heresy of the 
pensioner but eventually unsaying it, too. In the context of the novel, the accuracy of his 
conclusions are not clear or especially coherent. That is, it is difficult to discern precisely 
how they follow from the story. Nevertheless, the specific conclusion appears less 
material than their effect on the listener. Billy, like the anonymous reader of the novel, 
exhibits no response, only absorbs the story and moves on.  
 Billy is more directly engaging in his later encounter with a blind man and his 
wife, in which they tell the story of the man’s blindness. Their story is also long, difficult, 
and winds toward a theme of illumination through sightlessness. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that the man’s narrative begins with horrific violence and pain—his eyes being 
sucked out by his captor, Wirtz, during the Mexican Revolution. Like the narrative 
voice’s present-tense shift in other texts, the man also suggests that the, ogre, “[e]ste 
chupador de ojos,” the sucker of eyes, still exists. “Él y otros como él. Ellos no han 
                                               
361 Crews also notes that McCarthy’s ’s religious questions do tend to arise dialectically 
(Crews, Books, 159).  
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desaparecido del mundo. Y nunca lo haran. [He and others like him. They have not 
disappeared from the world. And they never will]” (TC 290). The endemic nature of the 
eye-sucker, the evil that removes illusion is yet one more argument that may or may not 
be accurate: “Si el mundo es ilusión la pérdida del mundo es ilusión también. [if the 
world is an illusion, then the loss of the world is also an illusion]” (TC 283). The 
interpolated arguments in this counter likewise twist toward other conclusions, some of 
which are the type of enlightened darkness I have already discussed. The blind man says 
that, 
the light of the world was in men's eyes only for the world itself moved in eternal 
darkness and darkness was its true nature and true condition and that in this 
darkness it turned with perfect cohesion in all its parts but that there was naught 
there to see. He said that the world was sentient to its core and secret and black 
beyond men's imagining and that its nature did not reside in what could be seen or 
not seen. (TC 283) 
 
The rapid movements of de-anthropomorphizing (“in men’s eyes only”) and immediately 
and declaratively re-anthropomorphizing (“the world was sentient to its core”) the world 
correspond to the damage wrought on the body by unjust violence. Divested of sight, the 
blind man “suspect[s]” that the world itself is sensate (TC 284). The pain and damage 
inflicted by Wirtz remove metaphors enlightenment and illumination as rhetorical options 
for understanding while, at the same time, they expand the risk of pain, damage, and 
dissolution to the world itself. The culmination of violence, blindness, death, and 
dissolution he takes for a sign:  
Lo que debemos entender, said the blind man, es que ultimamente todo es polvo. 
Todo to que podemos tocar. Todo to que podemos ver. En esto tenemos la 
evidencia más profunda de la justicia, de la misericordia. En éste vemos la 
bendición mas grande de Dios. [What we must understand is that finally 
everything is dust. Everything we can touch. Everything we can see. In this we 
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have the deepest evidence of justice, of mercy. In this we see the greatest blessing 
of God.] (TC 293) 
 
Given the frequent conflation of the visible with the “articulate” in McCarthy, the blind 
man’s sightlessness is a form of visual silence. 362 The knowledge that silence produces is 
an elevated sense of the finitude overlooked by the conventionally “sighted.” The finitude 
of “articulate things,” dust with temporary discernable form, is itself a blessing in the 
pattern of the custodian’s claim that “every breath that does not bless is an affront” (TC 
158). Like that which “cannot be spoken but only praised,” the outer limits of what is 
sensible or said is not information but a sign that is also an action (APH 162).363  
Finally, The Crossing addresses problems of reference and the hazards of 
definition in Billy’s dialogue with the gitano. As Billy carries Boyd’s body from Mexico 
back to New Mexico, he engages in a final extended discussion with a gitano. The man, 
with companions dragging a tattered canvas biplane on the road, tells Billy the airplane 
has three histories. Billy asks to hear the true story, of which “[c]ertain facts were 
known.”(TC 404)  He adds that one could begin at the “common ground” of those stories: 
that it was one of two planes that had wrecked in the mountains of Sonora (TC 404). 
“[T]hus far all was a single history,” he says, “Whether there be two planes or one. 
Whichever plane was spoken of it was the same” (TC 404). The problem of reference 
                                               
362 This conflation occurs as a synonym for appearance at least four times in The Crossing. 
In Blood Meridian, a good example of its use as a visible bare-minimum is: “kid looked 
at him and he looked at the faint and formless articulation along the horizon to the 
south” (BM 218). 
363 This is consonant with what Matthew Potts has argued this in terms of Augustinian 
sacraments, which are visible words that “do what they say” (Potts, Signs of Sacrament, 
11).   
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without difference is immediately raised. “Billy asked him whether it made any 
difference which plane it was since there was no difference to be spoken of” (TC 404). 
Like the custodian, he claims that the meaning of objects have evidentiary value only in 
their narrative significance: “[h]e spoke of the identity of the little canvas biplane as 
having no meaning except in its history […],” that is, a meaningful context in which to 
differentiate it from its identical “sister” plane (TC 405). Put differently: Things need to 
be assigned histories in order to bear significance. But how is this assignment made?  
The assignment of histories to objects is superstitious for the gitano. He says that 
“[t]he reverence attached to the artifacts of history is a thing men feel. One could even 
say that what endows any thing with significance is solely the history in which it has 
participated. Yet wherein does that history lie?” While in the mountains, he says, the 
question of identity was irrelevant. Only when the two airplanes are brought down from 
the natural to the domestic realm of meaning—one down the river, the other to the road—
would be “forcing a decision” (TC 406). But to force the decision—to differentiate 
between the two identical planes—is dangerous. The river bearing the second plane down 
from the mountains floods and carries it away from the party who attempt to retrieve it. 
The following day, after the plane is lost, the survivors see a drowned man in the river. 
The gitano describes him in great detail. This man 
shot out of the cataract upriver like a pale enormous fish and circled once 
facedown in the froth of the eddywater beneath them as if he were looking for 
something on the river's floor and then he was sucked away downriver to continue 
his journey. He'd come already a long way in his travels by the look of him for his 
clothes were gone and much of his skin and all but the faintest nap of hair upon 
his skull all scrubbed away by his passage over the river rocks. In his circling in 
the froth he moved all loosely and disjointed as if there were no bones to him. 
Some incubus or mannequin. But when he passed beneath them they could see 
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revealed in him that of which men were made that had better been kept from 
them. They could see bones and ligaments and they could see the tables of his 
smallribs and through the leached and abraded skin the darker shapes of organs 
within. He circled and gathered speed and then exited in the roaring flume as if he 
had pressing work downriver. (TC 408-9) 
 
The body, like the plane, is anonymous, its containing flesh flayed and its secrets 
distorted and exposed to public viewing. The gitano does not specify who the drowned 
man is, only places him in the middle of the narrative and in great detail without 
explanation. He is not one of the party, only a broken, undifferentiated and grotesque 
body exposed to the hostile and wild landscape. This landscape, which refuses the 
differentiation between the two airplanes, exacts a cost for entrance and exit. The entire 
project risks discovering things one does not wish to know about the origins and potential 
dissolution of a finite body in such an environment.  
Again, the gitano stresses how little information can actually be gleaned from the 
signs available and misleading evidence might actually be: 
From a certain perspective one might even hazard to say that the great trouble 
with the world was that that which survived was held in hard evidence as to past 
events. A false authority clung to what persisted, as if those artifacts of the past 
which had endured had done so by some act of their own will. Yet the witness 
could not survive the witnessing. In the world that came to be that which 
prevailed could never speak for that which perished but could only parade its own 
arrogance. It pretended symbol and summation of the vanished world but was 
neither. He said that in any case the past was little more than a dream and its force 
in the world greatly exaggerated. For the world was made new each day and it 
was only men's clinging to its vanished husks that could make of that world one 
husk more. (TC 411) 
 
The gitano evacuates the imagined potential of evidence to provide much useful 
information: wreckage has no will behind it to provide it with a narrative meaning. Like 
the evidence the custodian sought—“A doll. A dish. A bone,” the plane is only “[b]its of 
   
 
249 
wreckage. Some bones. The words of the dead. How make a world of this? How live in 
that world once made?” (TC 142, 411). The artifacts of the past, evidence of what has 
come before is not itself a narrative, but only bones upon which we hang new 
constructions and project meaning. Translated into the vocabulary of signs, the gitano 
suspects that the potential of indexes to produce narrative meaning is what is 
embellished. However, his story is also embellished. We learn that story of the plane can 
only be a parable, for, as an anonymous Texan who claims to own the plane tells Billy, 
“[t]hat airplane came out of a barn on the Taliafero Ranch out of Flores Magón. It 
couldn’t even fly where your talkin about. The ceiling on that plane aint but six thousand 
feet” (TC 418). The force of the actual past on the relevance of the story is minimal 
unless, as the gitano suggests, we “cling” to it as a representation of history. The story is 
an ironic indicator of the futility of stories when those stories are projected onto the 
world. 
If the force of the past itself is greatly exaggerated, as the gitano claims, it is 
McCarthy’s other teachers who exaggerate it. The ranch manager, Quijada, does so only 
a few pages prior to the above discussion. “People speak about what is in store. But there 
is nothing in store. The day is made of what has come before. The world itself must be 
surprised at the shape of that which appears.” The hyperbole appears when he adds, 
“[p]erhaps even God” (TC 287). The blind man, in consonance with the gitano, and by 
contrast to Quijada, claims that, “for the world to survive it must be replenished daily” 
(TC 293). While more cautiously, the custodian’s claim is that 
everything is necessary. Every least thing. This is the hard lesson. Nothing can be 
dispensed with. Nothing despised. Because the seams are hid from us, you see. 
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The joinery. The way in which the world is made. We have no way to know what 
could be taken away. What omitted. (TC 143) 
 
But finally, he says, “nothing is real save his grace” (TC 158). Each of the teachers have 
an implicit cosmology of the relationship of the present to the past or, as they say, the 
way the world is made. They propose images of what they take the world to be when 
adjusted for human biases like the appeal to future metaphors (what is in “store”) or to 
primary sense experience of sight and light. Yet even though they attempt to account for 
biases, all of The Crossing’s sages suggest that parochial images are, in part, all that we 
have: “ultimately the truth cannot be anywhere but in speech,” says the gitano (TC 411). 
Similarly, an indigenous elder Billy meets tells him “that the world could only be known 
as it existed in men's hearts” (TC 134). Even Quijada says that the corrido (folk song) 
tells something so universal that it contains reference to any specific instance (TC 386). 
Finally, the custodian agrees, declaring that “all is telling” (TC 143, 155).364 
 The conviction that meaning and knowledge are solely linguistic may be another 
piece of evidence that McCarthy does consider us trapped in language, as discussed in 
this dissertation’s Introduction. However, if, as Pseudo-Dionysius says, truth is the truth 
about things, then perhaps all really is telling, if by “all” we mean only things. All is 
telling that can be told, that is. The world of named and narratively derived distinctions is 
the extent to which meaning is possible.365 If the projection of human meaning onto the 
                                               
364 As Jean-Michel Verdun’s translation has it elegantly, “only in speech does the truth 
reside.” See Verdun, Jean-Michel, “Hybridization in Cormac McCarthy’s The Crossing” 
in in Cormac McCarthy: Uncharted Territories/Territoires Inconnus, edited by Christine 
Chollier (Reims: Presses universitaires de Reims, 2003), 411. 
365 This is a popular position. Wittgenstein’s “the limits of my language is the limit of my 
world” is derived from different premises, but is not altogether different from Foucault’s 
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world constitutes social and existential relevance, the question remains whether anything 
or no-thing transcends it. For Dionysius and other religious users of apophasis, the 
answer is already revealed—by Scripture or by gnosis, for example—and the organized 
failure of reference is but a tribute to the transcendence that cannot be known but only 
shown or intuited.366  
 Without externally sourced revelation or a claim to special knowledge of the 
transcendent, McCarthy attempts to linguistically imagine the world without language, 
just as the blind man offers Billy an image of the world without light or sight. To this 
end, Quijada, in yet another discourse on maps, directs Billy’s attention away from 
narratives and names toward an image of the world as it might be without them: 
The world has no name, he said. The names of the cerros and the Sierras and the 
deserts exist only on maps. We name them that we do not lose our way. Yet it was 
because the way was lost to us already that we have made those names. The world 
cannot be lost. We are the ones. And it is because these names and these 
coordinates are our own naming that they cannot save us. That they cannot find 
for us the way again. (TC 387) 
 
                                               
reduction of truth to discourse. A version of this position is discernable in Dewey for 
whom knowledge itself is inseparable from its function for solving problems (See 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, Chapter 1). Knowledge of a thing, its what-ness is 
subordinate and perhaps even identical to what it is for. If Kant’s argument for the limits 
of reason are taken as valid and sound, then the thinkable and the sayable have fairly firm 
limits. This would be, I think, a fairly mundane point to the mystics we have engaged, 
however, who benefit from the contemplative fruits of revelation that are not derived 
from nature or experience, but given.  
366 I add this term because the Neoplatonists should be included in this category, even if 
the conditions of special knowledge are quite different from those of their Christian 
adaptors. After Kant, “intuition,” like “reason,” is probably too laden of a term to do 
much justice to the logos of the soul in Plotinus. See, for example, Enneads, 1.1.13. 
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Quijada does not say what will save us, if anything can.367 It is his argument against 
Billy’s final quest to carry Boyd’s corpse across a border on a map. The border, which he 
has crossed again, has only artificial significance. Even so, the artifice determines much, 
the jurisdiction of law, life, and death for the wolf, as Billy tries to explain before the 
wolf is made to fight dogs for sport: 
[Billy] said the wolf knew nothing of boundaries. The young don nodded as if in 
agreement but what he said was that whatever the wolf knew or did not know was 
irrelevant and that if the wolf had crossed that boundary it was perhaps so much 
the worse for the wolf but the boundary stood without regard. (TC 119) 
 
The ambivalence of conventional borders is a consistent source of tension throughout The 
Crossing, in both in the rhetoric of the dialogue and in plotted action of the book. The 
artificial boundary’s significance is always in flux, always permeable but not without 
consequence and force. The conventional border is clearly transcended by nature, even 
while hostile deadly to it. All of the characters struggle with both the limitation and harsh 
reality of all types of signs: conventional names, representations, and indexes. The 
arbitrary names and borders to which they apply are nevertheless policed. Historical 
indexes, too, are too vague and indeterminate to build inhabitable meanings—they 
remain ruins that only the few anchorites like the custodian or the pensioner can occupy 
for very long. If one follows this line of reasoning when interpreting The Crossing’s 
parables, the via negativa is dangerous and blinding. It flays the figurative bodies of those 
who attempt or are forced into it just as it sometimes impinges on the safe, domestic 
                                               
367 Quijada’s dialogue aligns closely with Alfonsa’s in All the Pretty Horses: “There is no 
one to tell us what might have been. We weep over the might have been, but there is no 
might have been. There never was. It is supposed to be true that those who do not know 
history are condemned to repeat it. I dont believe knowing can save us” (APH 239) 
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spaces in which we live. As the custodian says of the “terremoto”: “Even today you can 
see the great crack in the mountain wall across the river like an enormous laugh” (TC 
145). The dialectic tension of signs in which the aesthetically intense forms of apophatic 
rhetoric trade are increasingly costly because the negation involves the loss of something 
real, however imaginary or constructed. 
 The recording of negation in the novel form is as much of a performance as its use 
in the liturgical prayers of Dionysius. Loosely conceived, a type performance occurs in 
any mutual participation of the text and the reader. In the novel, both the posited and the 
negated occur imaginatively and, due to McCarthy’s genre-crossing, logically as well.  
Yet in The Crossing, McCarthy also seems aware of a more strict, Austinian sense of 
performance as a type of utterance that includes within itself a type of illocutionary 
action. To this end, the novel’s narrator briefly describes an encounter between Billy and 
the wolf after she is captured,  
He made her promises that he swore to keep in the making. That he would take 
her to the mountains where she would find others of her kind. She watched him 
with her yellow eyes and in them was no despair but only that same reckonless 
deep of loneliness that cored the world to its heart. 
 
The narrator withholds the quoted content of the promises which are, by the definition of 
a promise, sworn in their making.368 The wolf responds only by being a wolf, interpreted 
by Billy with a clumsy and indirect attempt to cross impassable and “reckonless deep” 
between he and the wolf. The indirectness of the performed promise, like that of the 
fictional negation I have discussed, is a necessarily failed attempt to cross that border 
                                               
368 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 5, 9.  
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with language. In the act, however, the transcendent conditions of the impossible crossing 
is reimagined and, paradoxically, reengaged.  
The argument of this chapter is to demonstrate the means by which the 
interpretive categories developed in this dissertation aid the exegesis of the complex 
interpolated stories in McCarthy’s novels. This is necessarily indicative rather than 
summative because the actual performance of the negation, double-negation, and 
reformation is in the thing itself, performed in the fullness of the texts. My argument here 
has consisted of a demonstration of how the texts, by way of the themes developed in the 
previous chapters, teaches readers the vocabulary needed to understand the parables and 
arguments embedded in the novels, which themselves negate each other and escalate their 
own negative intensity.  
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Chapter 6: A Balance Sheet 
   
Acts of negation are costly by definition. McCarthy, whose recent non-fiction 
writing on ancient cave paintings corresponds with the frequency of petroglyphs in the 
novels, is likely also aware that some of the earliest forms of writing were developed to 
keep accounts.369 Of the fictional writing represented in McCarthy’s novels, a repeated 
type is the figure of the ledger.370 After demonstrating the exacting cognitive, emotional, 
and even  physical costs of apophatic rhetoric, it is fitting, then, that the concluding 
payoff to this project should be reflected on a balance sheet. 
A clear feature of apophatic traditions like the via negativa or the docta 
ignorantia is that they are, by design, not epistemologically lucrative. It does not provide 
specific information about its object, it offers no obvious plan for action, and may 
produce more confusion than it clears. When nested within broader religious traditions, 
apophatic rhetoric often supplements other positive teachings that stabilize ethics and 
determinate doctrines that sustain meaning. By contrast, McCarthy’s narrative apophasis 
contains very little counterweight to its negative mode. Such an aggressive form of 
                                               
369 McCarthy even has a short allusion to the ironies of writing along the lines of Plato’s 
Phaedrus during Cities of the Plain‘s horse-buying scene in which Mac and Oren mock 
each other about forgetting to write things down but also writing them down because they 
kept forgetting them in the first place (CP 112).  
370 This is true of the judge’s ledger. In The Crossing, Billy receives a lecture on one’s 
word over his family’s “worn blue ledger book in which they kept accounts” (TC 51). 
Billy’s dream messenger delivers their message “on a ledgerscrap” (TC 82), and in the 
first pages of the novel, the narration explicitly compares both book and world to a 
useless book-keeping: “A cold wind had come down from the north with the earth 
running under bare poles toward a reckoning whose ledgers would be drawn up and dated 
only long after all due claims had passed, such is this history” (TC 5).  
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apophasis might well obstruct the kind of meaning-making activity that soothes the 
cognitive and emotional pain produced by a world of ambiguity, injustice, and brute 
power that the novels tend to depict. Without in-built restraints, apophasis can as easily 
injure trust in benign signs as it can dispel overwrought or malignant ones. Thus, the 
practice of apophasis as a literary-semiotic solvent may commit one to a somewhat 
ascetic form of imaginative spirituality. For artists like McCarthy, who purposefully 
engage the boundaries of what is ostensibly ineffable, the enterprise may be worth the 
existential risks. For others, the expenditure may outweigh its sparse remuneration. 
Helpfully, though, McCarthy raises the spiritual and moral actuarial theme to engage this 
very dilemma.  
McCarthy provides us two figures with which to evaluate costs: the settling of 
accounts in ledgers and that of a minter and coin. Both litter the books as props. But they 
take on further significance when, for example, Lester Ballard attempts to muster a little 
credit for a basic grocery bill (COG 125-7). His failure to secure credit, at least in part, 
sets in motion his amputation from society. Other books tie the ledger more directly to 
existential debts, as when The Crossing’s primadonna tells Billy and Boyd, “you will see 
in your own life what is the cost of things” (TC 230). Such transactions surface more 
ironically, too, as when Suttree’s (sometimes titular) narrator swears of the sinners of 
McAnally Flats: “I’ll bewray the tribe of them to the high almighty God who ledgers up 
our deeds in a leather daybook. With marbled endpapers, I’m told” (S 457). The Sunset 
Limited also conjures an image of a moral imbalance that is a kind of account: “the 
dialectic of the homely presupposes a ground of evil,” says White, “how many wrong 
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paths are there? Their number is legion. How many right paths? Only one. Hence the 
imbalance [….]” (SL 69-70). In The Road, it is either the novel’s narration or the man 
himself who mocks the man’s vestige of such post-mortem accounts: “Do you think that 
your fathers are watching? That they weigh you in their ledgerbook? Against what? 
There is no book and your fathers are dead in the ground” (TR 196). The context of both 
figures tend to be cosmic, ethical, or both. Every decision, every action exacts a cost that 
may be traced back to responsible agent who owns the debt.  
The rhetoric of ledgers and coins align closely when the motif of blood-debt 
and the embellishment of those debts to account for events in the world. An example of 
this is the Rinthy Holme’s encounter with Outer Dark’s tinker, who claims of his 
manifold humiliations, “[t]hem accounts is in blood and they ain’t nothin in this world to 
pay em out with” (OD 193). By contrast, blood actually can settle accounts according to 
Anton Chigurh, who sees himself as the agent of the settling. Chigurh melds the figure of 
the ledger with the recurring image of the flipped coin. 
They pass from hand to hand. People dont pay attention. And then one day there's 
an accounting. And after that nothing is the same. Well, you say. It's just a coin. 
For instance. Nothing special there. What could that be an instrument of? You see 
the problem. To separate the act from the thing. As if the parts of some moment in 
history might be interchangeable with the parts of some other moment. How 
could that be? Well, it's just a coin. Yes. That's true. Is it? (NC 57) 
 
A similar model of fate is rejected by Alfonsa in All the Pretty Horses: 
The example [my father] gave was of a tossed coin that was at one time a slug in a 
mint and of the coiner who took that slug from the tray and placed it in the die in 
one of two ways and from whose act all else followed, cara y cruz. No matter 
through whatever turnings nor how many of them. Till our turn comes at last and 
our turn passes (APH 231).  
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Alfonsa rejects the numismatic decision, finding the world more like the receding puppet 
show discussed in the first chapter of this project: “My father must have seen in this 
parable the accessibility of the origins of things, but I see nothing of the kind” (APH 
231). Another version of the coin minter occupies Blood Meridian’s kid’s dreams, as 
discussed in the second chapter of this project. Here, as the narrator makes claims for the 
judge’s inscrutability, the kid dreams of a cold forger minting coins to please the judge:371 
who worked with hammer and die, perhaps under some indictment and an exile 
from men's fires, hammering out like his own conjectural destiny all through 
the night of his becoming some coinage for a dawn that would not be. It is this 
false moneyer with his gravers and burins who seeks favor with the judge and 
he is at contriving from cold slag brute in the crucible a face that will pass, an 
image that will render this residual specie current in the markets where men 
barter. Of this is the judge judge and the night does not end. (BM 322) 
 
In the dream, “the night does not end,” and the minting and presumably the random 
flipping goes on in the dark forever.  If the coinage stands for decision and action, the 
judge’s roll as cosmic arbiter of authentic action is a horrifying image worth some moral 
consideration. What exactly would “pass” and what is fraud? The dream is not an 
                                               
371 The images seem to have been presaged in the kid’s imagination in his encounter with 
the judge in the jail:  
Whoever would seek out his history through what unraveling of loins and 
ledgerbooks must stand at last darkened and dumb at the shore of a void without 
terminus or origin and whatever science he might bring to bear upon the dusty 
primal matter blowing down out of the millennia will discover no trace of any 
ultimate atavistic egg by which to reckon his commencing. In the white and 
empty room he stood in his bespoken suit with his hat in his hand and he peered 
down with his small and lashless pig's eyes wherein this child just six-teen 
years on earth could read whole bodies of decisions not accountable to the 
courts of men and he saw his own name which nowhere else could he have 
ciphered out at all logged into the records as a thing already accomplished, a 
traveler known in jurisdictions existing only in the claims of certain pensioners 
or on old dated maps. (BM 321) 
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argument, but a terrible possibility. Chigurh, on the other hand, interprets the turnings of 
the coin as an arbitrator of an account opened by a single decision. It can be settled, 
though, with a circumscribed, fated second decision of “calling it.” But exercise itself is 
arbitrary and is a deferral of the very responsibility he claims to enforce.372 The coin’s 
turnings reduce the complexity of the world to a binary decision, heads or tails, but that 
decision of course has no bearing on the turning of the coin itself. 
When the image of the coin finally appears in The Road its significance has 
evaporated completely:  
Then he found a coin. Or a button. Deep crust of verdigris. He chipped at it with 
the nail of his thumb. It was a coin. He took out his knife and chiseled at it with 
care. The lettering was in Spanish. He started to call to the boy where he trudged 
ahead and then he looked about at the gray country and the gray sky and he 
dropped the coin and hurried on to catch up. (TR 204) 
 
If coins are tokens of the ambient feeling throughout McCarthy’s texts of an impending 
reckoning, in The Road, accounts have been settled in the red. The actuarial score-
keeping of action has, as Suttree’s snide comment about God’s “daybook,” a religious 
function. The world’s complicated web of causes are difficult to trace, “they lead to 
chaos,” as the custodian puts it. Nevertheless, in the background of action is the balance 
sheet of the world itself. Someone is always paying even if no one is keeping track. By 
                                               
372 Chigurh is a sort of perverse interpretation of Alfonsa’s father’s idea, yielding mind to a 
chain of causes leading backward to an arbitrary act of will for which he takes no 
responsibility: 
 I had no say in the matter. Every moment in your life is a turning and every one a 
choosing. Somewhere you made a choice. All followed to this. The accounting is 
scrupulous. The shape is drawn. No line can be erased. I had no belief in your 
ability to move a coin to your bidding. How could you? A person's path through 
the world seldom changes and even more seldom will it change abruptly. And the 
shape of your path was visible from the beginning (NC 259).  
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the time the world dissolves back into its origins in The Road, coins are of no use. All 
accounts are settled. The cost of being is, of course, eventually not being. But The Road 
raises a question: what value is added by having been at all?  
 This final question is a central struggle in McCarthy’s books, figured in monetary 
terms, but ultimately couched in terms of nature and blood-sacrifice. In his 1992 
interview with Richard Woodward, McCarthy famously says that, "[t]here's no such thing 
as life without bloodshed."373 Whatever philosophical commitments produce such a 
statement, McCarthy’s fictional prose tends to represent the cost of life in terms of that 
somatic currency more than it does in coinage. Indeed, the cost of decision and action in 
stories like The Counselor and No Country for Old Men retain this sense of exchange. 
But in other instances, like that of the Tinker in Outer Dark, it seems that some 
exchanges are not transitive. They are made of blood, but blood cannot set them right 
again. McCarthy expands the reach of the accounts to include ontological costs, of 
existence itself, which do not balance with mere negation.  
 The cost of existence as such is especially visible in its visitation on animal life. 
Human actors recklessly abuse animals throughout McCarthy’s books. Yet other 
characters also attribute an inarticulate knowledge to natural life, especially to wolves 
and horses.374 As the Brujo tells Billy “no man knew what the wolf knew” (TC 45). 
                                               
373 Woodward, “Venomous Fiction,” 1992.  
374 Blood Meridian is certainly the most violent toward animals, but even Suttree himself 
seems needlessly cruel by peeing on a lizard for the fun of it. The plight of dogs, 
especially as weaker iterations of wolves, is also grim in the Border books. In The 
Crossing, Billy, in the fading light of what seems to be one of the New Mexico nuclear 
experiments, laments his feral aggression toward a grotesquely deformed stray dog by 
calling after it without answer. He and John Grady later violently rope and kill wild dogs 
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Likewise, both Boyd and John Grady hold similar opinions about what horses “know.” 375 
But the ontological exchange is made explicit in a scene in which John Grady, holding 
                                               
on near Mac’s ranch, even while going through great pains to rescue wild pups left 
behind in the rocks.  
375 John Grady’s dreams of horses tend to project a similar sense of natural knowledge: 
 In his sleep he could hear the horses stepping among the rocks and he could hear 
them drink from the shallow pools in the dark where the rocks lay smooth and 
rectilinear as the stones of ancient ruins and the water from their muzzles dripped 
and rang like water dripping in a well and in his sleep he dreamt of horses and the 
horses in his dream moved gravely among the tilted stones like horses come upon 
an antique site where some ordering of the world had failed and if anything had 
been written on the stones the weathers had taken it away again and the horses 
were wary and moved with great circumspection carrying in their blood as they 
did the recollection of this and other places where horses once had been and 
would be again. Finally what he saw in his dream was that the order in the horse's 
heart was more durable for it was written in a place where no rain could erase it 
(APH 280).  
All the Pretty Horses’ mozo expresses similar speculation, 
 He spoke of his campaigns in the deserts of Mexico and he told them of horses 
killed under him and he said that the souls of horses mirror the souls of men more 
closely than men suppose and that horses also love war. Men say they only learn 
this but he said that no creature can learn that which his heart has no shape to 
hold. His own father said that no man who has not gone to war horseback can 
ever truly understand the horse and he said that he supposed he wished that this 
were not so but that it was so. Lastly he said that he had seen the souls of horses 
and that it was a terrible thing to see. He said that it could be seen under certain 
circumstances attending the death of a horse because the horse shares a common 
soul and its separate life only forms it out of all horses and makes it mortal. He 
said that if a person understood the soul of the horse then he would understand all 
horses that ever were (APH 111). 
In The Crossing, Boyd is preoccupied with the question of what and how horses know, “I 
think they just know where things are” (TC 189). Mr. Johnson and John Grady have a 
similar exchange in Cities of the Plain: 
You'll see things on the desert at night that you cant understand. Your horse will 
see 
things. He'll see things that will spook him of course but then he'll see things that 
dont 
spook him but still you know he seen somethin. 
What sort of things? 
I dont know. 
You mean like ghosts or somethin? 
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the body of a deer he has just shot, suspects that “the world’s heart must beat at some 
cost” (APH 282).376 The suspicion recurs in The Crossing by Billy’s narrated reflection on 
his wolf’s corpse. The text contains allusions to nearly every category of apophatic 
elevation examined in this dissertation and is marked by the polysyndetons that generate 
a high register of immediacy and emotion: 
He touched the cold and perfect teeth. The eye turned to the fire gave back no 
light and he closed it with his thumb and sat by her and put his hand upon her 
bloodied forehead and closed his own eyes that he could see her running in the 
mountains, running in the starlight where the grass was wet and the sun's coming 
as yet had not undone the rich matrix of creatures passed in the night before her. 
Deer and bare and dove and groundvole all richly empaneled on the air for her 
delight, all nations of the possible world ordained by God of which she was one 
among and not separate from. Where she ran the cries of the coyotes clapped shut 
as if a door had closed upon them and all was fear and marvel. He took up her 
stiff head out of the leaves and held it or he reached to hold what cannot be held, 
what already ran among the mountains at once terrible and of a great beauty, like 
flowers that feed on flesh. What blood and bone are made of but can themselves 
not make on any altar nor by any wound of war. What we may well believe has 
power to cut and shape and hollow out the dark form of the world surely if wind 
can, if rain can. But which cannot be held never be held and is no flower but is 
swift and a huntress and the wind itself is in terror of it and the world cannot lose 
it. (TC 127) 
  
                                               
No. I dont know what. You just knows he sees em. They're out there. 
Not just some class of varmint? 
No. 
Not somethin that will booger him? 
No. It's more like somethin he knows about. 
But you dont. 
But you dont. Yes. 
The old man smoked. He watched the moon. No further birds flew. After a while 
he said: 
I aint talkin about spooks. It's more like just the way things are. If you only knew 
it. 
Yessir. (COP 124) 
376 John Grady seems to so internalize this that even the living act of rolling bull looks 
“like an animal in sacrificial torment” (APH 302). 
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Billy’s live wolf can be imagined but not held. It vanishes in his possession as prophesied 
by Arnulfo. Here, the narrator absorbs for the wolf’s analogy John Grady’s vision of a 
single flower—a flower that feeds on flesh—and integrates it into a cycle of life and its 
negation in death. As the pensioner realizes in the custodian’s tale, “the very ground 
under his feet is composted with the blood of ancients” (TC 148). Jay Ellis also points to 
two categories of negative attention present in the passage: both the unstable status of 
grounds and the double negation of life by death and death by life as human viscera again 
turns to fertilizer.377 In these passages death and predation are negations of a type, but they 
are not final. Their significance as a species carries on even though the specific signs 
negated (the living things themselves) are obviously indifferent to what feeds on their 
deaths.  
 The vision of predation and death as an engine is familiar to Darwinian evolution 
and could be abstracted as a kind of naturalization of Hegel—taking up in negating but 
not (entirely) losing the negated. Yet such dialectical preservation is not without loss, as  
Billy perceives in wolf’s eyes earlier in the novel: 
A world burning on the shore of an unknowable void. A world construed out of 
blood and blood's alcahest and blood in its core and in its integument because it 
was that nothing save blood had power to resonate against that void which 
threatened hourly to devour it. [….] When those eyes and the nation to which they 
stood witness were gone at last with their dignity back into their origins there 
would perhaps be other fires and other witnesses and other worlds otherwise 
beheld. But they would not be this one. (TC 73-4) 
 
                                               
377 In this type of cycle Mundik seems to find the suggestion of the anti-cosmic in Blood 
Meridian. Yet it is part of a larger order not completely internalized by gnostic thought. 
The world is full of suffering, to be sure, but the feeling of its malevolence is an 
anthropomorphic bias. See Mundik, Bloody and Barbarous God, 8.    
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Billy grasps that, despite the continuity of “wolf” as species, the instance can indeed be 
lost. Notwithstanding the gitano’s subsequent reassurance that even the dead are not lost 
because “world cannot be quit for it is eternal in whatever form as are all things within 
it,” the prevailing intuition of The Crossing is that the instance both costs and is 
irreducible to its membership in its kind: “But they would not be this one” (TC 413, 74). 
There is a tension, if not a contradiction, between the costly death of the instance and a 
wide view of time in which all accounts are settled since nothing was ever gained or lost 
but eternally whole. Resolutions are glimpsed and felt throughout the texts but are often 
rejected or at least undermined elsewhere. Like the actual instance of the wolf or 
Alfonsa’s claim that the desire for courage is courage itself, the enactment of the self-
destructive prose is itself a sign of what it fails to finally sum.  
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Conclusions 
 The argument of this project is that specific themes in McCarthy’s prose follow a 
pattern of performative negation. The texts enact indexical signs of transcendence by 
failing in the referential “direction” of an object that is beyond their capacity to reference. 
The texts’ preoccupations with limit discourses like will, fate, justice, and God, indicate 
toward those boundary concepts and images, but ultimately fail to articulate them. I have 
argued that the means by which McCarthy’s texts self-undermine is manifest in several 
themes and figures examined in each chapter of this project: names that fail to reference 
their objects; grounds of knowledge and being collapse into abysses and voids; space and 
landscape overwhelm and are overcome; the coherence of bodies destroy, are destroyed, 
or are left in a state of unspeakable pain. Finally, I have argued that these themes seep 
into the explicit arguments in McCarthy’s texts, exemplified by the dialogues in The 
Crossing, where names, grounds, space, and violence comprise the central vocabulary in 
debates about justice, God, and fate. I have suggested that these themes overlap with 
traditions of mystical rhetoric found in ancient, medieval, and early-modern Christianity 
and Judaism, especially those that are influenced by Greek and Hellenistic forms of 
Platonism. I have also suggested that while religious rhetorical traditions are present in 
McCarthy, as many McCarthy interpreters point out, they do not amount to a set of 
univocal metaphysical assertions. They are instruments, not doctrines. The unresolved 
termination of metaphysical speculation is itself a properly apophatic conclusion to such 
mystical language. Indexical signs are a more viable interpretive product of McCarthy’s 
prose than signs that directly represent or construct metaphysical, religious, or moral 
   
 
266 
conclusions. Likewise, unlike the apophatic mystics and theologians influenced by 
Neoplatonism, for whom the revelation of scripture or special knowledge served as a 
robust hint of the shape the transcendent, McCarthy has no inbuilt means of knowing 
what lies beyond what is written in the book. McCarthy’s language, in its many failed 
stories and arguments, attempts to stretch itself a little further. These texts attempt to 
reference the transcendent by means of the linguistic and imaginative side of the 
transcendent-immanent divide. That such theological-literary “boot-strapping” fails is the 
point of the artifice.  
 One reason this rhetorical pattern in literary fiction warrants a cross-disciplinary 
examination is precisely its messy fit in either literary or theological genres. Given the 
disciplinary division of epistemological labors, the constraints are understandable. But 
when a set of imaginative texts contain stories, lyrical narration, historical figures, 
theological theories about the nature of the world and God, it is not clear which discipline 
or subject is responsible to understand them. These texts require interdisciplinary 
engagement because of their broad scope.  
The scope is, as McCarthy admits is his ambition, coextensive with the reader’s 
existential condition.378 McCarthy’s apophasis, I suggest, clears epistemological space for 
the moral and spiritual decisions that are forced upon our lives. One reason Sells’ 
analysis of apophatic texts is an effective tool in this case is its cross-disciplinary 
emphasis on how texts are designed to produce effects or “meaning events” in the 
                                               
378 Literature for McCarthy, as the Woodward interview also draws out, is “deals with life 
and death. See Woodward, “Venomous Fiction,” 1992. 
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reader.379 The aesthetics of performed linguistic failure might do something to us. Thus, 
rather than proscribing sets of actions based on the many arguments examined in this 
dissertation, McCarthy’s techniques of apophasis expose the existential stakes involved 
in living while clearing away some of the semiotic distraction that clutters our decisions 
and loyalties. In its early movements, McCarthy’s apophatic narrative exposes the 
condition of being a limited creature with limited language who must face up to a world 
with rich, violent, but also ostensibly unlimited values. Put bluntly, one has to decide how 
to interpret and engage the Lester Ballards, the Judge Holdens, the eye-suckers, and 
again, one might even have to decide how to interpret the loss of the world itself.   
The end result of apophasis is a species of aesthetic argument designed to clear 
space for decisions we might rather avoid. Charles Peirce, to whom I owe the semiotic 
theory of this project, makes a helpful distinction between organized argumentation and 
the argument of feeling. The feeling produced by certain interpretations, elected by 
certain signs, can shift mental states and habits even more subtly than logical 
argumentation, which proceeds on more definite premises and conceptual 
organizations—by syllogism, for example.380 In the case of McCarthy, the apophatic mode 
attempts to displace such definite premises with others. Specifically, the ruins of those 
very arguments within McCarthy’s novels. Apophatic arguments may contradict and one 
may even cancel out another, yet the cancelation will leave something behind, even if that 
something is an experience of the canceling itself rather than an organized conclusion. 
                                               
379 Sells, Unsaying, 9.  
380 Charles S. Peirce, “The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,“ in Collected 
Papers Vol. II. 
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The end result is that one’s habits of judgment and action may shift. This is true, also, of 
some apophatic texts, which may have as much doxological significance to the author as 
they do to a reader who may change their lives in response. If this dissertation is correct 
about McCarthy, then the importance of the literary experience is the effect such space-
clearing might have upon the reader’s moral, ethical, and existential life. The imaginative 
moral task one is faced with is relatively simple, if extremely difficult. What does one do 
in the face of the overwhelming arguments of the judge? What does one continue to value 
as all external values are paired away from the world, as is the case in The Road?  
While raising difficult moral problems, McCarthy’s apophatic mode also weakens 
the finality of despairing spiritual and moral conclusions by placing frightening 
existential dilemmas into subjunctive worlds awash in metaphorical significance.  
Literary critic Northrop Frye saw poetry, story, and metaphor as messengers “announcing 
a world beyond speech.”381 I have no more wish than McCarthy to declare of what such a 
world might consist. But setting aside questions of its final veracity, if poetic rhetoric has 
such a function, then several of McCarthy’s teachers are correct in their refrain that 
                                               
381 Frye’s complete claim is fairly bold:   
 Imaginative, metaphorical, poetic speech is about the limit with words. The 
kerygmatic, whether the Vico-Joyce thunderclap or the Blakean ‘Awake, ye dead, 
and come to Judgment!,’ is presented as verbal, but it's really announcing a world 
beyond speech. This world is first of all an alternation between experiencing as a 
unit & understanding without words, a larger entity: then it goes beyond that 
duality. 
See Northrop Frye, Northrop Frye’s Late Notebooks, 1982-1990: Architecture of the 
Spiritual World. ed., Robert D. Denham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 
715.  
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“rightly heard all tales are one” (TC 143).382 McCarthy’s tales are one because of a shared 
refusal to foreclose or determine final conclusions. 
 I have argued that McCarthy tends to burry within his rhetoric a nucleus of its 
own destruction. Yet insofar as their rhetoric is successful, these novels also attempt 
move the spectrum of what can be said. Anthropologist Roy Rappaport writes that, 
“language does not merely support the communication of what is conceived but expands, 
eventually by magnitudes, what can be conceived.”383 If considered in this light, 
McCarthy’s non-fictional prose suggests that language, thought, and experience are all 
fed by springs which are much dimmer and more indeterminate than may be rationally or 
emotionally comfortable for theories either of language or of mysticism. Conventional 
imaginative language obviously admits of vast swaths of grammatical and intelligible 
sense where there is no commensurate, determinate referent in the world. But “thought” 
may not be identical to the wide field of conventional sense that depends on the 
determinacy of an imaginative referent. Rather, the collapse of logical and metaphorical 
sense is an aesthetic sign, an indication, of what is beyond language, thought, and 
                                               
382 Frye’s sentiment is shared by Arendt, who argues that that the success of metaphor 
begins western philosophical thought by providing evidence that mind that apprehend 
invisible relationships in the world. Quoting Heraclitus, “’The god is the day night, 
winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger [all opposites, he is the nous]; he changes in 
the way that fire, when it is mixed with spices, is named according to the scent of each of 
them.’” Arendt argues that the intuition that this unifying fabric extended to the human 
mind was the plausible grounds for relying on its capacities in the search for truth: “It is 
in this context that the mind’s language by means of metaphor returns to the world of 
visibilities to illuminate and elaborate further what cannot be seen but can be said.” 
Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 108-9.  
383 Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5. 
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experience. There is of course no means by which to prove that an index refers beyond 
possible forms of evidences. But by practicing the language, performing it, contorting it 
into new shapes, it begins to point further and deeper into the world than was previously 
accessible without having undergone apophatic language’s “semantic events.”384385 Such 
reading, I suggest, is existentially dangerous—and spiritually poignant—because it can 
be cognitively exhausting, but also because it might be true and might change one’s life. 
If we look to the stakes raised in The Road, it may cost, at least hypothetically, one’s 
whole world. This cost, moreover, is paid without any guarantee of ever possessing the it 
toward which the textual annihilation so warily refers.  
 Much of the accounting in this conclusion has been, in part, owning up to the 
price of searching for an ineluctably missing referent. In text and in fiction, such a cost 
can be accounted at a slight remove. As readers we are allowed to experiment 
hypothetically and vicariously the potential moral and physical cost of engaging whatever 
lies beyond the “ground” of what we think we know. This project has shown that 
                                               
384 This is another articulation of Sells’ “meaning events. Sells, Unsaying, 9.  
385 As Linda Woodson argues in “Mapping The Road,” speech-act theory is operative in 
the moral, not just the semiotic or speculative branches of McCarthy’s novels.  
“In All the Pretty Horses, the Dueňa Alfonsa describes courage as a performative 
noun, as used in Austin's speech-act theory: ‘[t]hat the desire was the thing itself' 
(235). When the boy asks the man near the end of The Road what is the bravest 
thing he has ever done, the man replies facetiously, ‘Getting up this morning’ 
(229). That is, however, the essence of courage that is desire: desire to live, desire 
to protect, desire to keep going in the face of the insurmountable. When the boy 
expresses a desire to give up, the man encourages him to continue, ‘This is what 
the good guys do. They keep trying’ (116). Courage as a quality then becomes the 
desire itself, not its enactment in the stories of others,”  
Linda Woodson, “Mapping ‘The Road’ in Post-Postmodernism,” The Cormac McCarthy 
Journal 6, Special Issue: The Road (Autumn 2008): 87–97. 
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McCarthy is not merely cagey about that “beyond’s” identity and shape, but rather 
produces artifice that keeps its missing reference suspended. As McCarthy’s texts have 
been at pains to demonstrate, that reference is by definition not a thing, and if the 
apophatic mystics we have discussed are correct, it is technically not even an “it.” But the 
novels are at least in part an inquiry in pursuit of it, the non-thing that haunts them and 
that enlarges, as Peter Hawkins’ paradoxically puts it “our notion of what cannot be 
imagined.” By exhausting what little we can speak of and, even less, what we know, we 
catch glimpses of it on its own ground. It is not a thing named and it does not speak 
except indirectly or as a possibility that remains in the absence of a total linguistic 
foreclosure. As Frye suggests, McCarthy’s narrative apophasis announces another world, 
one that breaks words. Perhaps, one of which the wind itself is in terror, and this world 
cannot lose. 
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